CA Unpub Decisions

A.N. appeals juvenile court orders terminating her parental rights to her daughters, K.N. and W.N., and referring the matter for adoption. She contends substantial evidence does not support the court's finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption and termination of parental rights of Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i)[1] did not apply. She argues K.N. and W.N. are bonded with her and the benefits of continuing their relationships outweigh the benefits of adoption. We affirm the orders.

On appeal, Ryder argues the late disclosure of the presence of a second police officer during an interview with Ryder prejudicially violated the reciprocal discovery statutes (Pen. Code, § 1054 et seq.), his rights to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel, and his due process rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We affirm the judgment.

Bussell appealed the interlocutory judgment, asserting (1) the judgment violated the spendthrift provision of the trust and Probate Code sections 15300 and 15301; (2) the court erred by including an award of attorney fees and costs in the judgment; and (3) the court erred in awarding Reedy the costs of maintaining, preserving and marketing the property. We affirmed the interlocutory judgment in a nonpublished opinion, Reedy v. Bussell (Jan. 6, 2010, D054569) (Reedy I).
Following remand, Reedy brought a motion for an order confirming the sale of the property to the City of San Marcos in the amount of $6.5 million. The motion asserted that the sale was upon terms and a price that were the best that could be obtained.
Bussell opposed the motion, asserting (1) the process which culminated in the sale was unfair in that the sale price was based on an appraisal that was prepared by an appraiser who was retained and paid by the proposed purchaser of the property; (2) the appraisal was 18 months old; (3) Reedy had not served the motion on all parties who appeared in the action; and (4) if the motion was granted, he requested that the proceeds be deposited with the court pending resolution of the proper distribution of the proceeds from the sale

A jury convicted Britin Amiel Riley of first degree murder (count 1), five counts of attempted murder (counts 2-6), two counts of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (counts 7-8), and one count of street terrorism (count 9). The jury also found true a street gang enhancement on counts 1 through 8, and that Riley had a prior serious felony conviction, a prior strike conviction, and a prison prior. Riley appeals, contending: (1) the trial court failed to sua sponte instruct the jury on principles of accomplice testimony; and (2) his conviction must be reversed because the trial court erred in admitting evidence obtained from a wiretap of his cell phone. He also requests that we review in camera the affidavit in support of the wiretap of his phone and the transcript of in camera proceedings held in the trial court to determine whether probable cause supported the issuance of the wiretap order and whether the trial court properly ordered the affidavit sealed. We affirm the judgment.

Jimmie William Johnson and his wife filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus against the City of San Diego (the City). The Johnsons then failed to take any action on the writ petition for over two years. The court issued an order to show cause (OSC) why the matter should not be dismissed, and ultimately, dismissed the writ petition for lack of prosecution.
Johnson, but not his wife, appeals the order of dismissal, contending the court did not have the authority to dismiss the writ petition, the court failed to consider certain factors in deciding to dismiss the writ petition, and Code of Civil Procedure[1] section 583.310 permits an action to be brought to trial within five years. Because we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the writ petition, we affirm.

Defendant Michael Lawrence McNealley was convicted after a bifurcated jury trial of driving under the influence of alcohol, with a blood-alcohol percentage of .08 percent or higher, and having sustained three prior driving under the influence convictions within the previous 10 years. (Veh. Code, § 23152, subds. (a) & (b).) The trial court imposed and suspended a three-year prison term and placed defendant on probation for three years with the condition he spend one year in county jail.
Defendant appeals. He contends the trial court’s rulings on his motion in limine regarding the reporting witness were in error and chilled his ability to mount a defense in violation of his due process rights. We affirm.

During the evening of September 13, 2010, Los Angeles Police Department detectives had a Sun Valley apartment building under surveillance. The detectives saw appellant Jason George Harvey sitting in the driver’s seat of his car parked in the building’s underground garage. A male stood on the driver’s side of the car and a female stood on the passenger side. The officers saw the male reach into the open driver’s side window and then walk away. Based on their experience and training, the detectives concluded they had witnessed a drug transaction.
One of the detectives approached and stopped the man who had reached into appellant’s car. The detective searched the man’s pocket and found rock cocaine. The detective alerted his fellow detective, who approached appellant standing near his car. That second detective asked for and received appellant’s permission to search appellant’s car. The detective found a small amount of marijuana and cocaine under the car’s front seat.

Plaintiff and appellant Dinia Gamilla (Gamilla or the buyer) appeals an order of dismissal following the sustaining without leave to amend of a demurrer interposed by defendants and respondents Yul Kwon and Hee S. Lee (collectively, Kwon or the sellers) to the first amended complaint. Gamilla purchased an apartment building from the sellers. Gamilla sued the sellers for breach of contract and breach of warranty on the ground that only two of the three apartment units were legally authorized by the City of Los Angeles (the City). In sustaining the demurrer without leave, the trial court ruled the “Purchase Agreement and Joint Escrow Instructions, attached to the First Amended Complaint, does not contain a representation or warranty regarding the number of legally approved units,” paragraph 12b of the agreement was “blank as to the number of units on the property,” and “no implied warranty applicable to the grant deed relates to the alleged number of legally approved units on the property.” We affirm. The purchase agreement did not contain a representation or warranty regarding the number of legally approved units, and a grant deed does not contain an implied warranty of compliance with building codes.

Margaret M. (mother) appeals from orders denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition and terminating her parental rights.[1] Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied her section 388 petition because mother did not receive proper notice of the juvenile court proceedings. Mother further argues that reversal of the order denying her section 388 petition requires reversal of the juvenile court’s subsequent order terminating her parental rights. We affirm the orders.

A father, claiming a denial of due process and asserting that the order he sought would promote his biological child’s best interests, filed a petition requesting that the juvenile court vacate its existing orders and return a dependency action to the jurisdictional phase. Following a hearing on the petition, the court found the father failed to show changed circumstances by virtue of inadequate notice, or that the proposed order would serve the child’s best interests and denied the petition. We affirm.

Richard Ryan Compton appeals the order revoking his probation and sentencing him to two years in state prison following his no contest plea to possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), and battery upon a peace officer (Pen. Code,[1] § 243, subd. (b)). His sole claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in increasing his previously imposed restitution fine (§ 1202.4) from $200 to $400. The People concede the issue, and ask us to order the judgment modified to reflect that the corresponding $200 probation revocation fine (§ 1202.44) is now due. We shall order the abstract of judgment modified accordingly, and also order the parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45) reduced to $200. Otherwise, we affirm.

Griselda U. (mother) and Edwin R. (father) appeal from the October 4, 2011 order terminating their parental rights to their daughter, A.R., and selecting adoption as the permanent placement plan. Both parents contend the trial court erred in finding the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception to the preference for adoption did not apply.[1] We reverse.

Larry Scarborough in propria persona appeals from the judgment following the jury’s determination by special verdict in favor of Marissa Grant. Scarborough seeks reversal of the judgment, contending that he should have prevailed on his claim for negligence against Grant arising from an automobile collision. We affirm.

The juvenile court sustained a petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, and found minor R.L. (defendant) committed the offense of misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, § 242), when he threw a shoe at his mother, hitting her in the face and causing her nose to bleed. The court also found defendant committed the offense of felony dissuading a victim from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)) when he subsequently told his mother, “If you call the cops, when I get out, I’m going to come back and stab you.” The trial court ordered a midterm camp commitment and declared a maximum term of confinement of four years six months, with credit given for 23 days. On appeal, defendant contends insufficient evidence supports the dissuading a victim count and that he is entitled to additional custody credits. We disagree and affirm the judgment.