CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found Eddie Lamont Conner guilty of willful, deliberate and premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code, 664/187.) On appeal, Conner contends the trial court erred in not giving a sua sponte instruction on attempted voluntary manslaughter. Court affirm.

Matthew Montijo appeals from the judgment following his entry of a guilty plea to conspiracy to commit first degree robbery and felony assault with a deadly weapon and his admission that he served a prior prison term. (Pen. Code, 182, 211; 245, subd. (a)(1); and 667.5, subd. (b).)[1] The court sentenced appellant to a five-year prison term, imposed restitution fines and ordered him to pay victim restitution.
Appellant contends that the court erred by accepting his guilty plea to conspire to commit robbery because there was no factual basis to support the plea, and that the court abused its discretion in denying his section 1018 motion to withdraw his plea. Court affirm.

Appellant H.C., Sr. (father) appeals from the juvenile courts order terminating his parental rights over minors H.C. (born in May 2004) and N.Q. (born in September 2006). Court affirm the juvenile courts order.

The question posed by this appeal and resolved by the California Supreme Court in State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Superior Court (2009) 45 Cal.4th 963 (Chiropractic Examiners) is whether an aggrieved public employee must petition for a writ of mandate before filing a civil action under the California Whistleblower Protection Act (Whistleblower Act; Gov. Code, 8547 et seq.)[1] when, as here, the employee did not request and the State Personnel Board (SPB) was not required by law to provide a quasi-judicial hearing. Plaintiff Anna Ramirez, a state employee, contends that a plain reading of section 8547.8, subdivision (c) requires an injured party to file a complaint with the SPB and allows the filing of a civil complaint once the board has issued, or failed to issue, findings. The Department of Health Services (DHS), on the other hand, insists that exhaustion of judicial remedies is a prerequisite to a civil action. The trial court sustained DHSs demurrer without leave to amend because plaintiff failed to file a petition for a writ of mandate before pursuing her whistleblower claim. Our review, therefore, is de novo.

In this products liability action involving a 2002 Toyota Corolla, the jury found in favor of the Toyota defendants Toyota Motor Corporation, Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., and Toyota Town (collectively, Toyota). The jury determined, in a special verdict, that the design of the Corolla was not a substantial factor in causing the death of the plaintiffs decedent. The crash at issue involved the decedents ill-timed pass on a highway, a jammed seat belt buckle, and a fire that engulfed the Corolla.
On appeal, the heirs of decedent (plaintiffs) contend the trial court erroneously (1) provided a special verdict form that failed to resolve plaintiffs independent cause of action for negligence, (2) failed to give the consumer expectations test of design defect, and (3) instructed that a design defect is not a legal cause of injury if the injury would have been the same had there been no defect. Court disagree with each of these contentions and shall affirm the judgment.

This appeal involves two separate trial court cases involving defendant Mario Esparza Rojas that were consolidated over his objection. In the first case, in which defendant had been appointed counsel, a jury convicted him of misdemeanor vandalism but deadlocked on two felony charges that the People wanted to retry. The trial court (Winn, J.) granted the Peoples motion to consolidate those charges with a second case, in which defendant had retained attorney Robert Holley.

A jury convicted defendant Wayne Lee Bowen of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a)) and sustained an allegation of personal use of a firearm (Pen. Code, 12022.5, subd. (a)). The court sentenced defendant to 27 years to life.
Defendant appeals, contending the judgment should be set aside for prefiling prosecutorial delay, and the 10 percent administrative fees assessed on the restitution fine and victim restitution were unauthorized. Court shall modify the sentence to strike one of the administrative fees and affirm the judgment as modified.

T. H., father of the minor, appeals from the juvenile courts reconsideration of his Marsden motion and reappointment of the attorney previously relieved for a conflict of interest.[1] Appellant contends the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in considering and granting the motion for reconsideration; the mother, who brought the motion, lacked standing to do so; and reappointment of his prior attorney deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. However, developments following the perfection of the appeal have rendered the case moot. Accordingly, Court shall dismiss the appeal.

Defendant Jorge Martinez Mendez appeals the trial courts imposition of five years formal probation conditioned, in part, on service of one year in county jail for his four misdemeanor convictions. He contends imposition of the probationary period constituted an unauthorized sentence. Court modify the probationary period to three years and affirm the judgment as modified.

The People filed a delinquency petition alleging that between September 7-11, 2008, the minor committed five violent or threatening acts while in custody after she absconded from a group home in which she had been placed due to a prior sustained delinquency petition. After the trial court received reports that supported the view that the minor was unfit to be treated as a juvenile, the minor stipulated to such unfitness. In exchange, the People filed a criminal complaint alleging only two of the five counts from the delinquency petition (Pen. Code, 69, 71) and the parties agreed the minor would waive custody credits and receive a sentence of two years and eight months, to be served in a juvenile facility. At a subsequent hearing, the minor pled guilty to the charges in the complaint, and admitted violating probation in an underlying case, and was sentenced to two years and eight months, to be served at a juvenile facility, in accordance with the prior agreement.

Plaintiff Judy Ray, proceeding in propria persona, appeals from a judgment entered in favor of defendant Joseph Maiorano. Maiorano represented Ray in a federal lawsuit against the City of Chula Vista and a number of police and animal control officers (Ray v. Tsunoda, et al. (Case No. 03cv1884 DMS-BLM); the Tsunoda Action). After the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants in the Tsunoda Action, Ray wanted Maiorano to appeal the court's ruling. Maiorano counseled against filing an appeal because an appeal would be costly, and Maiorano did not believe an appeal would be successful.

A modification decision.

In this action involving a real estate purchase agreement, Kenneth Boyle appeals from an order denying his motions to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings. He contends: (1) arbitration was mandated under a validly executed arbitration clause in the purchase agreement; (2) the trial court erroneously declined to conduct an evidentiary hearing on whether the plaintiffs knew their contract included an arbitration clause; and (3) certain claims against the codefendants were unrelated to the subject of the parties' dispute. Court reverse the order and remand with directions.

Carolyn P. seeks review of a juvenile court order setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends the court's reasonable services finding is not supported by substantial evidence. Court deny the petition.