CA Unpub Decisions

David Clyde Argo appeals his conviction, by jury, of possessing a short-barreled shotgun, a felony (Pen. Code, 12020, subd. (a))[1], and two misdemeanor counts of brandishing a firearm. ( 417, subd. (a)(2).) The shotgun was discovered in appellant's bedroom, after appellant consented to a search. He contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress on the ground that the search exceeded the scope of his consent. Appellant further contends that the trial court should have excluded the statements he made to police officers because the statements were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.) Court affirm.

Duane Brown appeals from the judgment entered after he had pleaded nolo contendere to possession of cocaine base while armed with a loaded firearm. (Health & Saf. Code, 11370.1, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced appellant to prison for four years, suspended execution of the sentence, and placed him on probation for three years. Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to quash a search warrant and suppress the evidence found at his apartment pursuant to that warrant. He argues that the facts alleged in the supporting affidavit were insufficient to establish probable cause for the search. Court affirm.

H.F., the biological mother of C.V., appeals from the trial court's order of August 28, 2008 terminating family maintenance services and setting a permanent plan selection hearing (No. B212311), and separately from the order of January 15, 2009, terminating her parental rights pursuant to section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.[1] (No. B214037.) We ordered the two appeals consolidated. H.F.'s sole contention is that respondent, the San Luis Obispo Department of Social Services (DSS) and the trial court failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 United States Code, sections 1901, et seq., because notice to the Upper Sioux Community was incorrectly addressed. Court conclude the error was harmless because the tribe received actual notice of this proceeding and later determined that C.V. is not eligible for membership. Accordingly, Court affirm.

Appellant S.B. appeals from an order of October 3, 2008, declaring her a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 after the juvenile court sustained a petition alleging that she dissuaded a witness from arresting another for a crime in violation of Penal Code section 136.1, subdivision (b)(3), and resisted, delayed, and obstructed a peace officer in violation of Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1). Appellant was ordered suitably placed in an open or closed facility.

Ann H., mother, challenges the juvenile courts jurisdictional order finding her daughter Lisa L. to be a dependent of the juvenile court. Mother also challenges the juvenile courts dispositional order removing Lisa from her custody. Court find both orders to be supported by substantial evidence and affirm.

B.V. (B.), a prior court dependent, was a ward of a legal guardianship until the guardianship terminated by operation of law on his 18th birthday in June 2007. Thereafter, he filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1]petition to reinstate dependency court jurisdiction so that his caretaker could continue to be eligible for foster care funding. The dependency court denied the petition on the ground it lacked power to reinstate jurisdiction. B. appeals the order, contending it was an abuse of discretion. We hold that the Arnold Kennick Juvenile Court Law, sections 200-987 do not confer jurisdiction over a former guardianship ward who is over 18 years old and not a current dependent of the court. Accordingly, Court affirm the dependency courts denial of the petition.

Appellant C.H. (father) appeals from the juvenile courts February 18, 2009 order terminating parental rights in 14-year-old H.H. and 10-year-old J.H. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in refusing his request to have H.H. testify regarding her desire to be adopted by her maternal grandparents, and therefore the order terminating parental rights must be reversed. We find that even if H.H. should have been allowed to testify, the absence of her testimony caused no prejudice, in view of the other evidence that was before the trial court.
Father also contends that the juvenile courts visitation orders of May 2008 and July 2008 must be reversed because the juvenile court inappropriately delegated discretion to the minors and H.H.s therapist. Court hold the July 2008 order is not appealable and the appeal from the May 2008 order has been forfeited.[2] Even if the orders were reviewed on the merits, the orders did not improperly delegate discretion for visitation to the minors or H.H.s therapist.

Christina Evelyne Barnes appeals the judgment entered after she pleaded guilty to fraudulently obtaining welfare benefits in excess of $400 (Welf. & Inst. Code, 10980, subd. (c)(2)). Imposition of sentence was suspended, and Barnes was placed on formal probation with terms and conditions including that she serve 45 days in county jail. She was also ordered to pay $5,359 in victim restitution to the Ventura County Human Services Agency (HSA).
Because Barnes pleaded guilty prior to the preliminary hearing, the relevant facts are derived from the probation officers report. Sometime prior to June 2005, Barnes began receiving welfare assistance from HSA. In June 2005, she obtained employment but failed to notify HSA. During the period of her employment from June 2005 until February 2006, HSA gave her $4,239 in cash and $872 in food stamps. Court appointed counsel to represent Barnes in this appeal. After counsel's examination of the record, she filed an opening brief in which no issues were raised.

Plaintiff Jennifer J. Abraham filed an action against her employer, the State of California (State), and five of her supervisors for employment discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and violation of her civil rights, all related to a claim that defendants improperly refused to promote her. The trial court sustained without leave to amend defendants demurrers to plaintiffs causes of action for violation of her rights under title 42 of the United States Code section 1981 (section 1981) and for harassment under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, 12940 et seq. (FEHA)).[1] The trial court granted defendants motion for summary adjudication of plaintiffs retaliation claim under the FEHA. At trial, the trial court granted nonsuit on plaintiffs claim of violation of her rights under 42 United States Code section 1983 (section 1983) against the individual defendants.[2] The jury returned a verdict for defendants on plaintiffs remaining claim for discrimination under the FEHA. In a special verdict finding, the jury found the State did not refuse plaintiff a promotion. On appeal, plaintiff does not challenge the jurys verdict or its special finding that the State did not refuse plaintiff a promotion. Instead, plaintiff claims on appeal that the trial court erred in its rulings on her other causes of action. Court shall affirm the judgment.

D.F. (appellant), the father of K.F. and A.F. (minors), appeals from the juvenile courts orders adjudging the minors dependent children of the court and removing the minors from parental custody. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 360, subd. (d), 395.)[1] Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile courts jurisdictional findings and dispositional order of removal. Court shall affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Jose Stewart Benavidez of evading an officer by means of a vehicle chase and driving under the influence with a prior alcohol-related driving conviction, and driving with a suspended license. In a court trial, defendant was found to have six prior felony convictions, one of which was a strike, and to have served five prior prison terms. He was sentenced to 11 years in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike any of his prior convictions, and (2) the court committed constitutional sentencing errors. Court affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

After finding that defendant Walter P. Pantega had twice violated probation by failing to pay victim restitution, the trial court revoked his probation and sentenced him to prison. Defendant appeals, contending that the trial court never found he willfully failed to pay and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Court remand the matter for rehearing.

Roseville Police Officer Carlos Cortes saw a car driving with no license plates, in violation of the Vehicle Code. He stopped the vehicle and asked both the driver, David Hamilton, and the passenger, defendant Scott Miller Anschuetz, for identification. Within a few seconds, Officer Cortes confirmed defendant had a warrant for his arrest. He asked defendant to step out of the car and placed him under arrest. He then asked Hamilton if he could search the car and Hamilton agreed. He asked defendant if anything in the car belonged to him and defendant replied his backpack was in the front passenger side of the car. Another officer arrived at the scene, with a canine unit. The dog had special training in narcotics and alerted on defendants backpack. Inside the backpack was methamphetamine and a pipe.
Defendant was charged with transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a)), possession of methamphetamine (id., 11377, subd. (a)) and possession of drug paraphernalia (id., 11364). It was also alleged defendant had served five prior prison terms (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)) and been convicted of three prior drug offenses (Health & Saf. Code, 11370.2, subd. (c)).