CA Unpub Decisions

Mother, S.M., lost custody of three-year-old son T.M., and two-year-old daughter C.M. when she and a boyfriend were arrested for possessing stolen property and she admitted a long history of drug use. Mother nearly succeeded in reuniting with the children, but her poor judgment resulted in the termination of services when her visits with the children became sporadic, and she failed to follow directions by the Department of Children and Family Services (CFS) to prevent contact with T.C., a violent felon with whom she had become involved, and her children. Mothers parental rights were terminated at a selection and implementation hearing (Welf & Inst. Code,366.26), and she appealed.
On appeal, mother contends (1) the adoption assessment and report prepared for the hearing at which her rights were terminated did not contain adequate information about the childrens relationship with her or the history of visits and was insufficient to support the judgment; and (2) the court used the wrong standard to evaluate the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship. Court affirm.

Appellant M. C. (mother) is the mother of S.F. (child), who was nine years old at the time mother filed this appeal. Mother challenges the juvenile courts visitation orders issued April 9 and May 7, 2009, which included the provision that S.F. not be forced to visit with mother. Specifically, mother argues the juvenile court impermissibly delegated its authority over visitation to the child when it allowed the child to refuse visits with mother, thus violating mothers due process right to litigate to establish the parent-child benefit exception to adoption at the later Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing held on September 15, 2009. As discussed below, we conclude that mother waived her right to appeal the issue by failing to timely raise the issue by appeal or in a petition for extraordinary writ.

Defendant and appellant C.S. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile courts order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 as to her two-year-old daughter R.S. Mothers sole contention on appeal is that the information provided in the notices by the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) sent to Indian tribes, pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) (ICWA), was incomplete, requiring reversal of the order terminating parental rights. After a thorough review of the entire record, Court agree that the notice provisions of ICWA were not adequately complied with and will remand the matter for that limited purpose.

A jury found Ryan Joseph James guilty of first-degree burglary, two counts of first-degree robbery in concert, and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon during a home invasion in Oakhurst. On appeal, he argues two instructional issues, a prosecutorial misconduct issue, and cumulative prejudice. Court reverse the judgment as to one of the assault with a deadly weapon counts but otherwise we affirm the judgment.

Dustin Garnett agreed to sell marijuana to Francisco Iniguez. Garnett went with his friend Christopher Stoner to a motel room where, he was told, the deal was to go down. Instead, Iniguez, Jesus De Leon, and others kidnapped Garnett and Stoner and, on a remote frontage road in the middle of the night, fired shots at Stoner, killing him, and at Garnett, hitting him in the hand. Garnett fell to the ground, put his bloody hand over his head, and played dead. Something cold and round touched the back of his head. Then he heard someone say, [T]heyre dead, dont shoot any more. Lets not make any more noise. Leaving Stoner dead and Garnett for dead, everyone else drove away.
A jury found Iniguez and De Leon guilty of, inter alia, first degree special circumstance murder of Stoner, attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of Garnett, kidnapping of both to commit robbery, robbery of both, and conspiracy to kidnap both. Additionally, the jury found allegations true of, inter alia, personal and intentional discharge by a principal of a firearm proximately causing great bodily injury or death and commission of the crimes to benefit a criminal street gang.

Appellant Birsen Blakeney contends the trial court erred in upholding an oral transmutation agreement. She also contends the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence and impermissibly placed the burden on her to produce documentation of ownership of a residence in Turkey. Court conclude there was no error and will affirm the judgment.

The Orange County Department of Child Support Services (DCSS) appeals from a writ of mandate, issued by the Orange County Superior Court, ordering DCSS to stop its actions enforcing a support order. The support order had been entered by the Los Angeles County Superior Court, but never registered with the Orange County Superior Court.
We affirm. Unless DCSS first complies with the registration provisions of Family Code section 5600 et seq., DCSS is not authorized to enforce a support order entered by a court in another county as if it had originally been entered by the Orange County Superior Court. A writ of mandate was the proper means for ensuring DCSSs compliance with the Family Codes rules regarding enforcement of support orders entered in other counties.

Defendant Robert Ruffin appeals from a sentence imposed following his pleas of guilty to a variety of charges related to two separate bank robberies.
Court appointed counsel to represent Ruffin in this court. Appointed counsel filed an opening brief which states the case and the facts, but raises no specific issues. Court notified Ruffin of his right to submit written argument in his own behalf within 30 days. That period has elapsed, and court have received no written argument from Ruffin.
As Ruffin pleaded guilty to the charges, Court derive the facts from the probation report, the testimony offered at the preliminary hearing and other documents in the record on appeal.

A juvenile wardship petition filed against minor F.A. alleged a felony violation of Penal Code section 12020, subdivision (a)(4) (carrying a concealed dirk or dagger) (count one) and a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 417, subdivision (a)(1) (exhibiting deadly weapon other than firearm, specifically a knife) (count two). The minor admitted the petition's allegations. The juvenile court declared minor to be a ward of the court, committed him to juvenile hall for 120 actual days, and imposed certain terms and conditions. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, 602, 725, 727.) Minor appealed. ( 800, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.585(a).)

Defendant Catarino Garcia Sandoval was charged by information with two felonies: possession of heroin for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351) and transportation, sale, or distribution of heroin (id., 11352, subd. (a)), and with one misdemeanor: possession of paraphernalia (id., 11364). The information further alleged that defendant had possessed more than 14.25 grams of a substance containing heroin within the meaning of Penal Code section 1203.07, subdivision (a)(1) and (a)(2), which, if true, would make him ineligible for probation.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of six drug-related crimes. Three were felonies. He thereafter waived his right to a jury on the trial of allegations under the three strikes law that he was previously convicted of two serious felonies, and on a sentence enhancement that he was on bail when he committed some of his crimes. The court denied defendants motion to dismiss the prior strike allegations under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 and found all of the allegations to be true. Defendant was sentenced to a total term of 77 years to life in prison.
In this appeal, defendant contends the bench trial on the enhancement allegations was equivalent to a slow plea, and therefore the court violated his constitutional rights by failing to advise him and obtain waivers of his rights not to incriminate himself and to confront and cross-examine witnesses. Defendant further contends that the court abused its discretion when it denied his Romero motion; and that his 77-year-to-life sentence imposed violates constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. In a separate petition for writ of habeas corpus, defendant claims his counsel was ineffective because he did not inform defendant of the advisability of a plea offered by the district attorney, and failed to suitably argue the Romero motion. Court find none of defendants contentions to be meritorious. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

A jury convicted defendant of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211). Following a bifurcated court trial, the trial court found true an allegation that defendant had suffered a prior conviction of second degree robbery, a serious felony. Defendant was sentenced to 11 years in prison after the trial court denied defendants motion to strike the strike prior. Defendants counsel has asked this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.)
ubstantial evidence supports defendants conviction. Witnesses testified that on the night of August 2, 2007, defendant rode his bicycle into a woman taking pictures of a restaurant on Mission Street near Fourth Street in San Francisco, knocked her over, pushed the bicycle against her body, then took the victims camera bag after a brief struggle. Defendant fled on foot, but was chased by passersby and arrested a short time later after witnesses flagged down police officers and told them what had happened.
Defendant was represented by counsel and received a fair trial. This court has reviewed the record, and there are no meritorious issues to be argued on appeal.

Appellant Louisa Mendoza (Mendoza) brought suit against respondents United Air Lines, Inc. (United) and Tish DeVere (DeVere) after her employment was terminated. The trial court granted United and DeVeres motion for judgment pursuant to a settlement by proposed order. (Code Civ. Proc., 664.6.) On appeal, Mendoza appears in propria persona to challenge both the signing of the proposed order and the granting of the underlying motion itself. We affirm the judgment.

Appellant Rafael Favis Luna was found guilty by a jury of sexually molesting his youngest daughter. He was convicted on all nine counts charged; five counts of committing lewd acts on a child under age 14, and four counts of oral copulation of a person under the age of 14. (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a), 288a, subd. (c).) On appeal he argues that the evidence of subsequent sexual conduct with his daughter after she turned age 14 was improperly admitted under Evidence Code section 1108, and as a result, the convictions should be reversed. Appellant also argues that he was denied his right to due process when count eight was modified at trial to a charge not presented at the preliminary hearing. court affirm.