CA Unpub Decisions

M.A. (Mother) appeals from the August 29, 2011 jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court adjudging minor D.W. a dependent of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect), arising out of Mother’s arrest in a high-speed car chase and subsequent incarceration.[1] The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a letter of non-opposition to the appeal, conceding that the court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders “conflict with relevant case law.” Albert W. (Father) contends that substantial evidence supported the court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders. We agree with Mother and DCFS that the court erred in asserting jurisdiction over D.W. on the basis that she is currently incarcerated and unable to care for D.W.
We reverse the jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the court.

Plaintiff Ta Siu appeals from the summary judgment entered in favor of defendant Jean Chang in this fraudulent conveyance action. We affirm the judgment because the action is untimely.

Lawrence Gomes appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of coram nobis. The denial of a writ of coram nobis is not an appealable order where, as here, the petition fails to state a prima facie case for coram nobis relief. (People v. Gallardo (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 971, 982-983 [dismissing appeal from denial of coram nobis petition].) Petitioner’s request to withdraw his true plea to two prior convictions because the prosecutor incorrectly advised him of the consequences of this plea, however, may be considered as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and we so consider it. (See People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 928, fn. 4.)
Assuming that defendant’s claim of misadvisement is correct, he still must show prejudice. This he has not done. Therefore, even treating his appeal as a petition for habeas corpus, the petition must be denied.

Following appellant M.V.’s admission to vehicle theft, the trial court placed him on probation and ordered him to pay the vehicle owner $5,072 in restitution. Of this amount, $2,500 was designated to replace the stolen vehicle, which was never returned to the owner. Appellant challenges the trial court’s valuation of the vehicle. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the vehicle’s value, and affirm.

A partnership to run a bed and breakfast in Nicaragua soured. Amidst ongoing legal jockeying in Nicaragua, one partner, Michael Lawler, has sued his partners, John and Patricia Casey, and their former corporation, Montecito Designs, Inc. (collectively Casey) in California. Lawler alleges fraud surrounding an oral partnership agreement the parties allegedly entered into in San Mateo, California. Casey petitioned to compel arbitration of Lawler’s claims based on an arbitration clause in a written partnership agreement signed by the parties in Nicaragua. The trial court denied arbitration because the arbitration clause appointed a biased arbitrator—namely, Casey’s lawyer. While we agree the named arbitrator cannot serve as such, we nevertheless reverse and remand because the trial court should have severed the biased appointment from the remainder of the arbitration clause, instead of voiding the clause in its entirety.

C.D. (Mother), mother of 15-year-old A.M., 7-year-old C.B.D., and 2-year-old C.D., appeals from the juvenile court’s orders denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 (388 petition) and terminating her parental rights to C.B.D.[1] Mother previously filed a petition under California Rules of Court, rule 8.452 to set aside the juvenile court’s order setting a permanency hearing under section 366.26 (366.26 hearing) for all three children, and we affirmed the order as to C.B.D. and C.D. (April 22, 2011, A130664).[2] In this appeal, Mother contends the juvenile court erred in: (1) summarily denying her 388 petition; and (2) terminating her parental rights to C.B.D. because the sibling relationship exception applied. We reject the contentions and affirm the orders.

Defendant appeals from a judgment following his plea of no contest and imposition of sentence. Defendant’s appellate counsel has not raised any issues and instead has asked this court to undertake an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any issues that would, if resolved favorably to defendant, result in reversal or modification of the judgment. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Counsel declares in her affidavit that she notified defendant he could file a supplemental brief raising any issues he wishes to present to this court. No supplemental brief has been received. Upon independent review of the record, we conclude that no arguable issues are presented for review, and affirm the judgment.

Paul M. Carrick appeals from a restraining order entered against him in a civil harassment proceeding brought by Aimee Levine. Because the restraining order has expired by its own terms, the appeal is moot. We will accordingly dismiss it.

In this case, June Stough filed suit against Appellant Robert Klure for financial fraud. Appellant filed a cross-complaint against Respondent Fernando Jimenez. The trial court dismissed respondent from the case, and entered judgment in favor of respondent.
In this appeal, appellant asserts the court erred in dismissing Jimenez from the case.

Norberto John Vargas appeals an order committing him as a sexually violent predator (SVP) to the custody of the California Department of Mental Health for an indeterminate term pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) Vargas raises constitutional challenges to the SVPA, and asserts the court erred in instructing the jury.
Statement of the Case[1]
In July 2006, the District Attorney of Monterey County filed a petition for an extension of Vargas’s commitment as an SVP under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq. Following a trial, a jury found the petition true and the court committed Rubio to an indeterminate term.

Defendant Anthony Underdue appeals a judgment of conviction of felony domestic violence (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), and felony false imprisonment (Pen. Code, § 236). On appeal, defendant asserts the trial court erred by admitting seven prior incidents of domestic violence under Evidence Code section 1109.

After participating in an attack on a fourteen year old girl at their high school, adult defendants Yolanda Rosales and Revae Alexandra Cuevas were both convicted by jury trial of one count of assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1).[1] The jury also found true that each defendant had committed the crime for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A).) Rosales and Cuevas were each placed on three years probation, and ordered to serve 10 months in the county jail. The court imposed various conditions of probation, including that each defendant “not be adjacent to any school campus during school hours unless” enrolled or with prior permission of the school administrator or the probation department. The court also imposed on each defendant a pre-sentence investigation fee of $300 and a monthly probation supervision fee of $110, both under section 1203.1b. According to the oral pronouncement of sentence, the court further imposed a restitution fund fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b) in the minimum amount of $200,[2] along with a $20 administration fee under section 1202.4, subdivision (l), and a probation revocation fine of $200 under section 1202.44, suspended.[3] But the clerk’s minutes incorrectly reflect both the restitution fund fine and the probation revocation fine at $220 each.

Jorge Luis Rubio appeals an order committing him as a sexually violent predator (SVP) to the custody of the California Department of Mental Health for an indeterminate term pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.)

After the court denied her motion to suppress evidence, defendant Jeannette Anne LaPerriere pleaded no contest to transportation of methamphetamine. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5; Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.) The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed her on probation with various conditions. On appeal she claims the court erred in denying her suppression motion. She also claims that a condition of probation prohibiting the use of drugs and alcohol is unconstitutional because it lacks a knowledge requirement.
We uphold the denial of the suppression motion, modify the probation condition to include a knowledge requirement, and affirm the probation order as modified.