CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted Victor Manuel Jacobo and Julian Imperial Mendoza of kidnapping Rafael Benitez to commit robbery (Pen. Code,[1] § 209, subd. (b)(1), count 1); burglary (§459, count 2); false imprisonment of Rafael Benitez, Ana Rodriquez, Brian Benitez, and Diego Benitez (§ 236, count 5); and robbery of Rodriguez and Margarita Ortiz (§ 211, count 7). A jury also convicted Mendoza of a separate count of burglary (§ 249, count 3); kidnapping Ortiz (§ 207, subd. (a), count 4); and false imprisonment of Ortiz (§ 236, count 6).
The jury found Mendoza personally used a firearm in committing counts 1, 3, 4, 6, and 7 (§12022.53, subd. (b)), and was an armed principal in committing counts 2 and 5 (§ 12022, subd. (a)). In addition, the jury found true Jacobo personally used a firearm in committing counts 1, 2, 5, and 7 (§12022.53, subd. (b)).

Keefer was granted probation on certain terms and conditions. Keefer filed a timely notice of appeal.
Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) raising possible, but not arguable issues. We offered Keefer the opportunity to file his own brief on appeal, but Keefer has not responded.

Appellant Jose D. is the father of 11-year-old Michael D. Appellant was arrested for repeatedly sodomizing a 13-year-old member of a soccer team that appellant coached, and he is believed to have molested other boys on the team. Appellant challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over Michael, which is based on appellant’s predilection for molesting young boys. We affirm the judgment. Substantial evidence supports the finding that appellant poses a substantial risk of harm to Michael.

Defendant Eric Duwayne Gee appeals from the order revoking probation and imposing a previously suspended four-year state prison sentence.
On June 10, 2010, defendant argued with his girlfriend, Charniece Shirley, and punched her in the arm. Their argument continued inside her car, where defendant cracked the windshield by kicking it with his feet. Police were contacted, and Shirley was given an “emergency protective order.” After defendant was taken into custody, he repeatedly telephoned Shirley in July 2010.

A jury convicted appellant Jamien Washington of forcible rape in violation of Penal Code section 261, subdivision (a)(2)[1]. The trial court found true the allegation that appellant had suffered two prior convictions of serious or violent felonies within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (e) through (i), 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), and 667, subdivision (a)(1). The trial court found appellant had suffered three prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
After denying appellant’s Romero motion[2], the trial court sentenced appellant to a total term of 35 years to life. The sentence consisted of 25 years to life for the rape conviction under the Three Strikes Law and five years each for the two prior serious felony convictions.

An information, dated December 7, 2009 and amended by interlineation on February 25, 2010, charged Scott Matthew Hill with three counts: (1) sexual penetration while the victim was unconscious of the nature of the act, which was known to him (Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (d))[1]; (2) dissuading a victim from prosecuting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(2)); and (3) stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (a)). According to the preliminary hearing transcript, all three counts related to Hill’s conduct in digitally penetrating the vagina of his former girlfriend and mother of his five children, Y.B., without her consent while she was sleeping, leaving her a message after his arrest to “drop the charges, bitch,” and calling her repeatedly and attempting to find her. Hill pleaded no contest to stalking as charged in count 3. The trial court dismissed the remaining two counts, suspended imposition of sentence and placed Hill on formal probation for five years. As conditions of probation, the court directed Hill to obey all laws and not to come within 200 yards, or to have direct or indirect contact, with Y.B. or their children, subject to any order of the family law court that might allow him to visit the children.

Paramount Developers & Contractors, Inc. (Paramount) appeals after a demurrer to Paramount’s second amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend. Although we find that Paramount’s second amended complaint did not accurately describe the judgment Paramount seeks to enforce in this action, we determine that the demurrer should have been overruled because Paramount adequately alleged that defendant Manufacturers Bank (the Bank) did not comply with all of the judgment’s terms. Accordingly, we reverse.

For purposes of determining priority, a mechanic’s lien relates back to the time of “commencement of the work of improvement.” (Civ. Code, § 3134.) Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the plaintiff, appellant Advent, Inc. (Advent), failed to establish the priority of its mechanic’s lien over a deed of trust held by respondent California Bank & Trust (CB&T). Based on evidence presented at trial, the trial court held that no apparent and visible work occurred prior to the recordation of the deed of trust, and therefore the work of improvement commenced after the deed of trust was recorded. We affirm.

Raymond Robles was convicted of murdering Richard Herrera. On appeal, Robles challenges the trial court’s refusal to suppress a covert recording of his incriminating statements about the crime. Appellant was recorded while conversing in jail with two “inmates” who were actually undercover detectives.
Appellant was not deprived of a fair trial in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination or his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, because this was not a “custodial interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 444. Appellant was unaware that he was speaking to law enforcement agents and voluntarily described the murder. As a result, his statements are admissible.

In this proceeding, the trial court concluded it lacked personal jurisdiction over foreign nonresident defendant Bridgestone Cycle Co., Ltd. (Bridgestone Japan) and on two successive occasions granted defendant’s motions to quash service of summons. Plaintiff appeals from the second order. In that order, the trial court found Bridgestone Japan (1) had not been served with the summons and (2) lacked minimum contacts with California. Plaintiff disputes only the second finding. Although plaintiff’s failure to dispute the first finding dooms her appeal, we nevertheless reach the minimum contacts issue, concluding plaintiff failed to show that Bridgestone Japan’s contacts with California subject it to jurisdiction. We thus affirm the trial court’s order.

A jury convicted appellant Joel Baul of carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a))[1] (count 1); two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) (counts 2 & 5); assault with intent to commit rape (§ 220, subd. (a)) (count 3); and attempted robbery (§§ 664, 211) (count 4). With respect to counts 1, 3 and 4, the jury found that appellant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The jury also found true the allegations that appellant had suffered three prior prison term convictions within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b), that he had suffered two prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a), and that he had suffered six prior serious or violent felony convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i) & 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)).
The trial court sentenced appellant to state prison for a total of 119 years to life as a third-strike defendant. In count 1 (carjacking), the trial court imposed the high term of nine years tripled, or 27 years, with a one-year enhancement for knife use, 10 years for two 5-year priors, and three years for three 1-year priors for a total of 41 years to life in count 1. In count 3 (assault with intent to commit rape), the trial court imposed a consecutive term of 25 years to life with one year for knife use, 10 years for two 5-year priors, and three years for three 1-year priors for a total of 39 years to life in count 3. In count 4 (attempted robbery), the trial court imposed a consecutive term of 25 years to life, with one year for knife use, 10 years for two 5-year priors, and three years for three 1-year priors for a total of 39 years to life in count 4. The trial court stayed sentences of 38 years to life in counts 2 and 5 under section 654.
Appellant appeals on the grounds that: (1) he was deprived of his constitutional right to self-representation; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict in count 3; (3) the trial court erroneously denied new counsel a copy of the trial transcript to prepare a defense for postconviction and sentencing proceedings; (4) appellant is entitled to per se reversal of his sentence because he was completely denied the assistance of counsel during his sentencing hearing; and (5) two of the one-year prison prior enhancements imposed in counts 1 through 5 should be stricken because the prior convictions for these prison priors were used to enhance appellant’s sentence under section 667, subdivision (a)(1).

In a prior opinion, we addressed Ralphs Grocery Co.’s appeals from orders denying its petitions to compel arbitration of two class action lawsuits filed by its employees, alleging Labor Code and Unfair Competition Law violations. Ralphs had unsuccessfully sought arbitration of these disputes in accordance with provisions in various agreements that subject such claims to individual binding arbitration and prohibit proceedings on a class or representative basis, and we affirmed the trial court’s orders denying Ralphs’ petitions. (Massie v. Ralphs Grocery Co., McLeod v. Ralphs Grocery, B187844, B187854, May 14, 2007 [nonpub. opn.].) Thereafter, our Supreme Court granted Ralphs’ petitions for review and remanded the matters with directions to vacate our prior decision and to reconsider the cause in light of Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443. (S153059.) We in turn remanded the matter to the trial court for the required factual showing.
After permitting the parties to conduct discovery on the Gentry factors and considering supplemental briefing and argument on these issues, the trial court again denied Ralphs’ motion to enforce its class action waiver and compel individual arbitration, finding “Just as in Gentry, the class arbitration waivers found in this case jeopardize the rights of its employees by prohibiting the most practical and most likely, only, effective means of challenging defendants’ overtime practices.”
Ralphs appeals. Because we conclude the agreement Ralphs seeks to enforce is procedurally and substantively unconscionable and unenforceable as a result, we affirm.

This is an appeal and cross-appeal from orders modifying obligations due under a stipulated judgment providing for community property division as well as spousal and child support. We reverse.

A jury convicted appellant Arutyun Khrayan of conspiracy to commit the crime of kidnapping for ransom in violation of Penal Code section 182, subdivision (a)(1);[1] attempted kidnapping for ransom in violation of sections 664 and 209, subdivision (a); and assault with a semiautomatic firearm in violation of section 245, subdivision (b). The jury found that in the commission of the conspiracy and attempted kidnapping counts, a principal was armed with a firearm within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). Appellant admitted a prior conviction of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of sections 667, subdivision (a); 667, subdivisions (b) through (i); and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d).