Ave. Neighborhood Assn. v. City of
Angeles
Filed 2/24/12 La Mirada Ave. Neighborhood Assn. v. City of Los Angeles CA2/4
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
LA
MIRADA AVENUE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION OF HOLLYWOOD et al.,
Petitioners and Appellants,
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,
Respondents.
B229517
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BS122662)
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County, David P. Yaffe, Judge.
Affirmed.
The
Silverstein Law Firm and Robert P. Silverstein; The Law Offices of David
Lawrence Bell and David Lawrence Bell for Petitioners and Appellants.
Carmen
A. Trutanich, Los
Angeles City Attorney, Terry Kaufmann Macias, Colleen Courtney and
Charles D. Sewell, Deputy City Attorneys, for Respondents.
introduction
Petitioners and appellants La Mirada
Neighborhood Association of Hollywood and Gary Slossberg appeal from the trial
court’s denial of their petition for writ of mandate and complaint for
City of Los Angeles (the City) challenging the meeting agendas published by the
City’s Area Planning Commissions (APC’s).
Petitioners contend that the use of the phrase “Public Hearing
Completed” on the meeting agendas with respect to particular items violates the
Ralph M. Brown Act (Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq. (the Brown Act))
because it misleads members of the public into believing that they have no
right to speak at the meetings regarding those items. Viewing the agenda as a whole, we conclude
that reasonable members of the public are not likely to be misled by the
phrase. We find no violation of the
Brown Act and thus affirm the judgment.
factual and procedural background
Target Corporation filed an
application with the City regarding a proposal to build a 192,680 square foot
retail shopping center (the Target Project).
Under the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC), the application required a
public hearing at which evidence would be taken. (LAMC §§ 11.5.7(F)(1), 12.24(D). Pursuant to LAMC section 12.24(D), the Central APC delegated these hearing requirements
to hearing officer Lynda Smith, who conducted a public hearing on April
10, 2009. Seven people attended and six of them
testified, including at least one member of the La Mirada Neighborhood
Association who testified in opposition to the Target Project. Smith then prepared a staff report containing
her findings, recommendations, and a summary of the
The Target Project was scheduled to be
considered by the Central APC at its regular meeting on June 23, 2009.
Pursuant to section 54954.2, which requires that an agenda be posted in
advance for all such meetings and that it contain a “brief general description
of each item of business to be transacted or discussed at the meeting”
(§ 54954.2, subd. (a)(1)), an agenda was posted for the June
23, 2009
meeting listing eight topics. On the
first page, the agenda stated in bold capital letters that “every person
wishing to address the Commission must complete a speaker’s request form at the
meeting and submit it to the Commission executive assistant.” The last item on the agenda, Item number
nine, referred to a “Public Comment Period” and invited the public to speak on
any “items of interest to the public that are within the subject matter
jurisdiction of the Area Planning Commission.”
Item number five on the agenda
described the Target Project as involving “[c]onstruction of a 192,680 net
square foot retail shopping center . . . which would include a 162,415 square
foot Target store, 26,600 square feet of retail and food uses, and 3,665 square
feet of associated uses.” Under this
item, a heading in bold capital letters read “Public Hearing Completed.” The phrase was intended to alert APC members
that a public hearing notice had gone out with respect to the agenda item and a
public hearing with an opportunity for public testimony already had been
conducted by a hearing officer.
Other items on the agenda included the
heading “Public Hearing Required.” This
phrase signified that the APC needed to conduct a public hearing pursuant to
the full LAMC requirements for taking evidence and testimony. Related to such agenda items, the first page
of the agenda states: “Pursuant to the
Commission’s general operating procedures, the Commission at times must necessarily
limit the speaking times of those presenting testimony on either side of an
issue that is designated as a public hearing item. All requests to address the Commission on
public hearing items must be submitted prior to the Commission’s consideration
of the item.”
At the June 23, 2009 meeting, nine
people, including at least one member of the La Mirada Neighborhood
Association, addressed the Central APC in support of or in opposition to the
Target Project. Following the meeting,
the Central APC approved the project with several modifications.
Pursuant to section 54960.1, subdivision
(b), petitioners demanded in writing that the Central APC rescind the approvals
of the Target Project and correct the allegedly misleading use of the phrase
“Public Hearing Completed” in the agenda.
The City Attorney responded that the City would not correct or cure its
actions.
On September 3, 2009, petitioners
filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and
injunctive relief. In support of their
petition they alleged that Slossberg, one of the members of the La Mirada Neighborhood
Association, did not attend the June 23, 2009 hearing but would have attended
and voiced his opposition to the Target Project had he not been misled by the
language stating “Public Hearing Completed” under the description of the Target
Project agenda item on the June 23, 2009 meeting agenda. Petitioners submitted other agendas of APC
meetings that use the same or substantially the same language as the June 23,
2009 agenda, including the phrase “Public Hearing Completed” under particular
agenda items and the general references to the public’s right to speak on
matters within the jurisdiction of the APC.
They alleged that the City’s recurring use of the phrase “Public Hearing
Completed” discourages public participation at APC meetings. The writ petition alleged two causes of
action under the Brown Act: the first
sought to nullify all approvals of the Target Project based on the allegedly
misleading June 23, 2009 meeting agenda, and the second sought declaratory and
injunctive relief prohibiting the City from including similarly misleading
language in future agendas for APC meetings.
After the petition was filed, the
project developer withdrew the Target Project from consideration, rendering the
first cause of action moot. Thus, the
only remaining claim concerned declaratory and injunctive relief with respect
to the language used in agendas for future APC meetings.
At a hearing conducted on September
28, 2010, the court concluded that the contention that the June 23, 2009 agenda
was subject to misinterpretation was not persuasive in the absence of evidence
that anyone but Slossberg was misled by the agenda and in the face of evidence
that approximately 10 other people attended the June 23, 2009 meeting and spoke
regarding the Target Project. The court
denied the petition and entered judgment in favor of the City. This timely appeal followed.
discussion
Petitioners contend the trial court
erred in dismissing their claim for declaratory and injunctive relief to
prevent the City from using the phrase “Public Hearing Completed” in its future
agendas for regular APC meetings. Where
the facts are undisputed and the issue involves statutory interpretation, we
exercise our independent judgment and
review the matter de novo. (
111 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1104.) “[W]e must
construe . . . the provisions calling for open meetings and public
participation broadly to effectuate the important purposes of the Brown Act.” (Galbiso
v. Orosi Public Utility Dist. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1080 (
“[T]he purpose of the Brown Act is to
ensure openness in decisionmaking by public agencies and facilitate public
participation in the decisionmaking process.”
(Service Employees Internat.
Union, Local 99 v. Options—A Child Care & Human Services Agency (2011)
200 Cal.App.4th 869, 877 (Local 99);
see § 54950.) The Brown Act permits
any interested person to “commence an action by mandamus, injunction, or
declaratory relief for the purpose of stopping or preventing violations or
threatened violations of this chapter by members of the legislative body
a local agency or to determine the applicability of this chapter to actions or
threatened future action of the legislative body.” (§ 54960, subd. (a).) Thus, even after the writ petition seeking to
nullify all approvals of the Target Project was rendered moot by the withdrawal
of the application for the project, petitioners were still entitled to seek
declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the City from violating the Brown
Act in agendas for future APC meetings.
(Regents of University of
California v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 509, 522.)
The APC Agendas Comply with Section
54954.3
Petitioners contend that the agendas
for the APC regular meetings routinely violate section 54954.3, which provides
that “[e]very agenda for regular meetings shall provide an opportunity for
members of the public to directly address the legislative body on any item of
interest to the public, before or during the legislative body’s consideration
of the item, that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the legislative
body.” (§ 54954.3, subd. (a); see
Although petitioners do not dispute that members of the public are in
fact permitted to comment on all such matters at APC meetings, they argue that
the language used in the agendas leads the public to the erroneous
conclusion that they will not have an opportunity to speak on
particular issues. We respectfully
disagree with petitioners.
We conclude that the APC meeting
agendas in the record before us adequately disclose that members of the public
have a right to speak at the meetings about any subject that falls within the
jurisdiction of the APC. The first page
of each of the agendas in question states in bold capital letters that “every
person wishing to address the Commission must complete a speaker’s request
form.” Further, each agenda contains a
section entitled “Public Comment Period” indicating that the APC shall provide
an opportunity for the public to address it on items that are within the
subject matter jurisdiction of the APC.
Given these multiple invitations for
public comment, the additional phrase “Public Hearing Completed” included under
certain agenda items does not reasonably lead members of the public to believe
that they will have no opportunity to speak regarding these items. Petitioners are correct that average members
of the public will not necessarily understand that the phrase “Public Hearing
Completed” is meant to signal to the APC members that the requirement of a
public hearing under the LAMC has already been satisfied and thus they need not
take evidence at the hearing. However,
given the other language in the agendas promising the public the right to
speak, we do not believe that the public reasonably would construe the phrase
to mean that no opportunity for public comment will be afforded on those
subjects that include the phrase “Public Hearing Completed.” Nor do we find anything misleading about the
language in the agendas stating that the APC may limit the speaking times of
those presenting testimony for items that are specifically designated as
“public hearing items.” Contrary to
petitioners’ contention, such statements do not reasonably suggest that
items not designated as “public
hearing items.”
“[W]e will affirm a judgment correct
on any legal basis, even if that basis was not invoked by the trial court. [Citation.]
There can be no prejudicial error from erroneous logic or reasoning if
the decision itself is correct.” (
Cal.App.4th 229, 269.) Because we
conclude based on our independent judgment that the APC meeting agendas were
not misleading and that the trial court correctly entered judgment in the
City’s favor, we need not consider petitioners’ contention that the court
committed error by allegedly failing to consider whether the APC agendas were
objectively misleading and instead focused solely on whether anyone was
actually misled by the agenda for the June 23, 2009 regular meeting of the
Central APC.
The Agendas Do Not Violate Section
54954.2
Petitioners also seem to suggest that,
by incorporating “cryptic, confusing, and misleading” language stating that
public hearings have been completed on particular agenda items, the agendas
violate another provision of the Brown Act, section 54954.2, which provides
that “[a]t least 72 hours before a regular meeting, the legislative body of the
local agency, or its designee, shall post an agenda containing a
of business to be transacted or discussed at the meeting.” (§ 54954.2, subd. (a)(1), italics
added.)
Petitioners provide no authority for
the proposition that a legislative body violates this provision of the Brown
Act by including language in a meeting agenda that obscures the public’s
understanding of their right to comment at the meeting. Moreover, we have already concluded above
that the agendas in question were not misleading in this regard. Thus, section 54954.2 has no application
here.
The two cases cited by petitioner,
Cal.App.4th 17 (Moreno) and
(1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 196 (Carlson),
do not support their argument. In
Act violations after the city council held a special meeting at which he was
not present and decided to fire him. The
agenda for the meeting listed the following topic: “‘Per Government Code Section 54957: Public Employee (employment contract).’” (Moreno,
supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 21.)
The Court of Appeal determined that “[t]he agenda’s description provided
no clue that the dismissal of a public employee would be discussed at the
meeting,” and thus it failed to provide a “brief general description” of the
action to be taken at the meeting as required by the requirement of section
54954.2. (Id. at p. 27.)
Carlson
does not even concern the Brown Act.
Rather, it deals with the requirement of Education Code section 966,
subdivision (b), that an agenda be posted for all school board meetings. (Carlson,
supra, 18 Cal.App.3d at p.
199.) The plaintiff complained that the
school board had voted to close an elementary school without providing notice
via the meeting agenda that it was considering such action. The Court of Appeal agreed with the
plaintiff, holding that “adequate notice is a requisite. In the instant case, the school board’s
agenda contained as one item the language ‘Continuation school site
change.’ This was entirely inadequate
notice to a citizenry which may have been concerned over a school
[¶] . . . [T]he agenda item, though not deceitful, was
entirely misleading and inadequate to show the whole scope of the board’s
intended plans.” (Id. at p. 200.)
Both Moreno and Carlson take
issue with inadequate descriptions on
meeting agendas of the matter to be discussed; neither concern language
in an agenda that is alleged to obscure the public’s right to comment at the
meetings. They are therefore inapposite
to petitioners’ claims here.
Reliance on APC
Internal Rules Does Not Aid Petitioners’ Claims
Lastly, petitioners rely on allegedly
flawed Central APC Rules and Operative Procedures providing that “[w]ith
respect to matters on which prior public hearings have been held, the regular
public meeting of the Commission shall be for decision only, however, an
opportunity for public comment may be
provided.” Petitioners correctly note
that, pursuant to section 54954.3, subdivision (a), the APC does not have any
discretion with respect to permitting public comment; rather, it
opportunity to speak during its regular meetings. (§ 54954.3, subd. (a).) Petitioners suggest that these rules and
operating procedures compound the confusion caused by the agendas.
A Brown Act violation cannot be
premised on these internal rules and operating procedures. Even if these guidelines misstate the applicable
Brown Act requirements, petitioners have presented no evidence that members of
the public have ever been denied the right to speak at APC regular meetings or
that there is a threat that they will be denied this right in the future. And as discussed above, the APC agendas
sufficiently disclose such a right to
comment. Thus, reliance on these APC
rules does not aid petitioners’ claims.
disposition
The
judgment is affirmed.
WILLHITE,
Acting P. J.
We
concur:
MANELLA,
J.
SUZUKAWA, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] All undesignated code sections herein
refer to the California Government Code.
“legislative body,” as defined in the act.
(§ 54952; see Local 99, supra,
