CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted appellant, Christina Iris Kerr, of petty theft with a prior (count 1/Pen. Code, 666)and second degree burglary (count 2/ 460, subd. (b)). In a separate proceeding, Kerr admitted two prior prison term enhancements ( 667.5, subd. (b)) and a prior conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i)).
On September 18, 2008, the court sentenced Kerr to a six-year term, the aggravated term of three years on count 2, doubled to six years because of Kerrs prior strike conviction, a stayed term on count 1, and concurrent one-year terms on each of Kerrs prior prison term enhancements.
On appeal, Kerr contends the trial court erred in imposing concurrent terms on her prior prison term enhancements and that this court should strike them. We agree that the court erred in imposing concurrent terms on Kerrs prior prison term enhancements but we will remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing. Court will also find that Kerrs abstract of judgment and the clerks minutes of her sentencing hearing contain several mistakes. In all other respects, Court will affirm.

A prisoner qualifies for involuntary commitment to a state hospital as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) if, among other things, the offense for which he was imprisoned was a qualifying offense. Among the offenses that qualify are those in which the prisoner used force or violence . (Pen. Code, 2962, subd. (e)(2)(P).)[1] Defendant Michael Paul Martin, who had previously been committed as an MDO, argued at a proceeding to extend his commitment that his offensepetty theft of the shoplifting varietywas not a qualifying offense even though he kicked a security guard who apprehended him after he left the store with the stolen merchandise. As a matter of law, he argues, this was not a crime in which he used force or violence because the petty theft was completed by the time he administered the kick and he was not charged with any other crime, such as battery.

We disagree, affirm the judgment, and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus in which Martin also asserts his claim. Since Court hold for the People on the merits, Court do not discuss their argument that Martins claim is procedurally barred.

On January 30, 2004, a criminal complaint was filed alleging appellant, Alejandro Fierro-Trejo, transported marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, 11360, subd. (a), count one), possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11359, count two), transportation of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, count three), possession of cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351, subd. (a), count four), and possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, count five).

S. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile courts jurisdictional and dispositional orders regarding her five children (15-year-old boy, 9-year-old boy, 5-year-old girl, 3-year-old girl, and 2-year-old girl.) J.J. (Father) also has appealed regarding his children (15-year-old-girl, 3-year-old girl, 2-year-old girl). Mother and Father challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the courts decision to sustain the petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b).They assert the court erred in removing the minors from their custody. In addition, Father contends the court erred in proceeding with the hearing before receiving documentation regarding his claim of Native American heritage. Court find all the contentions lack merit except for Fathers Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) claim. Accordingly, we affirm all the orders with respect to Mother. Court reverse the jurisdictional and dispositional orders with respect to Father and remand the matter for the court to determine if there is a need for an ICWA investigation.

Appellant Gatley Properties, LLC. (Gatley) and respondent James Campagna were engaged in a dispute over the terms of a commercial lease originally negotiated between Campagna's assignor, respondent Kenneth Arutunian, and the predecessor owner of the property, The Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University (Stanford). In a prior appeal (H022749) this court held, inter alia, that the lease called for base rent and overage rent throughout the 19-year term of the lease. Upon remand, the superior court made various rulings that included the determination of overage rent payable by Campagna to Gatley. Gatley again appeals, contending that (1) the trial court used an incorrect formula in calculating overage and (2) the court should have awarded prejudgment interest. Court find merit in these arguments and therefore must reverse.

The mother of a dependent child appeals the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights, citing three grounds: (1) failure to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act; (2) representation at the hearing by an attorney who was not counsel of record; and (3) insufficient evidence to support the courts finding concerning the mother-child relationship. For reasons explained below, Court reject the mothers challenges. Court therefore affirm.

Vincent Carrino (Vincent)[1] appeals from a Judgment Reforming and Enforcing Judicially Supervised November 2, 2006 Settlement Agreement in which the trial court reformed a portion of a settlement agreement after finding Vincent failed to provide his former wife Ann Camino (Ann)[2] with information regarding the value of one of their assets. He contends: (1) he had no duty to inform Ann of his opinion regarding the value of the asset; (2) Ann had a duty to determine the value of the asset on her own; (3) Ann knowingly and intelligently waived obtaining [the] information; (4) the language of the [settlement] agreement is clear and not reasonably susceptible to Anns [and the trial courts] interpretation; and (5) the trial court should have set aside the entire settlement agreement instead of reforming only one portion of it. Court reject the contentions and affirm the judgment.

This is an appeal from the judgment after a jury convicted appellant Craig Clark of second degree robbery and found true the allegation that he inflicted great bodily injury. The trial court thereafter found that appellant had previously been convicted of two offenses for which he served prison terms and sentenced him to a total of fifteen years in prison. On appeal, appellant contends the trial court committed reversible error by denying his motion to suppress evidence relating to an unduly suggestive lineup and by admitting evidence relating to his prior attempted robbery conviction. Court affirm the judgment.

In one of the most closely watched California cases in recent memory, In re Marriage Cases (2008) 43 Cal.4th 757, 856 (Marriage Cases), our Supreme Court held that state statutes denying same-sex couples the right to marry violated the California Constitution. The Supreme Court also affirmed this courts determination that one of the parties, appellant Campaign for California Families (Campaign), lacked standing to sue and consequently should have been dismissed from the proceeding by the trial court. (Id. at pp. 791-792.) The Supreme Court provided that the prevailing parties were entitled to recover their costs. (Id. at p. 857.) In this appeal, Campaign challenges two orders directing it to pay costs totaling slightly more than $12,000. Characterizing its role in the litigation as that of an amicus curiae, Campaign contends it cannot be assessed costs of suit as if it were a party. Court shall affirm the trial courts orders directing Campaign to pay costs.

Laurie Marie Laskey filed a complaint in propria persona for, among other claims, general negligence, intentional tort, and premises liability against Platt Electric Supply, Inc. (Platt). Platt demurred to her complaint, and the lower court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend on the grounds that all of Laskeys claims were time-barred. Subsequently, Laskey filed a first amended complaint (FAC). The trial court found that Laskeys FAC did not cure the defect and sustained Platts demurrer to the FAC without leave to amend. Laskey appeals and Court affirm the judgment.

Defendants and appellants Daniel Ike Crutchfield and Dewyan Williams appeal from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in Crutchfields convictions for sale of cocaine base and possession of cocaine base for sale, and Williamss conviction for sale of cocaine base. Crutchfield and Williams were sentenced to 14 and 16 years in prison, respectively.
Crutchfield, joined by Williams, contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 401. Williams contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his Pitchess motion for discovery of peace officer records and his Romero motion[2]to strike prior conviction allegations. Discerning no reversible error, Court affirm.

A jury convicted Tranquilino Castro (appellant) of possession for sale of a controlled substance (heroin) in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351 (count 5); possession of a rifle by a felon with priors in violation of Penal Code section 12021, subdivision (a)(1)[1] (count 6); possession of a firearm by a felon with a prior in violation of section 12021, subdivision (a)(1) (count 7); and possession of ammunition in violation of section 12316, subdivision (b)(1) (count 8).
The jury found that in the commission of count 5, appellant was personally armed with a firearm within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (c) and that appellant possessed for sale 14.25 grams or more of a substance containing heroin within the meaning of section 1203.07, subdivision (a)(1). The jury found that all of the offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A). Appellant admitted the allegations that he had suffered a prior strike under sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and that, at the time of the commission of the offenses, he was released from custody on bail or on his own recognizance in case No. MA029817 within the meaning of section 12022.1.

Abulghasen Ahmadpour appeals from the judgment entered after his conviction by a jury of five counts of filing or recording a forged instrument (counts 1, 3, 4, 6, and 7 - Pen. Code, 115, subd. (a))[1] and two counts of forgery (counts 2 and 5 - 470, subd. (d)). He was sentenced to prison for seven years. Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erroneously (1) failed to discharge a juror, (2) failed to inquire into the travel plans of two jurors, (3) limited his cross-examination and impeachment of prosecution witnesses, (4) admitted the expert opinion of a prosecution witness and excluded the expert opinion of a defense witness, and (5) excluded a title insurance policy. Appellant's final contention is that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument. Court affirm.

Appellant Jeremy Micah Coln appeals from his conviction of theft of access card account information (Pen. Code, 484e, subd. (d)).[1] He argues that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the prosecutor to amend the information to add a charge not supported by evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, and by allowing the prosecutor to introduce irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial evidence at trial. He also contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction.
Court find no prejudicial error, and affirm the judgment.