CA Unpub Decisions

Following a bench trial, the trial court denied a petition filed by plaintiff and appellant Christopher Frahm and sustained the objections to that petition filed by respondents George Applebaum (Applebaum), Jacqueline Frahm (Jacqueline) and Mitchel Frahm (Mitchel).[1] Appellant’s petition alleged claims including breach of fiduciary duty stemming from the allocation of trust assets. The trial court granted several petitions filed by Applebaum, also relating to the administration of trust assets, and overruled appellant’s objections thereto. Appellant contends the judgment should be reversed because the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence to rebut the presumption that certain assets were held in joint tenancy, the trust did not permit a reallocation of assets and the trustee failed to comply with his statutory and fiduciary duties.
We affirm. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to exclude evidence that was irrelevant to rebutting the form of title presumption contained in Evidence Code section 662. Moreover, substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings that the trust authorized appellant’s father Louis Herman Frahm (Louis) to reallocate trust assets and that he complied with his fiduciary duties in every respect.

A modification decision.

Defendant Khanh Nguyen appeals from an order of commitment as a sexually violent predator. We affirm the order of commitment but reverse and remand with respect to defendant’s equal protection argument.

Defendant Steven Hoefflin, M.D. (Hoefflin) appeals from an order denying his special motion to strike (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16)[1] and allowing this action by plaintiff Arnold W. Klein, M.D. (Klein) to proceed. We affirm the order in part and reverse it in part.

Appellant Barbara Hom was terminated from her employment as the manager of the restaurant operated by respondent Culinary Institute of America (CIA) at its Greystone Campus. CIA advised Hom that her position was being eliminated due to a sharp decline in revenues. Hom filed suit for wrongful termination, alleging, among other things, that she had been fired in retaliation for complaints she made about safety conditions in the restaurant. Hom appeals from a summary judgment in favor of CIA. We affirm.

Appellant P.S. appeals the juvenile court’s order authorizing the Solano County Department of Health and Social Services (Department) the discretion to place her son H.S. in an out-of-county placement. Because the order appealed from has been rendered moot by subsequent events, we dismiss this appeal.

After defendant J.T. pleaded no contest to second degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b)), the juvenile court committed him for six months to the county juvenile rehabilitation facility, and imposed probation on numerous terms and conditions, including “gang” terms and a prohibition against possessing or using “weapons” or “burglary tools.” Defendant challenges these probation conditions. We modify the weapon and burglary tools prohibition to include a “knowledge” requirement and otherwise affirm the probation conditions.

Defendant Dung Phi Le appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after he pleaded no contest to cultivation of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11358) and possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence for two years and placed defendant on probation. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. We find no error and affirm.

Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, to assist the court in its independent review, counsel suggested two issues both concerning count 2:
(1) whether there was sufficient evidence of force, fear, or duress to support the aggravated sexual assault charge; and (2) whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of lewd act with a minor. In his supplemental brief, Aguilar generally discusses the respective discovery duties borne by the prosecution and defense. Unfortunately, he fails to allege any specific error relative to these rights and responsibilities.
We have reviewed the information provided by counsel and Aguilar’s supplemental brief, and we have independently examined the record. We found no arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) The judgment is affirmed

Defendant Susan Freistat was driving her car at about 25 miles per hour in stop‑and‑go traffic on a residential street, when she saw a car, driven by then 87‑year‑old Melvin Lifson, stopped in front of her. Lifson had stopped at a light behind a car containing plaintiffs Michael Summers and Ector Sepulveda. (We refer to Summers and Sepulveda collectively as plaintiffs.) Although defendant tried to avoid hitting Lifson’s car by slamming on her brakes and veering to the right, the left front bumper of her car collided with the right rear bumper of Lifson’s car. Lifson’s car, in turn, bumped into the car containing plaintiffs.
Neither defendant nor Lifson were injured in the accident. Plaintiffs, both in their late 30’s, sued defendant, claiming they suffered significant physical injuries as a result of the accident. A jury found plaintiffs’ claimed injuries were not caused by the accident. The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial.

Plaintiff Christopher Lindsey[1] was a pedestrian in a parking lot when he was hit by a truck driven by defendant Marissa Leigh Roge. Plaintiff sued defendant for negligence. In a special verdict, the jury found defendant was negligent, but that her negligence was not a substantial factor causing harm to plaintiff. Plaintiff contends this latter finding is unsupported by substantial evidence. We agree and reverse the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Vidal Lopez Cortez of all six counts with which he was charged: (1) lewd act upon a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a));[1] (2) forcible lewd act upon a child under age 14 (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)); (3) aggravated sexual assault of a child (§ 269, subd. (a)(3)); (4) attempted oral copulation with a person under age 14 (§ 288a, subd. (c)(1)); (5) sodomy of a person under age 14 (§ 286, subd. (c)(1)); and (6) sodomy by force (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)). After dismissing count 1 as a lesser included offense of count 2, the trial court sentenced defendant to 21 years to life in state prison. The sentence consisted of a 15 years to life term for count 3, a consecutive six year term for count 2, and a concurrent three year term for count 4. The court stayed execution of sentence on counts 5 and 6 pursuant to section 654.
Defendant raises three issues on appeal. First, as to count 2, he claims there was insufficient evidence of “force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim” (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)). Second, defendant posits the court improperly sentenced him to a consecutive six-year determinate sentence for conduct (touching the victim’s penis) that occurred at the same time as the conduct resulting in defendant’s indeterminate sentence of 15 years to life in prison (sodomizing the victim). Third, defendant asserts the court should have awarded him 718 custody credits rather than 717 custody credits.[2] We affirm.

Appellant, Ryan Alan Graves, appeals from a judgment entered after he pled no contest to possession of an injection device (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)), a jury convicted him of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger (former Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. (a)(4)),[1] a felony, and the court found true three prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441, we affirm.

F.B. claims his commitment to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) must be reversed, and the matter remanded to the juvenile court to allow him to withdraw his admissions, because he was not advised he would be required to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.