CA Unpub Decisions

Dawn McIntyre (McIntyre), a former employee of the Sonoma Valley Unified School District (the District), filed a petition for writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085) to compel the District to reinstate her as a permanent tenured teacher. The primary issue in this case is whether the District had a mandatory duty under the Education Code to classify McIntyre as a â€

Jason Broadbent appeals his conviction, which followed his no contest plea to a violation of Penal Code section 530.5, subdivision (a),[1] using personal identifying information for an unlawful purpose. He argues that his constitutional equal protection rights require the retroactive application of section 4019, as amended in October 2011, to award him additional conduct credits, despite its stated prospective application. He also argues we must reverse and remand for resentencing because he was sentenced based on a materially inaccurate characterization of the facts underlying his prior â€

Defendant Priscilla Peien Yuan was charged with felony assault with a deadly weapon. Based upon the opinions of two psychologists, the court determined that defendant was incompetent to stand trial and ordered her committed to a locked psychiatric facility for a term of no more than three years. Defendant claims that she was denied due process because (1) she was not afforded the opportunity either through counsel or by herself personally to argue in favor of a finding that she was competent; (2) she was not permitted to have separate counsel appointed who would argue that she was competent to stand trial; and (3) she was not allowed to confront witnesses by contesting the conclusions contained in the psychologists' reports relied on by the court. We conclude that there was no error and will therefore affirm the commitment order.
FACTS[1]
Defendant was â€

M.W. appeals from a juvenile court order continuing the removal of S.B. from her care. We will affirm that order and two related orders on the merits.

This appeal concerns the unfortunate scenario in which family members became embroiled in controversy over alleged misconduct in the management of the assets of a revocable family trust. David Henry Gill, the trustor of an eponymous revocable trust, passed away in 1990, five months after its creation. He was survived by his widow and six children. One of the trustor's children, Brian,[1] an attorney experienced in trusts and estates matters, served as the successor cotrustee for over 17 years after his father's death.[2] In 2008, after Brian resigned and two brothers, Jonathan and Jason (petitioners), succeeded him as cotrustees, they filed proceedings on behalf of the trust against Brian to recover trust funds allegedly taken by him without justification and allegedly excessive payments he made to his wife, Kim Gill, for interior design and project management services she rendered to the trust.
After a four-day trial, the court rejected petitioners' claims. It held that Brian had not improperly diverted trust funds to himself and the compensation he had paid to Kim for her services was reasonable. Thereafter, the court awarded Brian $213,274.18 in attorney fees and costs (the fee order), a sum that was about $92,000 less than the sum he had requested.

Jose Antonio Ortiz appeals from his judgment of conviction of multiple sex offenses. He was sentenced to a total prison term of 120 years consecutive to 21 years. We have reviewed his contentions and will now affirm the judgment as modified.

M.B. (Mother) and Mother's eldest child, D.P. (now 12 years old), appeal following an order terminating Mother's parental rights regarding now 11‑year‑old I.B., 10‑year‑old J.S., seven‑year‑old L.B., and six‑year‑old R.B (collectively referred to as the siblings). R.A., the presumed father of L.B. and R.B. (Father), has appealed from the same order which terminated his parental rights as to L.B. and R.B. Father has filed a letter brief stating that he â€

Emergency Technologies, Inc. (Emergency Technologies), appeals from an order awarding attorney fees to Sunday Garcia. We affirm. Emergency Technologies sought to recover damages from Garcia on a contract containing an attorney fees provision. The trial court found the contract was unenforceable because Emergency Technologies was not properly licensed. Emergency Technologies recovered nothing, which was less than the amount of Garcia's offer to compromise under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, and, as a consequence, the trial court awarded Garcia her attorney fees under the contract.
The parties have argued at length, both in their appellate briefs and at oral argument, over the extent to which an unenforceable contract may be enforced against one party and whether Emergency Technologies and Garcia are in pari delicto. The appeal is resolved, however, through a simple application of the mutuality rule of Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 611. Emergency Technologies would have been able to recover attorney fees if it prevailed and recovered on the contract; therefore, Garcia is entitled to recover her attorney fees by establishing the contract was unenforceable.

A jury found Victor John Disalvo guilty of first degree murder and found to be true he personally used a firearm within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d).[1] The court denied Disalvo's motion for new trial and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 50 years to life in state prison. On appeal, Disalvo argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call character witnesses and the trial court should have granted his motion for new trial on that same basis. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

The parties, very unhappy neighbors, now come before us for the fifth time.[1] In the lawsuit underlying this appeal, James Michael Harm and Soraya Maria Harm filed a complaint against Wayne T. Hetman for quiet title, slander of title, nuisance, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, declaratory relief and injunctive relief. Hetman filed a cross-complaint. The Harms obtained a money judgment against Hetman. The present appeal has to do with the Harms's efforts to collect on that judgment.
Hetman claimed a bank account upon which the Harms had levied was exempt from levy under Code of Civil Procedure section 704.160, concerning workers' compensation awards. The court denied his claim of exemption. Hetman appeals. We affirm. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Hetman failed to meet his burden to trace the purported workers' compensation settlement proceeds to the bank account in question.

Defendant Michael Patrick Jones was convicted of crimes related to defrauding his employer, the California Highway Patrol (CHP), and the State Compensation Insurance Fund out of monetary benefits by filing false and fraudulent claims that he was physically unable to work due to work-related back injuries. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to vacate the judgment. We will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Joseph Luis Montuy was convicted of felony child abuse for striking his teenaged daughter with a belt. On appeal, he contends (1) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his prior acts of domestic violence, (2) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to opinion testimony that defendant coached his children, and (3) the trial court erroneously imposed various fees. We will vacate some of the fees, remand with directions, and affirm in all other respects.

Plaintiff Marvin J. Derrick, M.D., elected to withdraw from a medical partnership known as California Cardiac Surgeons, a Medical Group (CCS), and he requested that his one-third interest therein be purchased by CCS in accordance with the terms set forth in paragraph 11.6 of the Restated Partnership Agreement (the Partnership Agreement). However, he was unable to reach agreement with the other two CCS partners, Sarabjit S. Purewal, M.D., and Patrick T. Paw, M.D., regarding the buyout price. Derrick sued CCS, Purewal, and Paw (collectively defendants) for an accounting to determine the value of his partnership interest and to enforce his alleged right to be paid for that interest. Purewal and Paw filed a cross-complaint relating to the same issues. The point of contention between the parties was whether Derrick's proportionate share of CCS's office lease had to be included as a liability when computing the buyout price. A second dispute emerged as to whether the buyout price should be calculated based on paragraph 11.6 of the Partnership Agreement or under Corporations Code section 16701.[1] At trial, Derrick's accounting expert testified that the lease should not be treated as a CCS liability in computing the value of Derrick's partnership interest. The trial court agreed with that analysis and also found that paragraph 11.6 was applicable in this case. The trial court then rendered its accounting based on evidence presented at trial and concluded that defendants owed Derrick the sum of $277,657. Defendants appeal from the judgment. We will affirm.

In this matter, we have reviewed the petition and the response by the People conceding that the writ of mandate should be granted. In light of this concession, issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is appropriate. (Palma v. U. S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)
Penal Code section 1405, subdivision (b)(1), requires that a court appoint an attorney to represent an indigent convicted person to prepare a motion for performance of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing. The appropriateness of filing a motion for DNA testing is not to be determined when the person requests the appointment of counsel. (In re Kinnamon (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 316.)
Therefore, we must conclude that the superior court erred in denying petitioner's request for appointment of counsel.