CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Alexandro Esquibel was convicted by plea of carrying a loaded, unregistered firearm in a vehicle in violation of Penal Code section 12031, subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2)(F)[1] and misdemeanor participation in a criminal street gang in violation of section 186.22, subdivision (a) after his motion to suppress evidence obtained following a traffic stop was denied. He was placed on three years formal probation and ordered to serve 180 days in county jail. On appeal, defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, contending that the traffic stop that led to police discovery of a loaded gun in a stash under his cars floorboard violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Court affirm.

Appellant R.H., mother of M.H., appeals from a juvenile court order selecting legal guardianship and supervised visitation as a permanent plan pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] The petition filed pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) alleged that M.H. had ingested a potentially lethal dose of Tylenol and had a serious fall from the familys second story balcony. The petition also alleged that M.H.s parents were not properly able to care for M.H. due to their problems with substance abuse and mental health. Initially, M.H. was left in her parents care, but after the parents missed drug tests, tested positive for drugs and father was arrested for domestic violence, the juvenile court ordered M.H. detained.
Shortly after M.H. was detained, mother threatened to kill the social worker. The court issued a restraining order, ordered reunification services and granted mother supervised visitation with M.H. Mother participated in reunification services for 18 months, during which time evidence came to light that M.H.s half brother (R.H.s son) had molested M.H.

In January 2008, defendant Anthony Coleman entered a plea of no contest to two felony counts, namely, willful failure to inform law enforcement of a new address as required for sex offenders, and willful failure to update sex offender registration within five days of his birthday. Defendant also admitted the allegation that he had previously suffered a felony conviction that constituted a violent or serious felony. He thereafter brought an oral motion to strike the prior serious felony conviction allegation, in accordance with People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero), which was opposed by the People. The court denied the Romero motion and sentenced defendant to a total term of 32 months in prison. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his (Romero)motion. Court conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion and therefore affirm.

Appellant L.L., father of L.L., appeals from a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] The child and his sibling were taken into protective custody after both parents were incarcerated. Father, who was incarcerated on a parole violation, had a history of domestic violence convictions. Mother was incarcerated on drug related charges.
The petition filed pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g) alleged that the child was at risk of physical harm due to mothers substance abuse, parents domestic violence, general neglect and incarceration. The juvenile court sustained the petition, placed the child in an out-of-home placement and ordered reunification services for the parents.

S.V. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court order denying her petition to modify (Welf. & Inst. Code, 388)[1] and a judgment terminating her parental rights and selecting adoption as the permanent plan ( 366.26) concerning her daughter S.W. (child) (born 2004). She contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her petition. And she challenges the evidence supporting the juvenile courts finding that the child likely would be adopted and rejection of her evidence and argument that the case came with the exceptions to termination described by section 366.26, subdivisions (c)(1)(B)(i) (no termination if termination would be detrimental to the child because the parents maintained regular visitation and the child could benefit from continuing the relationship), and (c)(1)(B)(v) (no termination if there would be substantial interference with a sibling relationship). Court affirm the order and judgment.

Defendant Floyd Robert Thomas appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after he pleaded guilty to four counts of forcible lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (b)(1)).[1] Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to 24 years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends that the imposition of a $300 fine pursuant to section 290.3 violated state and federal constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. For the reasons stated below, Court affirm.

Appellant K.M., mother of D.T., appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] D.T. and her sibling were originally taken into custody after mother was arrested for being under the influence of drugs.[2] They were again detained after mother hit D.T. on the hand with a hairbrush and was arrested for physical abuse against D.T. The juvenile court ordered the children detained and subsequently ordered family reunification services. At the contested 12 month review hearing, despite recent progress in her case plan, the juvenile court terminated services to mother and set the matter for a section 366.26 selection hearing. Visits between mother and D.T. continued, but after a few months, D.T. told her foster mother and social worker that she did not wish to visit her mother anymore and that she was happy where she was living. Mother filed a petition pursuant to section 388 requesting that the court reinstate reunification services based on her sobriety. After denying the petition, the court terminated all visitation between mother and D.T.

Appellant A.M., father of A.M., appeals from a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] The facts underlying the juvenile courts assumption of jurisdiction over the child are set out in further detail in this courts opinion in A.M. v. Superior Court, H033344.[2] In that case, we denied appellants petition for extraordinary writ challenging the juvenile courts order terminating reunification services. After our opinion was final, the case proceeded to a section 366.26 hearing to select a permanent plan. The Monterey Department of Social & Employment Services (Department) recommended that the court select adoption as a permanent plan. In a report filed before the hearing, the Department stated that the child had been placed with a prospective adoptive family since 2007 and both the family and child were happy and doing well together. The Department also recommended ongoing visits for the child with his siblings who were still in appellants care.

Plaintiff Malimos, L.L.C. (Malimos) appeals from the judgment entered for defendant Malibu Pier Partners, L.L.C. (MPP) after MPPs motion for summary judgment was granted on Malimoss first amended complaint for damages arising out of negotiations between the parties for a food and beverage concession at the Malibu Pier (Pier). Malimos contends that the court erred in granting summary judgment on its causes of action for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment. Court disagree and affirm the judgment.

In this breach of contract lawsuit, plaintiff and appellant Marina Glencoe, L.P. voluntarily dismissed its action against defendant and respondent Neue Sentimental Film, A.G. with prejudice. Appellant appeals the trial courts award of costs to respondent, arguing (1) the trial court erred by awarding respondent costs despite its unity of interests with co-defendants Neue Sentimental Film USA (NSF-USA) and Neue Sentimental Film N.Y., Inc. (NSF-NY); (2) equitable principles were not and should have been applied when the trial court awarded costs; and (3) respondent cannot be both a judgment debtor and a prevailing party.

We hold that because there was not a unity of interest between respondent on the one hand and NSF-USA and NSF-NY on the other, the trial court properly awarded costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032.[1] Because the award of costs was statutory not discretionary, the trial court correctly decided not to weigh equities. Res judicata precludes appellant from asserting that respondent is the alter-ego of NSF-USA and NSF-NY and should be treated as a judgment debtor rather than a prevailing party. The judgment awarding costs is affirmed.

Ultimax Cement Manufacturing Corporation (Ultimax) and Hassan Kunbargi (Kunbargi) appeal the summary judgment entered in favor Quikrete Companies, Inc. and Quikrete International, Inc. (collectively Quikrete) on the grounds that Ultimax and Kunbargis action is barred by the statute of limitations. Court find no error and affirm.

Hormoz Ramy appeals a judgment in favor of Related Urban Management Company (Related), claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support the judgment and the damages award. Court affirm.

Jesus Garcia, Sr. and Theodora Garcia appeal judgment on their cross-complaint against Century National Insurance Company. The Garcias son Jesus, Jr. deliberately set fire to the Garcias home, and Century National sought a declaration that coverage was excluded for the intentional acts of any insured; the Garcias cross-claimed for breach of contract, bad faith, and reformation. The trial court sustained Century Nationals demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that the policy language defining any insured to include relatives precluded recovery for the intentional acts of Jesus Garcia, Jr. Court affirm.

A jury convicted defendants and appellants Ever Anthony Vasquez and Juan Carlos Valiente of kidnapping for robbery and numerous sex offenses.[1] The sole issue on appeal concerns the alleged violation of defendants Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. (Crawford v. Washington(2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts(2009) 557 U.S. [129 S.Ct. 2527] (Melendez-Diaz).)Finding no prejudicial error, Court affirm.