P. v. Salter
Filed 12/12/12 P. v. Salter CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as
specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE
DISTRICT
(San
Joaquin)
----
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
DONALD SALTER, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
C069935
(Super. Ct. No.
SF107670A)
On August 25, 2008, defendant Donald
Salter, Jr., pleaded guilty to three counts of
1, 2008, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and
placed defendant on five years’ formal probation with a 360-day jail term.
On July 27, 2009, the trial court found
defendant violated his probation and imposed a two-year
and reinstated probation with a 60-day jail term.
On November 29, 2011, defendant
admitted violating probation and the trial court executed the suspended
two-year prison term.
On appeal,
defendant contends that the prospective application of the Criminal Justice
Realignment Act of 2011 (Realignment Act; Stats. 2011, ch. 15) violates his
right to equal protection of the law. We
affirm.
DISCUSSION
The facts
of defendant’s crime are unnecessary to resolve this appeal.
Under the
Realignment Act, felons are confined to county jail instead of state prison
unless they have a current or prior serious or violent felony conviction, or
are required to register as a sex offender, or are subject to the aggravated
white collar crime enhancement.
(§ 1170, subd. (h)(1)-(3).)
The
Realignment Act would apply to defendant but for the date of his
sentencing. “The sentencing changes made
by the act that added this subdivision shall be applied prospectively to any
person sentenced on or after October 1,
2011.†(§ 1170,
subd. (h)(6).)
Defendant
argues that the prospective application of the Realignment Act violates his
punishment, but instead confers a liberty interest that must be extended to all
similarly situated individuals absent a compelling state interest. Claiming that no compelling state interest
supports prospective application, defendant concludes that the judgment should
be reversed and he should be resentenced under the Realignment Act.
Felons
sentenced under the Realignment Act are committed to county jail instead of
state prison (§ 1170, subd. (h)(1)-(2)), may have a concluding portion of
their sentences suspended in lieu of probation (§ 1170, subd. (h)(5)), and
are not subject to parole (§ 3000 et seq.). This constitutes a reduction in punishment
for the affected crimes.
A criminal
defendant does not have a fundamental liberty interest in the retroactive
application of a statute reducing the punishment for a crime. (Baker
v. Superior Court (1984) 35 Cal.3d 663, 668-669.) A defendant’s right to equal protection of
the law does not prevent the Legislature from determining that a change in the
law reducing the punishment for a crime shall be applied on or after a
specified date. (People v. Floyd (2003) 31 Cal.4th 179, 188;
542, 546.)
We held
that prospective application of the Realignment Act did not violate a
defendant’s equal protection rights in People
v. Lynch (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 353, 362.
We reject defendant’s contention for the reasons stated herein and in
our opinion in Lynch.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
RAYE , P. J.
We concur:
MURRAY , J.
HOCH , J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
