CA Unpub Decisions

This case is before us for a second time. Pimentel was charged by amended information with possession for sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5)[1](count 1), cocaine ( 11351) (count 2), methamphetamine ( 11378) (count 3), and marijuana ( 11359) (count 4). He pleaded not guilty and was tried by a jury. After the jury deadlocked on all four counts, the trial court declared a mistrial. Pimentel was then retried. According to the evidence adduced at the second trial, on the evening of August 22, 2006, Officer Annette Razo and Detective Erik Armstrong of the Los Angeles Police Department were conducting an undercover narcotics surveillance at the corner of Slauson and Duarte Streets in Los Angeles. From their unmarked police car they saw Pimentel sitting in a chair outside a motorhome that was parked on the street. Using binoculars, Officer Razo watched Pimentel go in and out of the motorhome several times over a 15-minute period. She then noticed a dark sedan pull up next to the motorhome. The driver emerged and handed Pimentel some money. Pimentel went to the back of the motorhome, reached through a window and retrieved a small item that he gave to the driver.

The California Supreme Court directed us to vacate our decision in this case and to reconsider the cause in light of People v. Wagner (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1039 (Wagner). The conclusions in our original opinion are in line with Wagner. Those conclusions were and still are: (1) the speedy sentencing rights provided by Penal Code section 1381[1] apply to a probation revocation proceeding if imposition of sentence was originally suspended; (2) the trial court should have granted defendant Kevin Michael Daviss section 1381-based motion to dismiss his probation revocation proceeding for failing to sentence him within the 90-day period mandated by that section (and therefore that sentence must be vacated); and (3) under section 1387 the People may refile the probation revocation proceeding within defendants tolled period of probation.

Plaintiffs appeal from summary judgment rendered against them on their complaint of unlawful employment discrimination based on age in violation of the state Fair Employment and Housing Act. Undisputed evidence established that plaintiffs failed to file their required administrative complaint within the time mandated by statute. Court thus affirm the judgment against them.

Defendant Terry Meyers appeals from an order involuntarily recommitting him to an indeterminate term in the custody of the Department of Mental Health (the Department) as a sexually violent predator (SVP) pursuant to the amended Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600 et. seq.; further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.) He contends that the order must be reversed because (1) a prosecution experts testimony shifted the burden of proof on a critical element and must be discounted, which means the order is not supported by substantial evidence; (2) his recommitment was based upon the Departments illegal use of underground regulations in the evaluation and screening process; and (3) the amended SVPA violates various constitutional rights and provisions, including due process, the ex post facto clause, equal protection, and the First Amendment. Court shall affirm the judgment.

In this dependency case, the juvenile court sustained jurisdiction over three minors, removed them from their mothers custody, and ordered reunification services for the mother, who timely appealed. On appeal, the mother challenges the evidentiary basis for two components of those services. Court affirm.

Defendant John Beebe was convicted by a jury of seven counts of residential burglary (Pen. Code, 459),[1] three counts of attempted residential burglary (id., 459/664), possession of stolen property (id., 496, subd. (a)), possession of burglary tools (id., 466), possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)), and possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, 11364). He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 16 years eight months in state prison. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in admitting defendants confession at the police station, shortly after his arrest. We agree with defendant that the interrogating officer crossed the line into impermissible coercion and implied promises of leniency and that the trial court erred in admitting the confession. We shall reverse three counts of defendants conviction that were tainted by the admission of the illegal confession. Court shall affirm as to the remaining counts, which survive harmless error review.

Following an accusation issued by the Veterinary Medical Board of California (Board), an administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a proposed decision that sustained a single count of negligence against Joseph A. Humble, stayed revocation of his veterinary license, and placed him on probation for two years. The Board adopted the proposed decision, but reduced Humbles probation period to one year.
Humble appeals following the denial by the trial court of his petition for writ of administrative mandate, in which he sought to vacate the Boards decision. Humble contends the trial courts ruling is not supported by substantial evidence, the court erred in relying on the testimony of the Boards expert witness, and the case should be remanded for reconsideration of the penalty. Finding no merit in any of these contentions, Court shall affirm the judgment.

Defendant Stephen Michael Shade entered a plea of no contest to felony driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (a)) with three prior convictions in exchange for a state prison sentencing lid of the midterm of two years and the dismissal of the remaining counts and allegations. The court denied probation and sentenced defendant to state prison for two years. The court ordered defendant to pay various fees and fines including $500 for the cost of the preparation of the presentence report. On appeal, defendant challenges the courts order that he pay the cost of the presentence report, arguing that the trial court failed to comply with the procedural requirements of a separate hearing and a determination of defendants ability to pay. Defendant claims that the probation report, in recommending that the court order the $500 fee, did not evaluate defendants ability to pay. Defendant also claims that the record does not reflect that he waived his rights. Defendant further states: More importantly, the record does not show that the trial court conducted any evaluation of [defendants] ability to pay the cost of probation supervision. (Italics added.) Prior to the imposition of fees and fines, defendants attorney opined that defendants ability to pay any fees and fines would be nonexistent and requested that the court waive some of the discretionary ones. The prosecutor commented that the list of fees and fines in the probation report look[ed] like a too short list and that usually theres quite a bit more imposed.

D.M. (appellant), father of three of the minors and step father of the other two minors, appeals from the juvenile courts order granting a permanent restraining order against him. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 213.5, subds. (a) & (d); undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Appellant claims the court erred by issuing the restraining order. Disagreeing with this contention, Court shall affirm.

Accused of hitting a woman and making her suck his penis while he threatened to kick her ass if she bit him, defendant Brandon Bowden, Sr., entered a negotiated plea of no contest to one count of forcible oral copulation. (Pen. Code, 288a, subd. (c)(2); further section references are to the Penal Code.) Other charges against him were dismissed with a Harvey waiver (People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754). The trial court sentenced defendant to six years in state prison and imposed other orders. On appeal, defendant contends that the order requiring him to pay a $420 public defender fee must be reversed because the trial court failed to follow the statutory procedures required before such an order can be imposed. The People correctly concede the error.

In May 2007, a Chico police officer stopped defendant Matthew Gordon Casamajor, while defendant was driving his truck. Learning defendant was subject to probation search, the officer ordered defendant out of his truck and frisked him. After smelling marijuana on defendant, the officer searched the truck and found marijuana. Law enforcement authorities found a shotgun in the truck in the course of a later inventory search. Defendant has a prior felony conviction in Lassen County (case No. CR021427) for possession of a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a).) He was initially granted probation, but in April 2008, the Lassen County court revoked probation and sentenced defendant to three years in prison.

On November 20, 2007, Lisa Karnes noticed that a $600 check made out to her by an employer was missing. The check was deposited into the account of defendant, Brian Charles Sullivan, on November 26, 2007. Defendant was charged with forgery, petty theft having been previously convicted of theft, receiving stolen property, and grand theft of lost property. (Case No. 08F04503.) On February 5, 2008, officers stopped defendant for driving erratically. Methamphetamine was spread across the drivers seat, on the floor board, and in front of the rear passengers seat. Defendant was charged with multiple drug crimes. (Case No. 08F01524.)

L.C., the mother of minors L.C. and L.M., appeals from an order terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26; all further undesignated statutory references are to this code.) She contends that proper notice was not given under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and that there is insufficient evidence the minors are adoptable. We reject her second contention, but remand the matter to the juvenile court for further proceedings under the ICWA.

A jury found Marlo Duke Duran guilty ofstalking (Pen. Code,[1] 646.9, subd. (a)) (count 1), making a criminal threat as to victim Anita C. (Anita) ( 422) (count 2), making a criminal threat as to victim Donna S. ( 422) (count 3), making annoying telephone calls ( 653m, subd. (a)) (count 4), and violating a protective order ( 273, subd. (a)) (count 5).[2] After the jury returned its verdict, Duran admitted having suffered two prior strike convictions ( 667, subds. (c), (e)(2)(a), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)) and a prison prior ( 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced Duran to 25 years to life on count 1 and 25 years to life on count 3, to be served consecutively to the sentence on count 1. In addition, the court sentenced Duran to 365 days on count 4, to be served consecutively to the terms imposed on counts 1 and 3, and 365 days on count 5. The court specified that the term on count 5 be served concurrently to that imposed on count 4. The court also imposed a one-year sentence for the prison prior, to be served consecutively to the terms imposed on counts 1, 3, 4, and 5. The court imposed a sentence of 25 years to life on count 2, but stayed execution pursuant to section 654. The court sentenced Duran to a total aggregate term of 51 years to life in prison, plus an additional one year in any penal institution.