CA Unpub Decisions

19-year-old Ronnie R., a college student living with his long-term foster family, appeals an order terminating his dependency case. Ronnie argues his best interests would be served by maintaining his status as a nonminor dependent. We affirm the juvenile court's order terminating Ronnie's dependency.

Kenneth Clark appeals from a judgment in favor of the California Insurance Guarantee Association (CIGA). Clark had obtained a judgment in a personal injury action against the insured of a now-insolvent insurance company. CIGA paid the underlying damage award but not the costs or interest on the judgment. Clark filed this direct action against CIGA pursuant to Insurance Code section 11580[1] to recover his costs and interest. The trial court granted CIGA's motion for summary judgment applying the reasoning of San Diego Housing Com. v. Industrial Indemnity Co. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 669 (San Diego Housing), which concluded costs and interest that are payable under the policy's supplemental payment provision are not recoverable by a third party judgment creditor in a direct action against the insurer. Clark contends San Diego Housing is inapplicable to the case at hand. We find no merit to his contentions and affirm the judgment.

This appeal is one small piece of the litigation ensuing from James Piper's claim that he is the victim of a real estate swindle by his former business associates, George Alvarez and Louis Trujillo. In broad overview, the story as told in the complaint is that Piper invested in a two-story office building in Irvine known as the Fitch Building. Then Alvarez or Trujillo forged his signature on various loan documents using the Fitch Building as security. The loans weren't paid, and Piper lost his investment. The main villains in the narrative are, of course, Alvarez and Trujillo, and entities purportedly controlled by them.
This appeal, however, concerns only Piper's claims against a lender, MKA Real Estate Opportunity Fund I (MKA). (To be precise, the case concerns the claims of Piper and a limited liability corporation known as â€

Plaintiff Donna Carlson Reeves appeals from the judgment entered in this wrongful death action after the trial court granted defendant Department of Transportation's (the Department) summary judgment motion. Reeves's husband died in a traffic collision that occurred as he attempted to turn left from a commercial driveway onto a four-lane road owned, designed, maintained, and controlled by the Department. Reeves's complaint alleged the road presented a dangerous condition because a curve near the driveway impaired the ability of drivers to see one another and the Department failed to post any signs warning of this hazard.
The Department moved for summary judgment on the ground the curve did not create a dangerous condition because the sight distances for drivers exiting the driveway and drivers traveling on the road exceeded all recommended design standards. Reeves argued triable issues existed on whether the median in the road and lane configuration directly in front of the driveway created a dangerous condition. The trial court, however, refused to consider whether the median or lane configuration created a dangerous condition and granted the Department's motion.
We agree the median and lane configuration cannot be considered in ruling on the Department's motion because Reeves's complaint failed to allege that these features contributed to the dangerous road condition. We affirm the trial court's ruling granting summary judgment because Reeves failed to present any evidence creating a triable issue on the dangerous condition she alleged in her complaint.

Petitioner in propria persona seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452 (rule 8.452) from the juvenile court's orders issued at a contested 24-month review hearing terminating his reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] hearing as to his three and two-year-old daughters, I. and U. We conclude his petition fails to comport with the procedural requirements of rule 8.452. Accordingly, we will dismiss the petition as facially inadequate.

Petitioner, in propria persona, seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) (rule 8.452) from the juvenile court's orders issued at a contested dispositional hearing denying her reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] hearing as to her three-month-old daughter, A. We conclude her petition fails to comport with the procedural requirements of rule 8.452. Accordingly, we will dismiss the petition as facially inadequate.

The juvenile court found that B.J., the minor, had committed felony vandalism when he defaced the truck of Josh G. He appeals arguing his counsel's failure to raise an objection to the adequacy of the Miranda (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436) warnings given to him prior to making incriminatory statements was ineffective assistance of counsel. He also claims that under the totality of the circumstances his confession was coerced and his counsel was ineffective in challenging the admissibility of his statement on constitutional grounds.

Appellant, Larry Richard Pitts, pled no contest to possession of oxycodone and endocet (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350) and was placed on probation for five years. Following several violations of probation, on September 24, 2010, the court sentenced Pitts to a two-year term.
On appeal, Pitts contends: 1) he is entitled to enhanced conduct credit pursuant to the amendment of Penal Code section 4019[1] that became effective on January 25, 2010, for time he spent in custody prior to and after that date; and 2) the court violated his plea bargain. We will affirm.

During the evening of June 23, 2007, appellant Pedro Trujillo and his nephew, appellant Jose Trujillo, committed a drive-by shooting that left one man dead and two women wounded.[1] They were convicted after jury trial of, inter alia, murder and attempted murder. Together, appellants raise two claims of instructional error. Jose separately challenges the sufficiency of the evidence proving his guilt as an aider and abettor and raises an additional claim of instructional error. We have considered all of these contentions and conclude they either lack merit or, alternatively, any error was harmless. Consequently, we will affirm.[2]

This court granted a petition for writ of review filed by the County of Kern (Kern) to inquire into and determine whether the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) erred in concluding a volunteer firefighter with a local nonprofit firefighting organization was a county employee for purposes of workers' compensation coverage within the meaning of Labor Code section 3361.[1] (§ 5950; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.495.) Kern contends it never provided the organization with either the â€

D.A. (minor) (born June 2008) came to the attention of the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the department) on February 18, 2010, when paternal grandfather (grandfather) called the police; J.A. and L.A. (mother & father, respectively; collectively â€

Defendant and appellant K.P. appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her son, N.P. (We will use single initials hereafter.) She contends that she was denied due process when the juvenile court failed to continue the combined hearing on her petition to modify the order terminating her reunification services and the hearing on termination of parental rights, and that the court failed to act in N.'s best interests when it denied her request to continue the combined hearing. She also contends that the juvenile court erred in denying her petition for modification and in finding that an exception to the preference for adoption did not apply.
We will affirm the order.

On November 1, 2010, a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 alleged that S.Z. (the minor) came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), because he violated the terms and conditions of his probation. The minor was charged with (1) using marijuana, a violation of probation conditions 2 and 11 (allegations 1 & 2); (2) failing to attend â€

Defendant and appellant Jesse Lee Huggins appeals following the revocation and termination of his probation. Citing Penal Code section 1210.1 (Proposition 36),[1] defendant contends the trial court erred as a matter of law when it terminated his probation and sentenced him to prison. Defendant also seeks remand for a new sentencing hearing on the issue of conduct credits, because he believes the trial court erred when it declined to grant him any credits.