CA Unpub Decisions

Jose Israel Pozos Bravo appeals from a judgment and sentence following his no contest plea. His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief seeking our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. Court find no such issues and affirm.

W.B. appeals from the juvenile courts dispositional order declaring him a ward of the court. The minors counsel on appeal has filed an opening brief that asks this court to conduct an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel informed the minor of his right to file a supplemental brief on his own behalf, but he has not done so.

In our initial decision in this case (People v. Lawrence (Jan. 2, 2008, B193831) [superseded by grant of review Apr. 9, 2008, S160736] (Lawrence I)), we held Ringo Lawrence had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562] (Faretta), but the trial court had abused its discretion when it denied Lawrences two subsequent requests to withdraw that waiver and reassert his right to counsel. We also held the error was structural because it had the same deleterious effect as other deprivations of the right to counsel consistently found by the United States Supreme Court to be structural error and reversed the judgment of conviction. Considering only our holding regarding Lawrences requests to withdraw his Faretta waiver, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this court (People v. Lawrence (2009) 46 Cal.4th 186 (Lawrence II),[1]holding the trial court had not abused its discretion in part because Lawrences first request to withdraw his waiver was not unequivocal and the second request, made after the jury had been sworn, may have resulted in significant disruption or untoward delay in the trial that included Lawrences codefendant Patricia Broomfield. (Id. at pp. 194-195.) We now address several issues raised by Lawrence in his appeal to this court that we did not need to reach in Lawrence I.

Rochelle Levy appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of her former employer, American Film Institute (AFI),[1]in her action alleging retaliatory discharge and wage and hour violations. Levy contends triable issues of material fact exist as to whether AFI terminated her employment in retaliation for her testimony in a separate case by a coworker brought under Californias Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, 12940 et seq.). Levy also contends triable issues of material fact permeate her wage and hour claims. Court agree a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether Levy was properly classified as an administratively exempt employee. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to grant in part and deny in part AFIs alternative motion for summary adjudication.

Toby Polinger was injured while loading cargo on a 767-300 aircraft at the Ontario airport. He sued The Boeing Company (the designer and manufacturer of the aircraft and its cargo loading system), Delta Air Lines, Inc. (the aircraft operator), and Telair International, Inc. (successor to the manufacturer of component parts for the aircrafts cargo loading system). Each defendant sought summary judgment on different grounds, and the trial court granted each defendants motion. Court conclude that:

Plaintiff Jensen Trucking Service, Inc. (Jensen) appeals a judgment in favor of defendants Bulk or Liquid Transport (BOLT) and Mike Thomas and Tracy Thomas. Jensen sued defendants for breach of the duty of loyalty and intentional interference with business relations. We conclude, among other things: substantial evidence supports the verdicts; defense counsel's conduct at trial does not warrant reversal; the trial court did not err in denying Jensen's motion for a new trial; Jensen has not shown jury misconduct; and the verdict form concerning whether Tracy Thomas was a Jensen managing agent was proper. Court affirm.

The fundamental issue in this case is whether a public school district may be held liable for injuries suffered by a second grade student who was hit by a vehicle while walking home after school was dismissed. In the context of a motion for summary judgment, the trial court answered this question, no. The ensuing appeal presents two subcomponent issues for our consideration. The first issue involves a pure question of law: Do administrators at public elementary schools have a duty not to allow students to walk home after school is dismissed except in the company of an adult? The second issue is whether there is any evidence in the record to show that the administrators at Maurice Sendak Elementary School (Sendak) in North Hollywood assumed such a duty, or, in the language of the summary judgment statute, does the record disclose any triable issues of fact which need adjudging to determine whether Sendak assumed a duty not to allow its students to walk themselves home at the end of a school day? Our answer to both questions is, no, and, in the absence of the threshold element of duty, we affirm the summary judgment in favor of defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (District).

Jerome James Henderson appeals from his conviction of possession and transportation of controlled substances (codeine, marijuana, cocaine base & methamphetamine), and furnishing a minor with controlled substances. He contends that judicial misconduct amounted to a denial of due process, and that his conviction of possession of codeine was unsupported by substantial evidence. Henderson also contends that his conviction of possession of cocaine and methamphetamine must be reversed, because he was also convicted of transporting the same drugs. Finally, Henderson contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and that prejudice must be presumed, because retained counsel was unprepared to represent him at sentencing. Court reject Hendersons contentions and affirm the judgment.

Stuart Hoffman appeals from a judgment in the amount of $225,000, entered in favor of respondent Marina Pacific Associates, after Marina Pacific prevailed on a single cause of action, for breach of a Boat Slip Lease, in its cross-complaint. Court reverse.

Appellant Charles Crittenden was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of possession of a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a). Appellant admitted that he had suffered a prior felony conviction within the meaning of Penal Code[1] sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12 (the "Three Strikes" law). The trial court sentenced appellant to the low term of 16 months in state prison, doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law to 32 months. Appellant appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction, and further contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal made pursuant to section 1118.1. Court affirm the judgment of conviction.

Gustavo Padron was found guilty of the unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)), driving without a license (Veh. Code, 12500, subd. (a)), and hit-and-run driving (Veh. Code, 20002, subd. (a)). On appeal, his sole contention is that the trial court erred in finding he failed to demonstrate good cause in support of his Pitchess motion. He claims the error requires an unconditional reversal of the judgment. We agree that the trial court erred, but follow the recent mandate of our Supreme Court in People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172 (Gaines), and order a limited remand.

The minor, R.Z., appeals from orders: adjudicating a Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 petition; declaring that he remain a ward of the juvenile court; and placing him in a nine-month camp community placement program. (All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code except where otherwise noted.) Court reverse the dispositional order in part.

S.B. (mother) appeals from the postjudgment order of October 29, 2008, denying services to reunify with her four-month-old daughter under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10). She contends substantial evidence does not support the order. As substantial evidence supports the findings, Court affirm the order.

Frank Herrera appeals from the judgment following a guilty plea to driving under the influence causing injury (Veh. Code, 23153, subd. (a)) and admission that he inflicted great bodily injury and committed the offense while on felony probation (Pen. Code, 12022.7, subd. (a); 1203, subd. (k)).[1] Appellant also admitted violating probation in three other cases: case numbers 2006012043, 2005004859, and 2004024961. The trial court revoked probation in all three cases and sentenced appellant to a total aggregate term of seven years state prison. Appellant was ordered to pay restitution fines ( 1202.4, subd. (b); 1202.45), victim restitution ( 1202.4, subd. (f)), and a $20 court security fee ( 1465.8). Court appointed counsel to represent appellant in this appeal. After counsel's examination of the record, she filed an opening brief raising no issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)