Conservatorship of
Filed 1/17/13
Conservatorship of Sanford CA2/8
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule
8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
Conservatorship
of the Person of JASON STEVEN SANFORD.
B236302
AUDREY HUGHES,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
STEPHEN
SANFORD et al.,
Objectors and Appellants.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BP126115)
APPEAL
from an order of the Superior Court of
County. Mitchell
Beckloff, Judge. Affirmed.
Stephen
Sanford, Susan Sanford, in pro. per., for Objectors and Appellants.
Audrey
Hughes, in pro. per., for Petitioner and Respondent.
________________________________
Appellants
Stephen and Susan Sanford challenge a trial court order appointing Audrey
Hughes as limited conservator of Jason Sanford.
Jason is Stephen Sanford’s son, and Susan Sanford’s stepson.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In
December 2010, Audrey Hughes petitioned to be appointed the limited conservator
of the person of Jason Sanford. Hughes
represented she was Jason’s legal guardian.
The petition alleged Jason has a developmental disability as defined in
Probate Code section 1420,
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] and further asserted he is
unable to provide for his needs for physical health, food, clothing, or
shelter. At the time, Jason was under
the jurisdiction of the dependency court.
In
January 2011, psychiatrist
Pablo Davanzo submitted an evaluation and letter to the court. Davanzo treated Jason between 2006 and
2010. Davanzo reported Jason had been
diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder and paraphilia. Jason had a history of “recurrent episodes of
grandiosity, hypervigilance . . . flight of ideas, irritability, paranoid
ideation and somatization anxiety in the context of poor intermittent
medication compliance.†Davanzo noted
Jason had at times “presented with voiced homicidal ideation,†although this
improved following a change in medication.
Davanzo further reported that at age 16, Jason demonstrated “intense
sexual urges, fantasies, and behaviors that involve unusual activities . . .
and situations . . . began to cause clinically significant distress and
impairment in social areas of functioning.â€
Davanzo recommended Jason be placed in a residential facility.
In
late January 2011, Jason’s appointed counsel reported that while his client did
not oppose the establishment of a conservatorship, he was unable to decide
whether he wanted Hughes or Susan, his stepmother, to serve as
conservator. In February 2011, Stephen
Sanford petitioned to be appointed Jason’s conservator. Sanford’s petition alleged: “The juvenile court removed [Hughes] as my
son’s legal guardian on 2-1-11 and my son wants to live
with me and my wife and wants us to be his conservators. My son has made progress and is now able to
cook his own meals and drive a car. He
is now 18 years old and wants his father and/or his stepmother for
conservators.â€
In
March 2011, Jason’s counsel filed a supplemental report with the court. He reported that Jason understood he
needed a conservator and wanted the court to appoint his father, or his
stepmother as a second choice. Hughes
was Jason’s third choice. Jason also
wanted to live closer to his father.
Counsel recommended that if the court appointed Hughes as conservator,
it also direct her to find a suitable placement acceptable to Jason and closer
to Sanford. Counsel further suggested
it would be preferable if Hughes had no financial interest in the new
placement.
In April 2011,
Hughes filed an opposition to Sanford’s petition to be appointed limited conservator. Hughes alleged Sanford had served
a seven-year prison term in connection with the death of his infant son. Hughes also alleged that Sanford failed or
refused to understand Jason’s disability and his related limitations. She detailed several instances in which Sanford minimized
the significance of Jason’s inappropriate behavior. Hughes contended Susan would also be an
ineffective conservator because Sanford “dominated†her, and she had health issues that might impede her
ability to effectively serve as a conservator.
Hughes asserted she received no financial benefit from having Jason
placed in a home affiliated with her nonprofit organization.
In
May 2011, Sanford filed an objection to Hughes’s petition for conservatorship. Sanford alleged Hughes had been overly restrictive in limiting his visits
with Jason. He asserted Jason did
not want Hughes to serve as his conservator, and that he and Susan were willing
and able to care for Jason. Sanford further
alleged Jason’s “diminished capacity is greatly exaggerated,†Hughes had a
“harsh and negative†outlook on Jason, and he requested that the court appoint
him or Susan as the conservator, or choose a new independent conservator.
The
probate court held an evidentiary hearing over four days between June and
August 2011. Hughes and Sanford, both
representing themselves, presented evidence, as did Jason. We briefly summarize the testimony most
relevant to this appeal.
Hughes’s Evidence
Hughes called Sanford as her
first witness. Sanford testified
he felt Jason needed love and the care of a father, good guidance, and someone
to care for him. When asked if Jason
needed a conservator, Sanford responded: “That’s kind of a gray area with me because recently I’ve
seen him mature. And to the point where
he is now, I think he can make it on his own.
However, I’m willing to be the conservator to provide any extra advice
he might request as far as medical things go.â€
Sanford admitted he had not had physical custody of Jason since 1995. Sanford also admitted that when told about Jason’s sexually inappropriate
behavior—such as telling older women they aroused him—Sanford commented
that famous people do similar things without repercussions.
A
manager with Hughes’s residential program testified. She had known Jason for 13 years. The manager indicated Jason talked about
Hughes as if she were his mother, and he had recently said he would still like
to be part of Hughes’s family if he could not live with his father. The manager recalled that beginning in 2007,
Jason exhibited inappropriate sexual behavior such as masturbating with the
door open, making sexual comments to women at home or in public, and it was
reported that he inappropriately touched a young girl on the bus. The manager also testified that between one
and two and a half years earlier, Jason had episodes when he was eliminating
into a laundry basket or closet instead of a toilet. The manager recounted a recent visit Jason
had with Sanford at which Sanford told Jason he ran away when he was 18 or 19
years old and was under court supervision, then returned, and the legal system
“didn’t do anything†to him. Sanford made his
comments around the same time that Jason had talked about running away from his
foster home.
A
behavior analyst who had periodically worked with Jason since he was four years
old, also testified. The analyst opined
that Jason tended to misread social situations and sometimes acted so as to
elicit a strong, or shocked, reaction.
The analyst further opined that Jason’s conservator should be a person
with some knowledge of “pervasive development disorders.†She indicated this knowledge would allow the
conservator to predict situations that might present problems for Jason in
connection with his living environment.
Jason
testified he considered Hughes a mother figure.
Hughes testified
Jason was first placed in her group home when he was three years old. He lived in Hughes’s home intermittently over
the years that followed. Eventually
Hughes became Jason’s legal guardian.
Hughes testified she was concerned that Sanford did not want to accept
Jason’s limitations, and Sanford inaccurately attributed Jason’s behaviors to
him not having enough freedom, or his lack of acceptable sexual activity. Hughes also noted Sanford felt Jason should
be allowed to drive a car, but, according to Hughes, Jason has “slow processing
reactive time,†and requires supervision around traffic because “he doesn’t
necessarily pay attention to the traffic laws.
He has run out into the street without looking, has almost gotten hit by
a car.†Hughes expressed concern that
Sanford would give Jason too much freedom too quickly.
Hughes
further testified she felt Jason needed to have monitored visits with Sanford. She explained that if appointed Jason’s
conservator, she would include him in all decisions and she wanted him to be an
active participant in his own life.
Sanford called
Susan as a witness. In response to
questions from the court, Susan described a “wrap-around†meeting she attended
that she found confusing. Susan
testified the participants “were saying things about Jason that sometimes I
didn’t understand why they were talking about, what they were talking
about.†When the court asked if Susan
thought Jason had any behavioral issues, Susan responded: “I’m not totally sure
about all of that.â€
Jason
testified that he would prefer living in a residential facility in Santa Monica
near Sanford to living with Hughes. He
explained the reason for his preference: “Because I can finally stretch my
wings and feel like an independent man which I already – I’m a man already, and
I shouldn’t be locked up in my parents’ house all day. I feel like if I’m on my own, I can start
afresh.†He admitted on
cross-examination that he had recently called Hughes numerous times because he
wanted to find out how the court process would work.
Sanford
testified in his own presentation of evidence.
Sanford opined that Jason had matured and “a diagnosis is not written in
stone.†Sanford asked that he or Susan
be appointed conservators, or that the court request an Evidence Code section
730 evaluation “to determine what level Jason is at now.â€
“[Hughes] passed a life sentence on Jason years ago, and she won’t change
now. [Hughes] said in front of my wife
and I, Jason is never going to amount to anything. I think her entire attitude is harsh and
negative. Jason has matured over the
years and is now ready and mature enough to make it on his own or with the help
of my wife and I.†On cross-examination,
Sanford testified he thought Jason could “make it on his own,†but he would
“adopt the role as a conservator if so granted.†In response to a question from the court as
to whether Sanford thought Jason had any behavioral issues, Sanford said he
thought there were issues in the past, but now “nothing. He’s demonstrated no wrong things to
me.†When asked why Sanford applied to
be the conservator if he felt Jason did not need one, Sanford responded: “Well,
your honor, because in the view of professionals, if they deem that he does
need a conservator, then I would like to be that conservator. But I’m – in my layman’s viewpoint here, I
think he has matured enough where he may not really need a conservator.â€
Jason’s
Evidence
In response to
questions from his own counsel, Jason testified his first choice for
conservator was Sanford, his second choice Susan. He testified he wanted the
power to decide where he would live, the power to control access to his
confidential records, the power to consent to marriage, and the power to
control his social relationships. He
consented to have his father or Susan have the power to enter into contracts,
give consent for medical treatment, and make decisions about his education on
his behalf.
Although he was
represented by counsel, Jason regularly interrupted throughout the proceedings
to respond to witness testimony or ask questions.
In August 2011,
the trial court issued a ten-page decision.
The court concluded that although Sanford had priority under Probate
Code section 1810 as Jason’s nominee, appointing Sanford as conservator would
not be in Jason’s best interests. The
court reasoned:
“Father has an extremely naïve view of his son’s circumstances and
needs. Father’s contact with the
Proposed Conservatee throughout the Proposed Conservatee’s life has been
minimal and has always been supervised over the last fifteen years. Father’s refusal to acknowledge his son’s
significant issues would put the Proposed Conservatee at risk of harm in the
community. As Father does not appreciate
his son’s issues, Father could not know and predict what situations were likely
to be problematic for the Proposed Conservatee and therefore Father likely
would not provide necessary structure and support to avoid problems for the
Proposed Conservatee in the community.
[¶] There is no question that
Father loves his son. Nonetheless,
Father has chosen not to learn about his son’s needs. Father’s lack of knowledge about his son’s
needs makes him an unwise choice as conservator. He really has no plan to assist the Proposed
Conservatee with maximizing his independence.
[¶] Father’s wife is similarly
situated. The court has no doubt that
she is well intentioned. Nonetheless,
her history with the Proposed Conservatee is minimal. There was no evidence produced that Father’s
wife has any appreciation for the Proposed Conservatee’s needs. [¶] In
the court’s view, Father, his wife, and Ms. Hughes are not equally qualified to
serve. There is no question that Ms.
Hughes is the most qualified person before the court to serve as conservator.â€
In
reaching a decision, the court considered a regional center report issued
pursuant to Probate Code section 1827.5.
Although the report is not included in the record on appeal, the trial
court summarized it in the decision. The
report described Jason as “ ‘an 18 year-old young man with a diagnosis of a
condition similar to that of an individual with
Schizophrenia Paranoid type.’ †The
regional center recommended a limited conservator be given five of seven powers
pursuant to Probate Code section 2351.5.
The report noted the center believed Jason “has a ‘limited ability to
follow directives,’ has deficient independent living skills, cannot identify
educational goals, and engages in inappropriate social behaviors.†The report recommended that Jason not have
the power to control social and sexual relationships because “ ‘of his past
history of inability to judge whether a relationship is platonic as well as his
inability to not become sexually explicit both verbally and at times physically
with females that are in his environment.
Jason engages in inappropriate relationships and he does demonstrate
unsafe choice making in this area. Jason
can and has in the past approached adult women and attempted to touch
them. Jason may inadvertently place
himself in a dangerous situation where people will not be aware of his deficits
and his actions may lead to altercations with strangers.’ â€
The court denied
Sanford’s petition to be appointed conservator and overruled the objections to
Hughes’s petition. The court appointed
Hughes as limited conservator and granted her all powers under Probate Code
section 2351.5, subdivision (b).
This
appeal timely followed.
name="_ftnref5" title="">[5]
DISCUSSION
as Limited Conservator
Appellants
contend the trial court erred in denying their petitions seeking appointment as
Jason’s conservator. They argue the
trial court improperly ignored Jason’s request that they serve as his
conservators instead of Hughes. We find
no error.
The Probate Code
sets forth guidelines for the trial court’s selection of a conservator. Under Probate Code section 1810, “[i]f the
proposed conservatee has sufficient capacity at the time to form an intelligent
preference, the proposed conservatee may nominate a conservator in the petition
or in a writing signed either before or after the petition is filed. The court shall appoint the nominee as
conservator unless the court finds that the appointment of the nominee is not
in the best interests of the proposed conservatee.â€
Nominations
aside, under Probate Code section 1812, subdivision (a), the selection of a
conservator is solely in the discretion of the court.
the court is to be guided by what appears to be the best interests of the
proposed conservatee.†(Prob. Code, §
1812, subd. (a).) Probate Code section
1812, subdivision (b) provides that, “of persons equally qualified in the opinion of the court to appointment as
conservator,†the court is to give greater preference to a parent of the
proposed conservatee than to an unrelated person. (Prob. Code, § 1812, subd. (b)(3), italics
added.) Yet, “while statutory law gives
preference to spouses and other persons related to the conservatee [(Prob.
Code, § 1812, subd. (b))], who might know something of the conservatee’s health
care preferences, the law also permits the court in its sole discretion to
appoint unrelated persons and even public conservators (ibid.).†(
Cal.4th 519, 545.)
Here, the trial
court explicitly construed Jason’s expressed preference for either appellant to
serve as his conservator as a valid nomination under Probate Code section
1810. But the court also found that
appointing Sanford or Susan as Jason’s conservator would not be in his best
interests. We review that finding for
substantial evidence. This means
“we view the entire record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
findings. [Citations.] We must resolve all conflicts in the evidence
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the findings. [Citation.]
Substantial evidence is evidence of ponderable legal significance.†(Conservatorship
of Ramirez (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 390, 401.)
Substantial
evidence supported the trial court’s finding.
There was evidence that Jason suffers a significant developmental
disability and needed a conservator.
(Prob. Code, §§ 1420, 1801, subds. (a), (d)). However, there was also evidence that
appellants did not understand the scope of Jason’s limitations, and that they
had not attempted to learn about his disability. Susan testified she did not really know
anything about Jason’s condition or behavioral issues. Sanford’s testimony also suggested he
minimized the impact of Jason’s disability on his ability to function
independently. Indeed, Sanford concluded
Jason had matured to a point that he did not need a conservator. But evidence offered at the hearings
indicated Sanford’s conclusions were inaccurate. Sanford felt Jason was ready to drive a car;
Hughes presented competing evidence that Jason would not be able to drive a car
safely. There was evidence Sanford
thought Jason needed a normal sexual relationship to put an end to his
inappropriate sexual behavior; Davanzo’s letter suggested Jason’s sexual acting
out was a psychiatric issue that needed to be addressed with treatment. The regional center’s report opined Jason
could not live independently and was potentially at risk of harm because of his
inappropriate social behaviors. Since
neither Sanford nor Susan demonstrated an understanding of the conditions that
created a need for a conservatorship, the trial court could reasonably conclude
appointing them as conservators would not be in Jason’s best interests.
There was also
Hughes were not equally qualified, making the preference under Probate Code
section 1812, subdivision (b)(3) inapplicable.
The behavior analyst opined it would be important for Jason’s
conservator to have some understanding of developmental disabilities, or for
the person to acquire that knowledge.
Appellants offered no evidence suggesting they had experience making
decisions for persons with disabilities
or psychiatric diagnoses similar to Jason’s. In addition, they had spent only limited
time with Jason, much of it monitored, and there was evidence they did not
understand the scope of his limitations or behavioral issues. Jason had not lived with Sanford since he was
three years old.
In contrast,
Hughes was well qualified to serve in the role.
She had known Jason since he was a young child, was involved in
procuring treatment and services for him, and she had served as his legal
guardian. Jason had lived in her home
intermittently. Hughes also worked with persons
with developmental disabilities as a vocation.
Although Jason desired more freedom, he also acknowledged he had a bond
with Hughes, and still relied on her for advice and guidance.
Much
of appellants’ argument on appeal concerns allegations that Jason’s current
living situation is inappropriate.
However, it appears that the events described in the appellate briefing
took place after the court issued the conservatorship order challenged in this
appeal. In general, we review an order
based on the circumstances as they were at the time the order was rendered, and
we do not consider events occurring later.
(Vons Companies, Inc. v.
Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3.) No exceptions to this rule apply here.
To
the extent appellants’ argument is that Jason’s living arrangements at the time
of the conservatorship order were inappropriate, and were evidence that
appointment of Hughes was an abuse of discretion, we disagree. Although Jason was experiencing difficulties
in the residential placement Hughes had arranged, there was still significant
evidence that Hughes was well qualified to serve as conservator, as described
above. The court was aware of the
problems Jason was having in his home, and explicitly suggested different living
arrangements might be beneficial. The
trial court could reasonably conclude that, despite the problems with Jason’s
residential placement, appointing Hughes as Jason’s limited conservator was in
his best interests. There was
no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The
trial court order is affirmed. Each
party to bear its own costs on appeal.
BIGELOW,
P. J.
We concur:
RUBIN,
J.
FLIER,
J.
Sanford by their first names, and to Stephen Sanford by his last name, or to
Stephen and Susan Sanford collectively as “appellants.â€
disability†as follows: “[A] disability which originates before an individual attains age 18,
continues, or can be expected to continue, indefinitely, and constitutes a
substantial handicap for such individual. As defined by the Director of
Developmental Services, in consultation with the Superintendent of Public
Instruction, this term includes mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy,
and autism. This term also includes handicapping conditions found to be closely
related to mental retardation or to require treatment similar to that required
for mentally retarded individuals, but does not include other handicapping
conditions that are solely physical in nature.â€
