CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Jesus Gallardo Quintero appeals from a jury verdict for one count of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(2))[1]by personal use of a handgun ( 12022.5, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)), and one count of corporal injury to a cohabitant ( 273.5, subd. (a)). Court affirm.

Petitioners D.B. (mother) and A.P. (father) filed separate petitions for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, challenging the juvenile courts order denying reunification services as to their children, D.P. and J.P. (the children), and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Mother and father (the parents) argue that the juvenile court erred in denying them reunification services under section 361.5. We deny their writ petitions.

A jury convicted appellant Frank Mason, Jr., of violating Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a),[1]lewd acts on a minor under the age of 14, and section 288.3, subdivision (a), communicating with a minor with intent to commit a sexual offense. Mason contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior uncharged sexual acts pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108. He also contends the Penal Code section 288.3 conviction must be stricken because it is a lesser included offense of the section 288 offenses. Court affirm the convictions, but remand for resentencing because the trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence.

Following a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found true allegations that appellant F.B., a minor, committed first degree burglary (Pen. Code, 459, 460, subd. (a)), and that in committing that offense appellant violated probation granted in a previous wardship proceeding. Following the disposition hearing, the court ordered appellant continued on probation for a period not to extend beyond his twenty-first birthday and ordered him committed to Camp Erwin Owen.
On appeal, appellant contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his adjudication on the instant offense and the true finding on the probation-violation allegation, and (2) the court abused its discretion by failing to consider appellant for deferred entry of judgment (DEJ). Court will reject the first contention, find merit in the second, reverse and remand for further proceedings.

On May 14th, 2008, a jury found appellant guilty of the following: making criminal threats (Count I, Pen. Code, 422)[1]; threatening a witness (Count II, 136.1, subd. (b)); and endangering a child (Count III, 273a, subd. (b)). In a bifurcated trial, the court found true the special allegations of a prior felony conviction pursuant to sections 667 and 1170.12. Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of nine years. Appellant filed a notice of appeal, claiming there is insufficient evidence to support the findings that he made a criminal threat. Court disagree and will affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Andre Laffraey Smith of attempting to make a criminal threat (Pen. Code, 422, 664),[1]a lesser included offense to the charged crime of making a criminal threat. The jury found Smith was not guilty of separate counts of burglary ( 459) and vandalism (594, subd. (a)). Smith was sentenced to 18 months in prison. Smith argues the trial court erred in denying his section 995 motion seeking a dismissal of the criminal threats charge as unsupported by substantial evidence at the preliminary hearing. The magistrate who conducted the preliminary hearing found the criminal threats charge was not supported by the evidence and did not hold Smith to answer to the charge. Nonetheless, the People included the charge in the information. Court conclude that the criminal threats charge should not have been included in the information because this offense was not transactionally related to the offenses for which the magistrate found probable cause to detain Smith. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment and order the criminal threats charge dismissed.

By information filed on February 14, 2008, it was alleged as follows: Appellant Frank Rodriguez, Jr. committed two counts of unlawfully taking or driving a motor vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)), four counts of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, 496, subd. (a)) and individual counts of receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, 496, subd. (d)), evading a pursuing peace officer (Veh. Code, 2800.1) and resisting a peace officer (Pen. Code, 148, subd. (a)(1)); he had suffered a strike;[1] and he had served three separate prison terms for prior felony convictions (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)).

A modification decision.

A jury convicted defendant Herman Maurice Chambers of one count of kidnapping to commit a sexual felony (Pen. Code 209, subd. (b)(1));[1] two counts of forcible oral copulation ( 288a, subd. (c)(2)); one count of a lewd act on a child ( 288, subd. (c)(1)); and one count of sexual penetration by a foreign object ( 289, subd. (a)(1)). The court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of 25 years to life for each of the five convictions under the Three Strikes law, and a consecutive five year sentence for a serious prior felony within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1), for a total of 130 years to life. Each of the five counts alleged against defendant pertained to a single 14-year-old victim, whom defendant kidnapped on the morning of January 31, 2007, and released after committing the crimes listed above.

Plaintiff Miguel Farfan brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries he sustained when he drove his motorcycle into the side of a car driven by defendant Robert Ottler. A jury found by special verdict that Ottler was not negligent, and returned a verdict for him and his codefendants. The trial court denied plaintiffs motion for a new trial, and plaintiff brought this appeal, contending that the verdict was marred by juror misconduct and is not supported by substantial evidence. Court find no error, and affirm.

Defendant John Kennedy Bacon was convicted on his plea of no contest to two counts of lewd acts on a child, against two different victims. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of three years and eight months in state prison. On appeal he contends that, given the particular facts before the court at sentencing, it was an abuse of discretion to deny probation. Court find no error, and affirm.

Plaintiff William Palmer entered into a contingency fee agreement with defendant Chris Lusby Taylor under which Palmer agreed to serve as Taylors attorney in an action against Intel Corporation (Intel) seeking the return of Taylors Intel stock that Intel had transferred to the State of California (the State) as unclaimed property. Taylor and Palmer agreed that Palmer would be compensated for his services with a contingency fee of 35 percent. Palmer filed an action against Intel on Taylors behalf. Palmer thereafter negotiated a settlement between Taylor and Intel under which Taylor agreed to assign to Intel certain accounts held by the State in Taylors name, and Intel agreed to make two separate deliveries of Intel restricted stock to Taylor. After Intel made the first delivery of restricted stock to Taylor, Taylor transferred to Palmer unrestricted Intel stock equivalent to 35 percent of this first delivery. However, after Intel made the second delivery of restricted stock to Taylor, Taylor refused to compensate Palmer any further.
Palmer filed this action against Taylor to recover his fees. Originally, Palmers action alleged breach of contract, but Taylor voided the contingency fee agreement under Business and Professions Code section 6147 due to the absence of certain recitals in the fee agreement. Palmers action thereafter proceeded on a single cause of action for quantum meruit. The action was tried to the court. The court found that Palmer was entitled to recover an additional $55,000 from Taylor. Taylor appeals and claims that the trial courts decision conflicts with Alderman v. Hamilton (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1033 (Alderman). We find Alderman distinguishable and affirm the trial courts judgment.

The appeal in the present case follows defendant Tam Minh Vos prior appeal and the remand for resentencing in that appeal. court conclude that defendants contention regarding Penal Code section 654 is barred under the law of the case doctrine. We also conclude that the abstracts of judgment and the minute order should be corrected to reflect that defendants prior Minnesota conviction allegations were dismissed. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiff Jeffrey A. Lucas brought a lawsuit against real estate agent Mark Capito, broker Halley Mitchell, referred to during the litigation as Halley Mitchell Dow (hereinafter "Dow"), and the Mitchell Group, Inc. a California corporation and against the Estate of Emogene Owen, through her representatives Allison Owen and Robyn Elizabeth Mostyn (hereinafter "Owen Estate") in regard to two real estate transactions. The first transaction involved the sale of plaintiff's real property on Oak Way in Carmel, California. The second involved plaintiff's purchase of real property on Coast Ridge Drive in Carmel, California, from seller Emogene Owen, now deceased.