CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
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In February 1976, petitioner James Theron Elliott was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit murder, robbery, grand theft and insurance fraud, first degree murder and first degree robbery. (People v. Elliott (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 673, 677 (Elliott).) Elliott was initially sentenced to death, but after the California Supreme Court held that the death penalty was unconstitutional, his sentence was modified to life imprisonment. (Id. at pp. 678, 689.)
On April 23, 2009, the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) found Elliott unsuitable for parole. The Santa Clara County Superior Court subsequently granted Elliott's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordered the Board to conduct a new hearing for Elliott within 95 days. The superior court found that the Board violated †|
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A jury convicted defendant Jose Hugo Simon of 14 counts of lewd acts on a child under 14 years of age (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a))[1] and one count of possession of child pornography (§ 311.11, subd. (a)). The court sentenced defendant to 135 years to life in state prison. Defendant claims there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions with regard to two counts of lewd conduct, and further claims the jury was not properly instructed with regard to those two counts. Defendant also raises a series of arguments with regard to the propriety of his sentence. Although we affirm the judgment of conviction, we reverse the judgment with regard to defendant's sentence and remand for resentencing.
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Petitioner in propria persona seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452 (rule 8.452)) from the juvenile court's order issued at a contested six-month review hearing setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] hearing. We conclude the petition fails to comport with the procedural requirements of rule 8.452. Accordingly, we will dismiss the petition as facially inadequate.
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Petitioner seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court's orders issued at a contested six-month review hearing terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] hearing as to his son J.H. We will deny the petition.
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This is an appeal from the denial of a motion in a dissolution of marriage action that has been going on for 10 years. David S. Hernandez (husband) and Sherri L. Hernandez (wife) began divorce proceedings in 2001. There have been many proceedings since the initial filing, including enforcement actions. We believe the divorce was final and the marital estate was divided by 2004. Since then, husband has made numerous attempts to relitigate issues already determined. He is appealing the denial of his most recent motion.
Husband, who is representing himself, asks us to review everything that has occurred in the family court, including new evidence that he is presenting to us, make new credibility findings and factual determinations, and issue a new judgment. This we cannot do. Our role is very limited. We review only what occurred in the family court to determine if there is any legal error that affected the outcome of the case. We make no credibility or factual findings. Our review is limited to those decisions of the family court from which a timely appeal is taken. Husband also has made our task very difficult by providing almost no record of the family court proceedings. For example, the record does not contain the motion the family law court denied. From the record before us, we cannot even determine whether this appeal is timely. For these reasons, we will affirm the order from which husband appeals. |
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The People appeal from an order dismissing a count of felony reckless evasion (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)) against Dino Allen Moreno under Penal Code[1] section 1385. The trial court dismissed the charge, which was contained in a single count information, after Moreno was convicted in a separate proceeding of attempted murder and other offenses and sentenced to an indeterminate term of 109 years to life in state prison.[2] The People contend we should reverse the order as void because the court did not provide written reasons for its dismissal in its minute order. They also contend the court manifestly abused its discretion because dismissal of the charge was not warranted under the facts of the case. Because the trial court did not provide a written statement of reasons for the dismissal entered upon the minutes, its dismissal order is ineffective. We therefore remand the matter with directions set forth below.
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D.D. appeals a juvenile court order denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1] in which she requested the court modify previous orders. She also appeals an order under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3) that efforts be made to find an appropriate adoptive home for her son, L.D. She argues the court abused its discretion by denying her section 388 petition, and substantial evidence did not support the court's finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption and termination of parental rights of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) did not apply to preclude terminating parental rights. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) maintains D.D's appeal from the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3) order is premature.
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In this case we conclude that the juvenile court acted beyond the scope of its authority in rescinding an order of victim restitution and instead ordering the district attorney's office to negotiate with the hospital to discount the victim's medical bills. We, therefore, grant the People's petition.
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Cheryl P. appeals a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her minor daughter, J.A., under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 366.26. Cheryl contends the court erred by summarily denying her section 388 petition for modification. She also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's findings J.A. was likely to be adopted and the beneficial parent-child relationship and beneficial sibling relationship exceptions to adoption did not apply to preclude terminating parental rights. We affirm the order.
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On August 27, 2010, Jose Anthony Baca[1] was charged with first degree murder (count 1) (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),[2] and assault by a life prisoner (count 2) (§ 4500). As to each charge it was alleged that Baca personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The complaint also alleged Baca had suffered one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, 668).
On October 19, 2010, Baca entered into a negotiated guilty plea in which he admitted having committed the charges in count 1, in exchange for dismissal of the balance of the complaint. Baca was immediately sentenced to 25 years to life in state prison, to be served consecutive to the current sentence he was serving. In addition, the trial court imposed a restitution fine of $10,000 (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)); a suspended $10,000 fine (§ 1202.45); a $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373); and a $30 court security fee (§ 1465.8). No credits were awarded. On November 4, 2010, Baca filed an appeal pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). |
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On July 12, 2010, Ronnie Bray pleaded guilty to Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), the unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle, and admitted a first degree burglary prior strike conviction. (Pen. Code, §§ 459/460, 667, subds. (b) - (i), 1170.12.) The trial court granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss the balance of the complaint, including one count of receiving stolen property, a prison prior and two other sentencing enhancements.[1] The court indicated its intention to select the lower term of 16 months, doubled to 32 months because of the prior strike. At sentencing the court imposed a term of 32 months, along with Penal Code section 4019 credits and various fines.
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M.W. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court's orders terminating her parental rights and ordering a permanent plan of adoption as to minor A.V., Jr. (A.V.). (Welf. & Inst. Code,[1] § 366.26.) A.V., Sr., the father, did not appeal.
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by finding that A.V. is adoptable. Concluding that substantial evidence supports this finding, we shall affirm. In doing so, we note that A.V.'s case serves as a stark reminder of the many years of emotional trauma and instability that can occur in a young child's life during juvenile dependency proceedings when cases are permitted to percolate their way through the system at their own pace, as we explain throughout. |
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