CA Unpub Decisions

Pornpam Tossey (Pam)[1] appeals from the trial court’s judgment on reserved issues following dissolution of her marriage to Laurence A. Tossey. She challenges the court’s decision to continue imputing income to her when she failed to demonstrate she searched for a customer support job or other employment. The court, however, refused to allow her to present any evidence concerning her job search or job availability, and instead announced at the outset of the trial on reserved issues that the evidence was “close[d]” even before the trial began. Pam also challenges both the trial court’s decision not to require Laurence to pay a portion of her attorney fees and the court’s decision to impose Watts charges (In re Marriage of Watts (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 366 (Watts)) for her exclusive use of the couple’s jointly-owned home while they were separated. As we explain, the due process violation requires reversal of the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Lamarr Edward Brown appeals from a judgment entered after a guilty plea. He contends the court erred in denying his Marsden motion (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden)) and he seeks a stay of punishment on one count of conspiracy pursuant to Penal Code section 654. We deny relief on the Marsden motion but order that punishment for conspiracy be stayed.

Defendant Maria Cecilia Silverio instructed two minor girls, her daughter and foster daughter, to plant drugs in defendant’s ex-boyfriend’s vehicles. A jury convicted defendant of three crimes: furnishing a minor with a controlled substance (§ 11380), possession of a controlled substance (§ 11366, subd. (a)), and transportation or furnishing of a controlled substance (§ 11379, subd. (a)). The court suspended imposition of sentence and ordered defendant to complete 36 months of probation and 360 days of local custody.
On appeal, defendant makes two arguments. Although defendant acquiesced in the trial court reopening voir dire, defendant argues the trial court erred in violation of the Trial Jury Selection and Management Act, Code of Civil Procedure section 190 et seq., as well as defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights against double jeopardy. She also contends the trial court erred by giving CALCRIM No. 371 because it was only relevant to counts 4 and 5, involving false testimony, which were dismissed before trial. We reject defendant’s claims of error and affirm the judgment.

I.V. appeals the orders entered at the jurisdictional and disposition hearing held under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 360, subdivision (d), and 361, subdivision (c). Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held review under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order obtained by the state, adversely affecting his custody of a child or his status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny I.V.'s request to review the record for error and to address his Anders issue. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)

M.P. appeals orders entered at a jurisdictional and dispositional hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 300, subdivision (b), and 361. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
In In re Sade C., the California Supreme Court held that review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 is unavailable in "an indigent parent's appeal from a judgment or order, obtained by the state, adversely affecting his [or her] custody of a child or his [or her] status as the child's parent." (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 959.) We therefore deny M.P.'s requests to review the record for error and to address the Anders issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.)
Citing In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, M.P.'s counsel requests leave for her client to file a supplemental brief in propria persona, and also asks this court to order counsel to brief any arguable issue. (Penson v. Ohio (1988) 488 U.S. 75, 88.) The requests are denied.

The juvenile court adjudged 17-year-old Jorge R. a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 based on a true finding that he had received a stolen vehicle. The court reduced the offense to a misdemeanor and placed Jorge on probation. Jorge appeals, contending substantial evidence did not support the court's true finding. We find his argument unavailing and affirm the order.

A jury convicted Samuel Edwards of four counts of robbery (counts 1-4) and found true allegations that he personally used a firearm in the commission of the offenses. Edwards appeals, contending there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions on counts 3 and 4 and the related firearm enhancements. We affirm the judgment.

In this gang-related murder case, an amended information charged Edward Eugene Thomas and Dejon Satterwhite (together defendants), who are half brothers, each with seven offenses: two counts of murder (counts 1 & 7: Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) (undesignated statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified)) for the murders of Lee Smith (count 1) and Richard Wilson (count 7); three counts of attempted premeditated and deliberate murder (counts 2, 4, & 6: §§ 664 & 187, subd. (a)) for the attempted murders of Charles Foster (count 2), Christopher Scott (count 4), and Michael Canty (count 6); and two counts of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (counts 3 & 5: § 246).
As to the two murder counts, the amended information alleged two special circumstances: (1) the murders were intentional and perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21)); and (2) defendants were each convicted in this proceeding of more than one murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)).
As to all seven counts, it was alleged that (1) defendants were principals and a principal personally used and discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (e)(1)); (2) they were 14 years of age or older and committed offenses which, if committed by an adult, would be punishable by death or a life term in prison (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (d)(2)(A)); and (3) they committed the crimes for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).
As to counts 1 through 5, it was alleged that defendants were principals and a principal personally used a firearm and proximately caused great bodily injury or death to a person other than an accomplice (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)).
As to counts 2, 4, and 6, it was also alleged that defendants personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).

Kayton Carter (father) appeals from orders appointing counsel for his three minor children and ordering father and Kawanna Carter (mother) to each pay half of counsels’ fees.
Father contends (1) the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to split responsibility for the fees with mother, because a prior order required mother to advance all fees; and (2) the trial court violated his due process rights by depriving him of the opportunity to be heard.

In 2008, the People filed a petition (2008 petition) to commit defendant Eugene Clarence Wood for an indeterminate term as a sexually violent predator (SVP) and the trial court found probable cause. Subsequent case law determined that the assessment protocol used to evaluate Wood was an invalid underground regulation. Two new evaluations (first pair) were ordered, but they resulted in a split of opinion as to whether Wood met the criteria of an SVP. Two additional evaluations (second pair) were ordered, but they also resulted in split opinions.
On March 4, 2010, the People filed a new petition for commitment (2010 petition), attaching two evaluations, one from the first pair and one from the second. Contemporaneously, after the People provided more information about Wood’s physical condition to the psychologist in the first pair who had found Wood was not an SVP, she changed her mind and found Wood was an SVP. On March 19, 2010, the People filed a supplemental petition (supplemental 2010 petition), attaching both evaluations from this psychologist.
After a bench trial, the trial court found Wood was an SVP, and committed him for an indeterminate term to the custody of the Department of Mental Health (DMH).

Following the consolidation of four superior court cases that had arisen from a single investigation, defendant Steven Ward Howe pleaded no contest to second degree commercial burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b)); felony hit and run (Veh. Code,[1] § 20001, subd. (a)); cutting trees without a permit (Pen. Code, § 384a); possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364); resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69); and two counts of driving with a suspended driver’s license (§ 14601.1, subd. (a)). Defendant admitted that he had suffered three prior convictions for driving on a suspended license (§ 14601.1, subd. (b)(2)) and had served a prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).
Defendant was sentenced to state prison for two years four months, consisting of one year four months for the burglary and one year for the prior prison term. Sentences for the two counts of driving with a suspended driver’s license were satisfied by time already served. The remaining counts were sentenced concurrent to an existing parole violation or were satisfied by time served. Defendant was awarded 99 days’ custody credit and 98 days’ conduct credit.[2]
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred at sentencing when it denied his request to dismiss the two counts of driving with a suspended driver’s license. We shall modify the judgment.

Defendant Francisco Rodriguez Pena was convicted by jury of committing a lewd act by force on a child under 14. Sentenced to a state prison term of 55 years to life under the “Three Strikes” law, defendant appeals. He contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to convict him of committing a lewd act by force on the child, (2) the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional rights by admitting evidence of his prior sexual offenses, and (3) the trial court misinstructed the jury with respect to the evidence of the prior sexual offenses by also allowing the jury to consider associated nonsexual offenses.
Finding no prejudicial error, we affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Roland Hoffman of receiving stolen property. (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a).)[1] In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found that defendant had served four prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) The court sentenced defendant to a state prison term of seven years (three years, the upper term for the present offense, plus one year for each prior prison term). The court also ordered various fines and fees, which we enumerate below.
On appeal, defendant contends that (1) the jail booking fee, classification fee, and presentence report fee must be stricken because there is no evidence defendant has the ability to pay them, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the restitution fine and the case must be remanded for an impartial judge to determine the restitution fine imposed under section 1202.4.
We conclude defendant has forfeited his challenge to the fees because he failed to object to the fees imposed by the trial court. With regard to the restitution fine, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed the restitution fine. As to the fines and fees imposed, the abstract of judgment does not specify the statutory bases for the fines and fees. Therefore, we must remand the matter for correction of the abstract of judgment. The judgment is affirmed.

A jury convicted defendant Kenneth Jerome Ray of infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); count 1). The jury acquitted him of a second count of the same offense occurring on another date as well as all lesser offenses. In bifurcated proceedings, the court found two strike priors and two prior prison term allegations to be true.
Sentenced to state prison for 26 years to life, defendant appeals. He contends (1) the trial court’s instruction on prior uncharged domestic violence violated his right to due process, (2) the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence in rebuttal and should have declared a mistrial, and, to the extent the issue is forfeited, counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of text messages sent by defendant to the victim. We affirm the judgment.