CA Unpub Decisions

The trial court awarded respondents James Tong and Charter Properties their attorney fees and costs after they successfully sought summary judgment in this action brought by appellant Tina Silvia. Appellant is representing herself in an appeal challenging the attorney fees award. Court affirm.

Appellant Vincent Rosenbalm filed an appeal from an order denying his motion for substitute counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) following two prior remands by this court. His court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief raising no issues, but seeking our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Court affirm.

Christopher S. Banning appeals from a judgment quieting title to real property in favor of respondents Jeffrey Stenfors and Marimi Ichikawa, trustees of the Stenfors family trust, and an order denying his motion to vacate the judgment. Appellant contends the judgment must be reversed and remanded with directions to enter a new judgment quieting title in his favor or, alternatively, declaring he has an easement or license to continue to use the property in dispute. Respondents provided undisputed evidence they are the legal owners of the property, for which they hold a recorded grant deed, and they paid all the property taxes on the property, while appellant concededly had no recorded grant deed and provided no corroborative evidence of payment of consideration for the disputed property. Court therefore affirm the judgment.

Defendants, Omar Malik Jefferson, Darryl Wendall Duncan, and Gerald Dwayne McCaffe, appeal from their convictions arising from a gang related shooting. All three defendants were convicted of first degree murder (Pen. Code,[1] 187, subd. (a)) and two counts of willful, deliberate and premeditated attempted murder. ( 187, subd. (a), 664.) Mr. McCaffe was also convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. ( 12021, subd. (a)(1).) The jury returned gang and multiple firearm use findings which we will discuss as they are pertinent. ( 186.22, subd. ((b)(1)(C), 12022.53, subds. (b)-(e)(1).) Defendants raise issues concerning: lesser included offense and reasonable doubt instructions; the admissibility of the taped statement of Alvin Boyd, a gang member, who is the victim alleged in count 3 of the amended information; and sufficiency of the evidence. Court asked the parties to address two jurisdictional sentencing contentions. We modify the sentences but otherwise affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Jaleh Kohan appeals the judgments (orders of dismissal) entered after the trial court sustained demurrers interposed by defendants the County of Los Angeles and the City of Inglewood to Kohans personal injury lawsuit without leave to amend. We affirm the trial courts orders with respect to Kohans cause of action for general negligence. However, with respect to the cause of action for dangerous condition of public property, Court reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Under the Labor Code and the California Code of Regulations, employees who work more than five hours a day are entitled to a thirty minute duty-free meal period. Employees are also entitled to a ten minute rest period for each four hours worked. (Lab. Code, 512, subd (a); Cal.Code Regs., tit. 8, 11040, subd. 12(A).)[1] If an employer fails to provide an employee with such a meal or rest period, "the employer shall pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the employee's regular rate of compensation for each work day that the meal or rest period is not provided." (Lab. Code, 226.7,

Father, R.J., appeals the juvenile courts jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders regarding his child, R.J., Jr. Father contends (1) the jurisdictional findings must be reversed and vacated because the sustained allegations of the amended petition fail to state a cause of action for dependency jurisdiction; (2) no substantial evidence supports the courts jurisdictional findings; (3) even if the juvenile court properly asserted jurisdiction, the orders removing the minor from father must be reversed with directions to the juvenile court to implement family maintenance services and modify an existing restraining order; (4) at the very least, the orders allowing only monitored visitation for father must be reversed for abuse of the courts discretion and, in any case, there was no substantial evidence fathers visits posed a threat to the minors safety; and (5) it was error to require father to participate in individual counseling addressing anger management. Court affirm.

Defendant, Erwin Daniel Galindo, purports to appeal from a post-judgment order denying his motion to vacate the judgment and set aside a prior felony conviction finding. We noted his appeal may not be appealable. We have a duty to raise issues concerning our jurisdiction on our own motion. (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126; Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 398.) We set the issue of our jurisdiction for oral argument. The post-judgment motion argued that defendant was not convicted of a felony in case No. LA035603. The post-judgment July 1, 2009 order is not appealable as we previously dismissed his appeal from the judgment in People v. Galindo (Mar. 15, 2007, B196273) [nonpub. order]. (People v. Cantrell (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 40, 43; People v. Bowles (1933) 135 Cal.App. 514, 516; see People v. Thomas (1959) 52 Cal.2d 521, 527; see 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Appeals, 53, p. 299.) Even if the motion was not one to vacate, it is in the nature of a habeas corpus petition the denial of which is not appealable. (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 767, fn. 7; In re Hochberg (1970) 2 Cal.3d 870, 876, disapproved on other grounds in In re Fields (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1063, 1070, fn. 3.) There is no merit to defendants contentions we should construe his appeal to be a habeas corpus petition or reinstate his appeal in case No. B196273 which was dismissed over two and one-half years ago. The appeal is dismissed.

Defendant Sultan Hameed appeals from a judgment against him in a breach of contract action brought by plaintiff Beck Properties, Inc. (Beck). Beck is a developer of residential properties. Its contract of sale required a purchaser to occupy the home. It cancelled a sales contract with Hameed upon learning Hameed did not intend to occupy the home. Later, in exchange for reinstating the contract, Hameed agreed under a new agreement not to sell or transfer the home for a period of one year following close of escrow. Hameed also agreed to liquidated damages of $50,000 should he breach this promise.
Hameed and his wife sold the home within one year of closing escrow. Beck sued to recover the liquidated damages as well as attorney fees authorized under the contract. Following a court trial, the court concluded Hameed had breached the contract, and it awarded the liquidated damages and attorney fees. Court affirm the courts judgment.

Despite the Rules of Court and repeated pronouncements by the appellate courts, some attorneys still do not submit even minimally adequate briefs. This is a case in point. The statement of facts submitted by appellants counsel is argumentative and does not contain all material facts, despite counsel indicating her client challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The argument section does not identify specific errors in the trial court proceedings but instead asks us to read specified pages in the record to ascertain the existence of error. Moreover, counsel argues we are to presume the errors we discover are prejudicial and must reverse the judgment against her client on that basis. Counsel does not explain how such a presumption can be made in this instance. Because of counsels failure to submit a sufficient brief from which we can ascertain her clients claims of error and supporting arguments, Court conclude plaintiffs claims are forfeited, and Court affirm the judgment on that basis.

Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant Derek Adam Nikrasch[1] pleaded no contest to felony evasion of a peace officer with willful disregard for the safety of persons or property (Veh. Code, 2800.2, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor resisting a peace officer (Pen. Code, 148, subd. (a)(1)). Subsequently, defendant moved to withdraw his plea based on counsels discovery of evidence allegedly favorable to his clients defense. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant obtained a certificate of probable cause and now appeals, claiming the trial court abused its discretion. Court shall affirm.

A juvenile delinquency petition filed in November 2008 accused Ricardo A. of residential burglary (Pen. Code,[1] 459, 460)), grand theft ( 487, subd. (a)) and receiving stolen property ( 496, subd. (a)). After a February 2009 trial the juvenile court entered true findings as to the first two counts and dismissed the third count. The court adjudged Ricardo a ward and placed him on probation. Ricardo appeals. Court affirm.

William C., father of dependent minors Peter C., Jennifer C. and Melissa C. (collectively, the minors), appeals after the juvenile court continued a family maintenance review hearing and set the matter for a contested hearing at William's request. William seeks to challenge the court's tentative evidentiary ruling and interim visitation order, both of which the court later addressed at the contested hearing. Court dismiss the appeal as moot.

Following an initial mistrial, a jury convicted Ricky Dean Fletcher of making a criminal threat. (Pen. Code, 422.)[1] The jury also found true allegations Fletcher used a deadly and dangerous weapon during the commission of the crime ( 12022.5, subd. (b)(1), 1192.7) and Fletcher committed the crime because of the victim's race or color ( 422.75, subd. (a)). In addition, the trial court found true an allegation Fletcher had a prior prison conviction. ( 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced Fletcher to five years and four months in prison.