CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant K.P. was declared a ward of the court after admitting a charge of grand theft. On appeal, he contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by placing him in a nine-month program at a juvenile ranch facility. We affirm.

Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), and the trial court found that sentence enhancement allegations for a prior robbery conviction and prior strike were true (Pen. Code, §§ 667, 1170.12). He argues in this appeal that the trial court erred by admitting his pretrial statements and the testimony of his mother. We conclude that no prejudicial error in the admission of evidence occurred, and affirm the judgment.

This appeal arises from the denial of a petition for writ of mandate (writ petition) brought under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) The writ petition sought to overturn the decision of respondent City and County of San Francisco (the City)[1] to permit real parties in interest and respondents T-Mobile West Corporation, T-Mobile USA, Inc., T-Mobile Resources Corporation, and Omnipoint Communications, Inc. (collectively T-Mobile) to place sets of wireless telecommunications equipment on existing utility poles, including a pole located near appellants’ homes.[2] The trial court denied the requested relief. We affirm.
facts and procedural background
On April 6, 2009, T-Mobile filed an application with the City’s Planning Department requesting CEQA review of a series of about 40 proposed wireless telecommunications equipment installations (the T-Mobile project[3]). The installations were to be fastened to existing utility poles at locations “distributed throughout the city and . . . not concentrated in one particular area.”

Appellant Robert A. Simoncini was hospitalized at Seton Medical Center, a hospital operated by Daughters of Charity Health System (DOCHS).[1] He was sued by California Service Bureau, Inc. (CSB), a collection agency, on common counts after failing to pay his hospital bill. Robert filed a cross-complaint against DOCHS for equitable indemnity, contribution, and declaratory relief, alleging that DOCHS had improperly failed to bill Medicare. A bench trial resulted in a judgment and award of attorney fees in favor of DOCHS. Robert contends that he was improperly denied trial by jury and challenges the evidence admitted at trial. We reject these claims, but modify the judgment to strike an award of attorney fees.

Appellant Josiah Miller was sentenced to 11 years in prison after entering a negotiated plea of no contest to a reduced charge of voluntary manslaughter in exchange for dismissal of an arson charge and weapon enhancement. Miller was awarded 828 days credit for time served. Additionally, the court imposed various fines and fees, including $18,063.11 in victim restitution.
Miller challenges the victim restitution order as well as the calculation of his presentence custody credit. We conclude that the challenge to victim restitution is without merit. We agree, however, with the parties that Miller should be awarded presentence credit for time served in Oregon stemming from the same conduct for which he was convicted in this case.
Miller’s petition for habeas corpus raises his challenge to presentence custody credit. We deny the writ as moot because we resolve the presentence custody credit in this appeal. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court for recalculation of Miller’s presentence credits to reflect the time he was in custody in Oregon, but in all other respects affirm.

In August 2008 the Board of Chiropractic Examiners (Board) issued a decision revoking Aster Kifle-Thompson’s chiropractic license. Kifle-Thompson sought judicial review by petition for writ of administrative mandate, and now appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition. She contends the Board’s findings are not supported by the evidence, the Board exceeded its jurisdiction and failed to give her a fair hearing, and improperly imposed the disciplinary measure of license revocation.
We conclude the challenged findings are supported by substantial evidence, and find no merit in Kifle-Thompson’s other claims of error. We affirm the order denying her petition.

Elizabeth Karnazes appeals from three orders pertaining to the enforcement of a settlement agreement with the City of Foster City (the City) in which she agreed to bring her residence into compliance with the City’s fire, safety, and health codes. We reverse the trial court’s order allowing the City to take video and photographs during a compliance inspection of Karnazes’s home, and dismiss her other appeals.

A jury convicted defendant Erik Magana of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a); all statutory references are to this code) and found the allegation he inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) to be true. The prosecution presented evidence Magana used his hands to beat Yherui Rodriguez into unconsciousness. Rodriguez suffered brain trauma, could not speak normally when he regained consciousness, and spent time in a rehabilitation center. Magana spoke with police officers a few weeks after the incident and admitted inflicting the beating because he believed Rodriguez had molested teenage girls. At trial, Magana testified Rodriguez started the fight by hitting him in the face after Magana called Rodriguez a “chester” (child molester). Magana acknowledged he had not told the investigating officers Rodriguez started the fight, explaining he had been nervous.

Danner & Martyn, Daniel E. Martyn, Jr., Michael D. Schulman, Diana S. Ponce-Gomez;Law Offices of Michael D. Schulman and Michael D. Schulman for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Plaintiff VW Credit, Inc. (VCI) sued certain individuals, business entities, and trusts (collectively, defendants) for failure to repay loan obligations taken on by two Lamborghini dealerships. After defendants ignored discovery requests and refused to comply with ensuing court orders, the trial court granted terminating sanctions (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (d)) against defendants. Thereafter, two default judgments were entered awarding VCI sizable compensatory (approximately $14 million) and punitive (approximately $44 million) damages against some of the defendants, including individuals Viken Keuylian, Nora Keuylian, Asdghig Keuylian, and Sossi Keuylian (appellants).[1] Appellants take issue with the punitive damage awards. Because we agree with their contentions, we modify the judgment by striking the awards of punitive damages. There was insufficient notice of the amount of punitive damages demanded by VCI. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 425.115, 580, subd. (a).) Moreover, there was insufficient evidence of appellants’ financial condition presented at the default judgment prove-up hearing.

A jury convicted defendant Dat Thanh Tran of possession of marijuana for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359.) Tran contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence as the product of an unlawful detention. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5.) He also argues there was insufficient evidence he possessed marijuana with the intent to sell it. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm.

Appellant, Victoriano Mejia, stands convicted of multiple felonies. In January 2010, the trial court imposed sentence and awarded custody credits.[1] Appellant appealed, and on appeal this court held, inter alia, that the trial court erred in determining appellant’s actual time credits and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to recalculate those credits.[2] Thereafter, the trial court issued an ex parte order and abstract of judgment indicating, inter alia, that appellant was awarded custody credits of 4,905 days, consisting of 4,681 days of actual time credits and 224 days of conduct credits. The instant appeal followed.
On appeal, appellant contends (1) the court erred in modifying appellant’s sentence without a notice and hearing and in appellant’s absence, and (2) the abstract of judgment contains other errors that should be corrected. The People concede the latter point. We assume without deciding that appellant’s first argument has merit, but conclude any error was harmless. We conclude further that the court’s award of custody credits was erroneous. We modify the judgment, order that the trial court issue a new abstract of judgment, and affirm the judgment as modified.

Donald J. Ackley appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court granted the summary judgment motion of defendants Jennifer Jones, Steve McLaughlin, and Thomas M. Avila. We affirm the judgment.

Petitioner L.H. (Mother) filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, challenging the juvenile court’s orders (1) terminating reunification services as to her older child K.Y., (2) denying reunification services as to her youngest child N.H, (3) and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 366.26 hearing as to both children. On appeal, Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in terminating her services as to K.Y. and denying her services as to N.H. pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (b)(13). She also argues that she was denied her due process right because she was not provided with notice that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), might be utilized in denying her services. For the reasons explained post, we deny Mother’s petition.

R.C. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order of November 23, 2011, reinstating a prior order terminating his parental rights to his two sons, E.A and D.C. (the children).[1] Father challenges the juvenile court’s findings at this hearing that the Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) complied with the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA), and that ICWA does not apply. The juvenile court made these findings after the case was remanded by this appellate court so DPSS could include available information about the paternal grandfather in its notices to the Indian tribes. In this second appeal, father contends the juvenile court’s ICWA findings are in error because DPSS failed to mail the improved notices to certain Apache and Creek tribes, to which it had previously provided notice. As discussed below, we agree with DPSS that father waived this issue on appeal after remand because father also received the notices three months prior to the November 23, 2011 hearing and failed to raise the issue at that time.