CA Unpub Decisions

This is a troubling case. Defendant Bert Aynbinder was charged with three counts of assault with a deadly weapon and by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)),[1] and single counts of felony reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 23105, subd. (a)) and hit and run with an injury (Veh. Code, § 20001), along with enhancements for personally inflicting great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subds. (a), (d)). Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of misdemeanor reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 23103) as a lesser included offense of the felony reckless driving count, and acquitted on all other counts, in spite of considerable evidence supporting defendant’s guilt on all charges. The trial court sentenced defendant to 90 days in jail, with credit for time served, and imposed various fines and fees which were offset by defendant’s excess presentence credits.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court violated his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial, there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction, and ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Mikael Tavit appeals from a judgment of conviction following his entry of a guilty plea on the charge of transportation of a controlled substance. Tavit contends, and the People concede, that the trial court erroneously assessed him $500 in attorney fees without affording him notice or a hearing under Penal Code section 987.8, subdivision (b) (section 987.8). We thus reverse and remand the matter to the trial court so that it may comply with the notice and hearing provisions of section 987.8.

The following facts are undisputed. The United States Copyright Office (Copyright Office), under the supervision of the Librarian of Congress (Librarian), controls the distribution of royalties for the retransmission of broadcast programming by cable and satellite. (See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, subd. (d) & 119, subd. (b).) Appellant Independent Producers Group (IPG)[2] and respondent Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) represent the interests of owners of media content as to such royalties.

Father Ricky A. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s order sustaining a petition declaring his daughter, Sade A., a dependent under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b).[1] He also challenges the disposition order removing her from his custody and requiring that his visitation be monitored. We find support for each order and affirm.

E.H. (mother) and J.H. (father) appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings and order filed on August 25, 2011, adjudging their six children dependants of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.[1] We conclude that the court’s findings that father hit seven-year-old daughter A.H. in the face and that parents gave her excessive amounts of alcohol are supported by substantial evidence. So is the court’s disposition, which allowed mother to move into the home where the children were placed. We affirm the order.

James L. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders regarding his child, Lucy L. He contends the court’s findings are not supported by sufficient evidence. He further asserts he was not permitted to cross-examine the case social worker (CSW), resulting in a violation of his right to due process under the state and federal constitutions. We reject his challenges, and affirm.

James L. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders regarding his child, Lucy L. He contends the court’s findings are not supported by sufficient evidence. He further asserts he was not permitted to cross-examine the case social worker (CSW), resulting in a violation of his right to due process under the state and federal constitutions. We reject his challenges, and affirm.

On April 27, 2010, defendant and appellant Jeffrey L. Knight entered a plea of no contest to a charge of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1))[1] of Linda Caseman. Imposition of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on formal probation for three years. The terms of probation required defendant to: “obey all laws”; “submit [his] person and property to search and seizure at any time of the day or night, by any . . . peace officer, with or without warrant, probable cause or reasonable suspicion”; “not use or threaten to use force or violence on any person”; and “cooperate . . . in a plan for psychological counseling and/or treatment.”
On September 20, 2010, defendant admitted a violation of probation based on threatening a peace officer. Probation was revoked and reinstated on the original terms and conditions, with a requirement that defendant serve 156 days in county jail.
After a formal revocation hearing on August 10, 2011, the trial court again found defendant was in violation of probation. Probation was terminated, and defendant was sentenced to the upper term of four years in state prison. This timely appeal followed.
Defendant contends it was an abuse of discretion to revoke probation because substantial evidence did not support the finding he violated terms and conditions of probation, and the violation was based on defendant’s exercise of his First Amendment right to free speech. We affirm.

Appellant Jose A. Galdamez was convicted of committing a lewd or lascivious act with a child who is under 14 years of age. He appeals the trial court’s judgment on two grounds. Appellant contends the trial court erroneously excluded certain evidence purportedly showing the child’s mother was motivated to make false allegations against him. He also argues the judgment must be reversed because of prosecutorial misconduct. We reject both arguments and affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Laura M. Solis sued EMC Mortgage LLC (EMC), Wells Fargo Bank, National Association as Trustee for the Certifcateholders of Structured Asset Mortgage Investments II Inc., Bear Stearns Mortgage Funding Trust 2007-AR3 Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2007-AR3 (Wells Fargo), and Quality Loan Service Corporation (Quality), after she defaulted on a secured real estate loan and lost her property to foreclosure. In her complaint, Solis asserted claims for declaratory relief, negligence, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, “promissory note,” and rescission. EMC and Wells Fargo demurred to the complaint. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. We affirm the judgment.[1]

Defendant Eutimio Reyes appeals his convictions of three felonies arising out of an assault on his former girlfriend Allyson F., and one count of felony stalking, also of Allyson F. His sole contention on appeal is that none of the convictions is supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm.

Larry Joseph List appeals from the judgment entered after his jury conviction of 15 counts of grand theft auto (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(1)) and one count of conspiracy to commit grand theft auto (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a)(1)).[1] List’s appointed counsel filed a Wende brief. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) On January 27, 2012, we directed List’s counsel to send the record on this appeal and a copy of the brief to List and notified List that he had 30 days from the date of the notice to submit by brief or letter any grounds of appeal he wished us to consider. We received no response from List.
We direct the court to correct a clerical error in the abstract of judgment but otherwise affirm the judgment.

Appellant Edward Buentiempo was convicted, following a jury trial, of two counts of second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211.[1] The trial court found true the allegations that appellant had suffered five prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a) and the "Three Strikes" law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), and 1170.12) and had served four prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The court sentenced appellant to a total term of 47 years to life in state prison, consisting of a 25 year to life term for one robbery conviction pursuant to the Three Strikes law, plus four five-year enhancement terms pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a), plus two one-year enhancement terms pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b). The court stayed imposition of sentence on the second robbery conviction pursuant to section 654.
Appellant appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that the trial court erred in finding that his prior conviction for burglary qualified as a serious felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law.[2] We affirm the judgment of conviction.

Defendant and appellant Maurice Levale Davis appeals from a judgment of conviction following his entry of a plea of nolo contendere on charges of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child under the age of 14. He entered his plea after the trial court ruled that evidence of a number of prior uncharged sexual offenses by Davis were admissible pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108 (section 1108). He asserts on appeal that the admission of such evidence was erroneous and violated his constitutional rights. We hold that Davis’ appeal is not cognizable by virtue of his plea of nolo contendere, and thus we dismiss it.