P. v. Denton
Filed 1/29/14 P. v. Denton CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a),
prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified
for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD
APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sierra)
----
THE
PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
STEVEN
ANTHONY DENTON,
Defendant and
Appellant.
C072568
(Super. Ct. No.
CR02937X)
Defendant
Steven Anthony Denton pled no contest to arson in exchange for dismissal of an
on-bail/own recognizance allegation as well as dismissal of case No. CR02911X
(felony vandalism). The court granted
probation for a term of five years and ordered defendant to register as an
arson offender.
Defendant
appeals. A certificate of
jurisdiction to accept his plea and enter judgment because there was a doubt as
to his competence. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
On
April 29,
2012, a brush fire burned one-eighth of an
acre, a wooded area with heavy forest undergrowth, near the Loyalton Senior
Apartments. No one was injured and no
structures were damaged. According to
witnesses, defendant had been seen in the area before the fire started. Based on prior contacts, deputy sheriffs knew
that defendant suffered from mental illness and had exhibited violent behavior. Later that evening, deputy sheriffs located
defendant, transported him to the substation and, after having advised him of
his rights pursuant to
defendant initially denied any involvement in the fire, he eventually admitted
that he caused the fire: “ ‘I tried
to put the fire out. It was an accident;
I didn’t do it on purpose. . . . I wanted to camp out . . . . I’m sorry it caused such a big fire.’ †He denied setting other fires: “ ‘No, I have not. That was just an accident fire, today; I was
afraid to tell the truth, I was afraid of the consequences.’ †He also stated many times that he tried to extinguish
the fire and that he had lit a small twig and the fire just grew. When he was told he was being arrested for
arson, defendant initially resisted being handcuffed but once secured, he
cooperated.
DISCUSSION
Defendant
contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to accept his plea and enter
judgment. He argues the trial court had
a mandatory duty to suspend criminal
proceedings and institute Penal Code
We reject defendant’s contention, finding no
create a reasonable doubt that defendant was unable to understand the
proceedings or to assist counsel in the
conduct of a defense in a rational manner.
I
The
prohibition against trying a mentally incompetent defendant “is fundamental to
an adversary system of justice.†(Drope v.
Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 172 [43 L.Ed.2d 103, 113].) The competency test is “ ‘whether [the
defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding --- and whether he has a rational
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ †(Dusky v.
United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402 [4 L.Ed.2d 824, 825].)
“State
constitutional authority is to the same effect.
[Citation.] [¶] The applicable state statutes essentially
parallel the state and federal constitutional directives.†(People v.
Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 691.)
Section 1367 provides in relevant part: “(a) A
person cannot be tried or adjudged to punishment while that person is
purposes of this chapter if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental
disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal
proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational
manner.†A defendant is presumed to be
mentally competent to stand trial.
(§ 1369, subd. (f).) If a
doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to the mental competence of the
defendant, the judge shall suspend the criminal proceedings and order that the
question of the defendant’s mental competence be determined at a hearing after
the defendant has been examined by an appropriate
Even
if the judge believes the defendant is competent based on the judge’s own
observations, the judge must, on the court’s own motion, declare a doubt and
suspend proceedings when the court becomes aware of substantial evidence of
mental incompetence. (
66 Cal.2d 508, 518; People v.
Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1153.)
“[E]vidence
of a defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior
medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant in determining
whether further inquiry is required, but that even one of these factors
standing alone may, in some circumstances, be sufficient. There are, of course, no fixed or immutable
signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine
fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range
of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.†(Drope v. Missouri, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 180
[43 L.Ed.2d at p. 118].) “ ‘[M]ore
is required to raise a doubt than mere bizarre actions [citation] or bizarre
statements [citation] or statements of defense counsel that defendant is
incapable of cooperating in his defense [citation] or psychiatric testimony
that defendant is immature, dangerous, psychopathic, or homicidal or
defendant’s ability to assist in his own defense.’ †(People v.
Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 527, italics added.) A court considers all relevant circumstances
as well as counsel’s opinion. (
1 Cal.4th 1132, 1164.)
When
substantial evidence exists, the judge has no discretion on whether to order a
competency hearing. (
acted in excess of his or her jurisdiction, depriving the defendant of a fair
trial and rendering that resulting judgment a nullity. (Id.
at pp. 70-71.)
II
At
the April 30,
2012, arraignment on the complaint, public
defender J. Lon Cooper was appointed and defendant entered a not guilty
plea. The court ordered an assessment at
“Alta Sierra Center†(Alta), noting defendant’s special mental health and medical needs
and the requirement of supervision.
There is no reporter’s transcript of this proceeding, only case history
notes.
On
May 9,
2012, the probation officer filed a bail
report recounting defendant’s family history, employment history, and other
information which was obtained from defendant’s social worker and confirmed by
defendant’s mother. With respect to
defendant’s family history, defendant’s mother was “abused by his father on a
regular basis†and defendant probably “witnessed this on multiple
occasions.†As far as employment,
defendant “worked a number of small jobs†and “[a]s long as he was taking his
medications, he reportedly performed quite well.†Under other information, the probation
officer recounted that defendant suffered brain trauma twice, the first time
when he was four years old (fell from a second story balcony) and the second
time when he was 14 years old (hit by a car).
He was also sexually abused when he was in second grade and as a result,
he attempted suicide by hanging. When he
was 15 years of age, he shot and killed his nine-year-old brother when they
were playing with a loaded firearm.
Defendant was not charged but it was never confirmed whether it was an
accident. Defendant started experiencing
auditory and visual hallucinations when he was 14 and was diagnosed as a
schizophrenic when he was 15. He has
attempted suicide more than 10 times, the latest in February 2012, having never
recovered from his brother’s death according to his mother. At 18, he started living on his own and was
placed in housing in Loyalton. Defendant
has had psychotic episodes and has been in a mental hospital six times in the
last five years, staying from two weeks to five months each time. Defendant’s mother “doesn’t think [defendant]
fully comprehends the court process. She
says he realizes he is in trouble but otherwise does not understand what is
happening in court or what the consequences are. His social worker says that he responds best
to very short and direct questions, but is easily confused by compound/complex
questions. His IQ is approximately
62. That being said, his mother did say
he received a high school diploma through the special education program.†Based on defendant’s social history, it was the
probation officer’s opinion that it was
a “tragic case†and that defendant should remain in custody or possibly be released
to a locked mental facility.
On
May 11,
2012, defendant appeared with attorney Cooper
who advised the court that defendant would waive his right to a preliminary
hearing. The court found that defendant
understood and waived his rights and held him to answer. Again, there is no reporter’s transcript of
this proceeding, only case history notes.
At
the May 25, 2012, arraignment on the information, defendant appeared with Cooper
who waived formal reading of the information,
commenting that defendant “understands what the charges are,†and
advisement of his rights and consequences, and entered a not guilty plea on
defendant’s behalf. (Italics added.) Cooper advised that time was not waived and
that he needed an assessment in order to assist defendant: “[Defendant] is waiting to get an
assessment. And, really, in terms in
which I can assist my client, I have to get that assessment. I don’t know why it has taken weeks and weeks
and weeks. But it needs to be done in
terms of his possible placement. He is
tired of sitting and waiting around in jail, and I don’t blame him. And I
also need a chance -- in terms of fully comprehending what he comprehends, it
is a real fine line as to whether he is clear about what is going on. So I’m not comfortable with that. So we need an assessment.†(Italics added.) The prosecutor noted that “if counsel is
concerned about whether or not the defendant is understanding what is going on,
a 1368 is appropriate, and get this suspended until we get a report.†Cooper responded that he was “aware of the
statutory vehicles†he could use but that “an assessment would be helpful†to
him and that he did not want to “just assume that this is the appropriate thing
to do . . . .â€
At
a pretrial conference on June 8, 2012, the parties
discussed a time waiver for purposes of completing the “psyche
evaluation.†Cooper stated, “I have
talked to [defendant] somewhat. I do
believe he understands the significance of a time waiver, which is no time
waiver. I think he is capable of
entering a time waiver today for a limited period. We have discussed the details. He is in custody . . . I believe he
is willing to waive time to [July 18].
I suggest that date, because he met with someone out at the California
Regional Services for a couple of hours.
They interviewed him, and his [p]syche evaluation is for June 26. I would like to have the benefit of the
information obtained in that, so it would assist me.†The court confirmed with defendant that he
understood his right to a trial within 60 days, and that he waived his right
until July 13 (the first law and motion date after June 26).
At
the pretrial conference on July 13, 2012, due to a
“Sheriff’s office problem,†defendant was not transported to be personally present
but was in custody and attended via video conference. Defendant stated that he could hear the judge
and would let the judge know when he could not hear, and responded “[g]oodâ€
when asked how he was doing. Cooper had
“just been handed a copy†of a “letter
from Alta California Regional Center,†(italics added) not an “assessment,†which indicated that
defendant qualified for their services.
Cooper noted that the prosecutor was “not particularly happy about the
way this case is proceeding.†Cooper knew
that an evaluation was scheduled for June 26, had spoken with Alta about
the assessment, and “fully expected†to appear with defendant personally
present and with the assessment in hand, commenting if he thought he “needed to
do more to get that, [he] would have done so.â€
The prosecutor expected more than a letter as well. Cooper also noted that defendant had entered
a limited time waiver but “we can’t keep doing that,†and that Cooper “still
ha[d] nothing in front of [him] that helps [him] assess that this is a possible 1368 situation . . . , being
taken out of the criminal system to deal with [defendant’s] issues.†(Italics added.) The prosecutor concurred with Cooper’s
evaluation of the case and that Cooper needed the “[p]syche assessment to know what
is going on with [defendant],†noting that “Human Services got involved in this
early on.â€
writing in order to “feel comfortable saying to [defendant], do you want to
waive time.†Cooper requested that the
matter be set for trial and that a “pre-probation report†be prepared to
“assist us . . . and maybe by the time our next pretrial is set, we
will have . . . this assessment, whatever it is.†Cooper also stated that “we need all the
information for [defendant] that we can get†but that defendant did not “have
an issue†with further county time and then placement with Alta “because he has
special needs.†The prosecutor did not
object to a “pre-plea†report, noting that “people got involved in this that shouldn’t
get involved, to the detriment of [defendant].â€
Defendant confirmed that he understood that he had the right to go to trial
within 60 days and that he needed to “move ahead†with the case. Defendant agreed to a trial date of September 5, 2012, with the next pretrial on July 27 with the court’s assurance
that he would be transported and personally present. The court directed probation to prepare a
“pre-plea report†by July 27. The
court apologized to defendant that he was “not here today, you are supposed to
be.†Defendant responded, “I know. I thought so too. The time came and I couldn’t come to court,â€
and thanked the court for its apology.
In
the preplea report filed July 24, 2012, the
probation officer summarized not only the facts underlying the arson but also
those underlying a felony vandalism offense which occurred on February 14, 2012. Defendant was caught on
video kicking a vending machine at a market, causing extensive damage
(approximately $1,000). When asked about
the incident, defendant stated: “ ‘I
was out last night riding my bike. I was
in a bad mood last night so I took it out on the Coke machine. I know it was wrong and I am very sorry.
. . . I don’t know why I did
it but I have been feeling this way for the past two days. I have not been taking the medication; I know
I am supposed to take it. I kicked the machine
several times with my feet, then the lights went out in the machine and I
left. I was not trying to steal money
from the machine. I just wanted to
damage it.’ â€
The
probation officer also reported that on July 16, 2012, she obtained a copy
of the psychological evaluation performed on defendant by Jeffrey Miller and
completed on June 26, 2012, noting that the “primary purpose of the evaluation was to assess the defendant’s
intellectual and emotional functioning, his adaptive behavior skills in
order to clarify his diagnosis, assist in the determination of his eligibility
for Regional Center Services, and make recommendations concerning treatment and
residential placement.†(Italics added.) The probation officer reported that Miller
diagnosed defendant as having “Schizoaffective Disorder, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder,
Mild Mental Retardation with a full scale IQ of 53, Dependent Personality Traits,
Posttraumatic Brain Injury, Seizure Disorder, Von Willebrand Disease,
Hypertension, and Polycystic Kidney Disease.†The probation officer included
Miller’s recommendations: “That the
defendant access individual psychotherapy
and medication management focused on improving impulse and anger control;
upon release he should be placed in a care home or residential facility and
should not live independently at this time; and that he participate in a
vocational training program or a day program for developmentally disabled
adults.†(Italics added.) The probation officer reported that
ability to understand and participate in the court process due to his mild mental
retardation with an IQ of 53†and did not address what threat level
defendant poses to society. (Italics
added.) The probation officer did not
attach Miller’s evaluation and the same does not appear in the record on
appeal.
The
probation officer noted that on July 17, 2012, she spoke with Alta’s service
coordinator supervisor about defendant’s eligibility under the “category of
mild retardation,†the residential facility recommended defendant’s placement,
and the likelihood of defendant qualifying for the placement within 60 days.
The
probation officer also stated that when defendant did not take his
“psychotropic medications as prescribed, he engages in behaviors that have
resulted in the law violations pending before the court.†The probation officer considered it
“problematic†whether to recommend either probation or prison “[w]ithout a
determination as to the defendant’s ability to understand and participate in
the court process†as well as the risk he posed to society if released. It was the probation officer’s opinion that
it was “questionable†whether defendant had the ability to understand terms and
conditions but that “medication
compliance†(defendant took Abilify, lithium, and Haldol) was “critical†and
noted that when he took his medications, “[h]is behavior is under good
control.â€
On
July 27,
2012, defendant entered his plea to
arson. The court meticulously reviewed the
plea agreement with defendant, as well as defendant’s written plea form, and
defendant responded appropriately to all questions. Cooper stated that defendant took “a number of
medications†but Cooper felt defendant “clearly
understands what he is doing today,†having discussed it with defendant and
that the “medications would not affect his ability to comprehend what is
happening here today.†In defendant’s
plea form, reference is made to Miller’s evaluation dated June 26, 2012, for the list of medications.
Defendant confirmed that he heard what Cooper said and agreed that the
medications he was taking did not affect his ability to understand. Cooper confirmed that he was satisfied that
defendant understood his rights, defenses, and consequences of the case.
On
August 2,
2012, defendant was placed at a home care
facility in Sacramento. Alta’s service coordinator
supervisor advised probation that they were “lucky†to obtain placement for
defendant who now had a felony arson conviction with which he was not eligible
for Alta’s diversion program which guarantees two years of services paid
completely by Alta. Without diversion,
defendant would receive only eight mental health sessions through the county
mental health but paid for by Alta. Alta
hoped that defendant’s felony could be reduced to a misdemeanor so that he
could be enrolled in diversion. The
probation officer recommended probation.
At sentencing on September 14, 2012, defendant appeared and was not in custody. Cooper confirmed that there was no legal
cause why judgment should not be imposed.
Cooper commented that his concerns were the defendant’s “special needsâ€
but Cooper was “satisfied, from talking to [defendant], that he is happy with
the placement where he is†and that he is “getting counseling, as instructedâ€
and “wants to be successful with his probation.†Defendant had nothing to add. The court then granted probation. In discussing factors related to defendant,
the court noted “[w]hile the defendant’s IQ is 53, he appears able to
understand when given simple basic directives.â€
An Alta representative stated that defendant would receive help to
register as an arson offender but noted that such registration “will slow his
admission to any placement or any care home for him.†Defendant confirmed that he understood the
terms and conditions of probation as stated by the court and confirmed that he
agreed to be bound by them. When asked
if he had any questions about how he appealed after the court explained it,
defendant responded, “Not right now.â€
Defendant confirmed that he understood how to appeal.
In a letter to Cooper
dated October 22,
2012, after sentencing, an Alta intensive
intervention specialist explained that defendant wanted to appeal, claiming defendant
did not “understand what he was doing,†and after sentencing, “was unable to
explain what had just gone on in his hearing or in any of the previous
hearings.†The specialist also claimed
that defendant was “unable to explain what it meant to register as an arsonist
or what the result could potentially be if he didn’t comply with his conditions
of probation.†The specialist stated
that Alta “is concerned that [defendant] was not competent to stand trial and
was therefore, not competent to issue a plea or accept a plea agreement.†Based on defendant’s low IQ and impaired
memory, the specialist opined that “it is highly unlikely that he would have
been able to understand the criminal proceedings or the consequences of any
plea agreements he was being offered.â€
brought to your attention . . . , you reported . . . that
you felt [defendant] understood enough to go forward with his case.†(Italics added.) The specialist attached a note purportedly
written by defendant stating that he wanted to appeal and claiming he did not
understand what he was doing when he entered his plea.
III
Defendant
contends the trial court’s mandatory duty to suspend criminal proceedings and
institute section 1368 proceedings was “first triggered at arraignment†when
Cooper stated that he was not sure that defendant understood and that he needed
an assessment. Defendant claims the
trial court was next alerted when the preplea probation report stated that
defendant’s IQ was 53 (which raised a question about defendant’s competency)
and that the psychological evaluation did not address the issue. Defendant claims Cooper’s opinion that
defendant understood when he entered his plea “did not relieve the court of its
duty to suspend proceedings in light of the substantial evidence before it that
[defendant] was significantly developmentally disabled and suffering from
multiple mental disorders.â€
At
arraignment, Cooper stated that defendant understood what the charges were but
Cooper wanted the previously ordered assessment to ensure that defendant was
“clear about what is going on.†That
defendant’s IQ level of 53 indicated mild retardation did not negate the fact
that, according to his social worker, defendant understood short and direct
questions. Defendant also received a
high school diploma through a special education program. When defendant entered his plea he responded
appropriately to all questions and defense counsel felt that defendant
“clearly†understood the plea proceedings, his rights, defenses, and
consequences. At sentencing, Cooper
noted that defendant was “happy†with his placement. Defendant confirmed that he understood the
terms and conditions of probation and agreed to them. That an Alta specialist was of the opinion
over a month after sentencing that defendant had not understood when he entered
his plea and was sentenced does not change the evidence in the record which
reflects just the opposite. It is
defendant’s present ability at the time of trial and prior to judgment that is
significant in any competency determination.
(Dusky v.
disability, he obtained his high school diploma and understood short and direct
questions. He had a mental disorder but
the evidence indicated that as long as he took his medications, there were no
behavioral problems. We conclude that no
substantial evidence was presented indicating defendant’s inability to
understand the proceedings or to rationally assist Cooper in the conduct of the
case.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
ROBIE ,
J.
We concur:
BLEASE , Acting P. J.
MAURO , J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694].
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] All further section
references are to the Penal Code.
