CA Unpub Decisions

Defendants appeal from the trial court’s judgment of quiet title in favor of plaintiff and cancellation of a real property installment sales agreement, a grant deed, and a purported deed of trust. They raise numerous grounds of appeal but have failed to include a reporter’s transcript. We are thus left with deciding only issues of law or those apparent from the face of the pleadings. (Kompf v. Morrison (1946) 73 Cal.App.2d 284, 286.) So limited, we review defendants’ claims they were wrongly denied a jury trial, the trial court’s judgment is erroneous under the one-action rule of Code of Civil Procedure section 726, and the court failed to provide a requested statement of decision. We affirm the judgment.[1]

A modification decision.

The jury found defendant Roberto Ramon Bonilla guilty of involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (b))[1] of Ozvaldo Hernandez. Imposition of sentence was suspended and defendant was granted formal probation for five years.
In this timely appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence that (1) he did not call 911 after Hernandez was in medical distress, and (2) that his surgery room was not sterile. He further contends substantial evidence does not support the conviction of involuntary manslaughter. We affirm.

Appellants Jaime Garcia, Javier Esparza and Claudio Bernardino were convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of first degree murder in violation of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a) and one count of kidnapping in violation of section 207, subdivision (a).[1] The jury found true the allegations that a principal was armed with a firearm during the commission of the murder within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). The trial court sentenced each appellant to a term of 26 years to life in state prison, consisting of 25 years to life for the murder plus a one-year enhancement term for the section 12022 allegation. The count stayed sentence on count 2 pursuant to section 654.
Appellants appeal from the judgment of conviction. Bernardino and Esparza contend that the trial court erred in denying appellants' Wheeler/Batson motions. Bernardino and Garcia contend that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on aider and abettor liability. Garcia contends the trial court also erred in instructing the jury on culpability under the law of conspiracy. Bernardino and Esparza contend that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that witness Matthew Foust was an accomplice as a matter of law. Esparza also contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the prosecution had the burden of proving accomplice corroboration beyond a reasonable doubt, that duress is not a defense to accomplice aider and abettor liability and that the jury was required to acquit Esparza if it found that Foust was an accomplice. He further contends that cumulative error on the accomplice instructions requires reversal. Bernardino contends that the trial court erred in admitting crime scene photos of the victim. Each appellant joins in the other appellants' contention to the extent applicable. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

Plaintiff Anry Ladian appeals from a judgment ordering $35,000 payable to him and $65,149 payable to defendant James Lewis from escrow funds, ordering Ladian’s cause of action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien denied, and ordering Ladian’s mechanic’s lien on Lewis’s real property expunged. Because Ladian has failed to provide an adequate record, has not shown error in the judgment, and has not provided legal authority or argument for his positions, he has therefore forfeited any claim of error on appeal. The judgment is affirmed.

Edward Lloyd Scaroni appeals the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of murder in which he personally discharged a firearm causing death, possession of ammunition, three counts of unlawful possession of a firearm and driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d), 12316, subd. (b)(1), 12021, subd. (a)(1); Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).)
We reject Scaroni’s claims of evidentiary and instructional error. However, we order the judgment modified to conform to the oral pronouncement of judgment, to reflect $240 in criminal conviction assessments (Gov. Code, § 70373), and to impose an additional $200 in court security fees (Pen. Code, § 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)). As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

In a previous appeal, this court reversed a judgment of conviction against defendant Ricky White for selling cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)) and remanded to the trial court for a determination whether denial of Pitchess[1] disclosure caused prejudice to White, i.e. whether there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of White’s trial would have been different had the information originally been disclosed. After ordering disclosure of Pitchess records and conducting a hearing, the trial court found no prejudice and reinstated the judgment of conviction, from which judgment defendant White now appeals.

Father P.S. (Father) and Mother A.S. (Mother) appeal from the order terminating their parental rights as to J.S.2[1] under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother has also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the challenged order, and, in a separate order, summarily deny Mother’s habeas corpus petition.

Defendant and appellant C.B. pleaded no contest to committing assault with a firearm and an enhancement of personal use of a firearm. He appeals from the dispositional order, claiming the juvenile court (a) erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during a probation search of his residence and (b) abused its discretion by committing him to the Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF). We conclude the juvenile court neither erred nor abused its discretion, and affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Timothy Russell Ryan, Jr., of furnishing marijuana to Katie W., a minor child, and molesting her. The trial court excluded defendant’s supposed evidence that Katie had fabricated two prior accusations of molestation. Later, during closing argument, the prosecutor asked, if Katie’s “constantly throwing molest accusations around . . . [w]here is the proof of that?” On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s evidentiary ruling and the prosecutor’s conduct. He also asserts the trial court erred by not sua sponte giving a “unanimity” instruction on the drug charges, and by imposing a longer sentence than he claims was appropriate, given that the drug charges, according to defendant, were incidental to the molestation charges. The Attorney General, in turn, identifies an apparent clerical error in the sentence on the abstract of judgment and asks us to correct it. We reject defendant’s arguments and affirm the judgment with directions to correct the abstract of judgment.

This matter comes to us on remand from the California Supreme Court with directions to take further action consistent with that court’s opinion in Quarry v. Doe 1 (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945 (Quarry). In our earlier opinion, we concluded that plaintiffs’ causes of action against Doe 1 (the Bishop),[1] alleging that plaintiffs suffered psychological injuries caused by childhood sexual abuse by a Catholic priest, were not barred by the limitations period of Code of Civil Procedure,[2] section 340.1, subdivision (a) because they did not discover the cause of their injuries until 2006. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that plaintiffs’ claims were barred because they did not bring their action within the one-year revival period prescribed by the 2002 amendment to section 340.1. (Quarry, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 952.) “When, in 2002, the Legislature made a narrow exception to the age 26 cutoff for a subcategory of third party defendants, it carefully specified what should happen to any claim that had lapsed when the plaintiff reached the age of 26; namely, such claims could be brought, but only during the one-year revival period [in 2003].” (Id. at p. 983; § 340.1, subd. (c).) The Supreme Court also rejected plaintiffs’ claim that common law delayed discovery principles survive section 340.1. (Id. at pp. 983-984.) The Supreme Court, however, did not decide whether plaintiffs should be permitted to proceed against the Bishop on a vicarious liability theory. (Id. at p. 990, fn. 23.) We, therefore, must decide whether the longer statute of limitations applicable to the perpetrator can be applied to the employer by virtue of respondeat superior. After considering the supplemental briefs filed by the parties, and having reconsidered the cause in light of Quarry, we affirm the judgment.

Appellant Betty Brooks hired respondent, the law firm of Fishman, Larsen, Goldring & Zeitler, to represent her with regard to ongoing litigation over appellant’s deceased parents’ trusts. When appellant refused to pay the legal fees she had incurred, respondent filed the underlying action to recover those fees. On respondent’s motion, the trial court granted summary judgment in respondent’s favor.
Appellant contends the trial court erred. According to appellant, respondent was not entitled to collect its fees because the services were rendered in contradiction of the rules of professional responsibility. Appellant argues respondent committed fraud and failed to disclose conflicts of interest.
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment. Respondent met its burden of proving each element of its cause of action entitling it to judgment as a matter of law. Appellant failed to produce admissible evidence showing the existence of either a triable issue of material fact or a defense to respondent’s cause of action. Therefore, the judgment will be affirmed.

A drunk driver caused a traffic accident that took the life of one person and severely injured two others. He was driving his own vehicle — albeit in the course of his employer’s business — and he had liability coverage under his own auto insurance policy for up to $300,000. His employer’s auto insurance policy, by its terms, covered only certain company vehicles listed in the policy.
The issue in this appeal is whether an objectively reasonable insured would nevertheless have expected coverage under the employer’s policy, in light of an accompanying “stuffer” in which the insurer requested information about “employees who drive their own vehicles on company business . . . .” The trial court ruled that it would; it therefore required the employer’s insurer to pay $5,896,675.11. Reviewing this ruling de novo, we conclude that it was erroneous. The policy itself was not ambiguous. It would have been objectively unreasonable to view the stuffer as part of the policy. Moreover, even if the stuffer was viewed as part of the policy, it would have been objectively unreasonable to understand it as broadening the coverage otherwise provided.

Edgar Adair appeals from a judgment convicting him of three sexual offenses arising from a molestation incident against a young girl. He asserts the judgment should be reversed for one of the offenses (lewd act based on the touching of the victim's buttocks) because there was insufficient evidence of sexual intent for this offense. We conclude there is substantial evidence to support the jury's finding of sexual motivation for this touching.