CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Richard Edward Kamka pleaded no contest in case No. CM022965 (case 965) to making criminal threats. In addition, a jury convicted defendant in case No. CM023797 (case 797) with failure to appear, unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and resisting an officer. The jury found on-bail enhancement and prior strike allegations true. Moreover, in case No. CM024029 (case 029), a jury convicted defendant of stalking. The trial court found on-bail enhancement and prior strike allegations true.
The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of 11 years 4 months.
Defendant now contends (1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea in case 965, because at the time the trial court denied the motion it was “reasonably aware” that defendant’s mental state was questionable; and (2) the criminal threats conviction in case 965 could not serve as a prior strike conviction in case 029 and case 797 because defendant was sentenced in all three cases on the same day.

In January 2007, pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant Elwood Dwayne Hayes pleaded no contest to assault in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1)[1] conditioned upon, among other things, that the offense was not a strike, a serious felony or a violent felony. In February, imposition of sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for three years on various terms and conditions.
In September 2009, defendant admitted violating conditions of his probation and, in December, he was sentenced to state prison for four years and given 199 days of presentence custody credit, consisting of 133 days actually served plus 66 days for conduct.
In April 2010, this court granted defendant’s request for constructive filing of a notice of appeal and he did so.

I.A. (Father) and R.A. (Mother) challenge an order of the juvenile court bypassing family reunification services and setting a permanent plan hearing regarding their three minor children. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 361.5, subd. (b)(4), 366.26, subd. (c).)[1] We deny their petitions for extraordinary writ.

Fritz S., father of B. S., appeals from the 12-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (f))[1] contending the court erred as a matter of law when it denied his request to have B. placed with him in Texas merely because Texas authorities denied two notices under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) (Fam. Code, § 7900 et seq.). We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Jesus Tarelo Gonzalez of kidnapping to commit rape (Pen. Code, § 209, count 1); forcible sexual penetration by a foreign object (id., § 289, subd. (a)(1), count 2); and attempted forcible rape (id., §§ 664, 261, subd. (a)(2)). The trial court sentenced defendant to life on count 1, and stayed the sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 654. The court imposed 25 years to life on count 2, pursuant to Penal Code section 667.61. In addition, the court imposed an eight-year term of imprisonment on count 2. On count 3, the trial court imposed one-third the midterm, or two years, consecutive to count 2. Gonzalez appealed his convictions and sentence, and in an unpublished opinion we concluded that the trial court erred in sentencing defendant to 25 years to life plus eight years on count 2, in addition to two years on count 3. We remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing, but otherwise affirmed defendant’s convictions. (People v. Gonzales (Feb. 9, 2011, B218052) [nonpub. opn.].)

Michael R. (Father) and F.H. (Mother) appeal the juvenile court order terminating their parental rights to their son P., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Father contends he did not receive notice of the August 31, 2011 continued section 366.26 hearing where his parental rights were terminated. Mother claims there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that P. was adoptable and that the juvenile court erred in its refusal to apply the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) parental benefit exception.[2] We affirm the juvenile court’s order.

Appellants Kurosh Hassid and Farzad Shooshani (Buyers) negotiated to purchase a parcel of real property from Carlos Jerez and Mary Jerez (Sellers) and prepared a printed form agreement for the purchase. Although the purchase agreement was not signed, Buyers and Sellers signed escrow instructions for the transaction. Sellers refused to complete the sale and Buyers filed a complaint for specific performance.
Buyers appeal the judgment in favor of Sellers entered after the trial court sustained Sellers' demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend. The trial court ruled that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it did not allege the formation of a binding contract.
We agree with Buyers' contention that the allegations of a negotiated purchase agreement combined with signed escrow instructions were sufficient to state a cause of action despite the failure of the parties to execute the purchase and sale agreement. We reverse.

Karen Guth and Joshua Yaguda appeal from an order denying their post-judgment motion for extra presentence conduct credits based on the January 25, 2010 amended version of Penal Code section 4019, also known as Senate Bill 18 (Stats. 2009-2010, 3d Ex.Sess., ch 28, § 50 (SB 18)).[1] The trial court found that SB 18, which provides for enhanced one-for-one presentence conduct credits, does not retroactively apply to appellants who were sentenced in 2009. We affirm. (People v. Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 318.)
In 2009 Guth and Yaguda pled guilty to multiple counts of securities fraud involving more than $100 million in real estate-backed securities. (Corp. Code, §§ 25110, 25401, 25541.)[2] On December 7, 2009, the trial court sentenced Guth and Yaguda to state prison for 12 years and 8 years respectively and awarded 428 days actual custody and 214 days conduct credit (§§ 2900.5; 4019).
On May 10, 2010 appellants filed a post-judgment motion for additional presentence conduct credits (i.e., another 214 days conduct credit) based on the theory that SB 18 retroactively applied to their sentences. The trial court denied the motion.

Lachre Johnson appeals her conviction by jury for forgery (count 1; Pen. Code, § 470, subd. (d))[1], second degree burglary (count 2; § 459), identity theft (count 4; § 530.5, subd. (a)), two counts of possession of a forged driver's license (counts 6 & 8; § 470b), two counts of forgery by possessing a blank check with intent to defraud (counts 7 & 9; § 475, subd. (b)), forgery by possession of a counterfeit traveler's check (count 10; § 475, subd. (c)), and three misdemeanor counts of identity theft (counts 11-13; § 530.5, subd. (c)(1).) The trial court sentenced appellant to five years state prison. Appellant appeals contending that the convictions are not supported by substantial evidence, that the trial court committed judicial misconduct, and that a Pitchess motion was erroneously denied. We affirm.

Mark Mundell appeals from the order awarding reasonable attorney fees to the City of Simi Valley (City) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.7.[1] Appellant contends that the trial court (1) erroneously found that his action against City had not been filed in good faith, (2) failed to provide him an opportunity to respond to evidence produced by City, and (3) abused its discretion in determining the amount of attorney fees. We affirm and remand for a determination of reasonable attorney fees on appeal.

Defendant Nam Ju Hoang appeals from a judgment sentencing him to nine years in prison after he was found guilty of commercial burglary (Pen. Code,[1] § 459) and vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)), with three prior felony convictions (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subd. (a)-(d)) and three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). He contends there was insufficient evidence to support a true finding as to one of the prior prison term allegations, and that he is entitled to additional conduct credits under section 4019, which was amended after he was sentenced. He also asks this court to conduct an independent review of the sealed transcript of the Pitchess[2] hearings conducted by the trial court, to determine if there was information that should have been disclosed. The Attorney General concedes there was insufficient evidence to support the true finding as to one of the prior prison term allegations; accordingly, we reverse that finding and order that the one-year prison term based upon that finding be stricken. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

Fernando Arriaga appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189.)[1] The jury found true an allegation that he had personally used a deadly weapon (a knife). (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) Appellant admitted the truth of a prior prison term allegation. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life for the murder plus one year for the deadly weapon enhancement. For the prior prison term enhancement, the court imposed a one-year prison term but stayed the sentence.
Appellant admits killing the victim after an argument, but he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict of first degree murder. In addition, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the victim's statements about her relationship with appellant.
As the People concede, the trial court erroneously stayed the sentence for the prior prison term enhancement. We order it stricken and affirm the judgment as modified.

Putative class representative Mark Barrueta is one of 250 off-duty or retired peace officers (ODO’s) who entered into independent contractor engagement agreements with defendant International Protective Services, Inc., doing business as International Services, Inc. (ISI), a “private patrol operator” licensed by the State of California to furnish security guards. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7582.1, subd. (a).) ISI hired the ODO’s specifically to work as armed security guards at various facilities of defendant Ralphs Grocery Company (Ralphs) during the “Southern California Supermarket Strike of 2003-2004” (strike), which lasted from October 2003 to February 2004.
The complaint alleged that ISI and Ralphs violated the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 (UCL)) by misclassifying the ODO’s as independent contractors rather than employees and failing to pay statutorily required overtime wages. Barrueta moved to certify the proposed class of ODO’s, but the trial court granted the motion only as to the claim against ISI. Based on the parties’ conflicting evidence concerning Ralphs’s liability as a joint employer, the trial court concluded that it was neither feasible nor desirable to litigate the claim against Ralphs on a classwide basis. In this appeal from the order denying class certification as to the claim against Ralphs, we affirm, finding no abuse of discretion or legal error.

Abraham Enrique Martinez, Jr. appeals a judgment following conviction of conspiracy to possess methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine for sale, and sale or transportation of methamphetamine. (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a)(1); Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11377, subd. (a), 11378, 11379, subd. (a).)[1] We affirm.