CA Unpub Decisions

We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), setting forth the facts of the case and requesting that we review the entire record. Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), appointed counsel suggested we consider whether the failure to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense resulted in the denial of defendant’s due process rights, and whether the evidence supported the conviction.
On June 18, 2012, this court provided defendant with 30 days to file written argument on his own behalf. That period of time has passed, and we have received no communication from him.
We have examined the entire record and counsel’s Wende/Anders brief, and find no arguable issue. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) We therefore affirm.

Amber Y. seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested six-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e))[1] terminating her reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to her one-year-old son, K.Y.[2] She contends the juvenile court erroneously terminated reunification services without considering the barriers to reunification she faced as an incarcerated parent as required by section 366.21, subdivision (e). We deny the petition.

Matthew B. (father) appealed from an order terminating parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to his son, 16-month-old Ryan.[1] After reviewing the entire record, father’s court-appointed appellate counsel informed this court she had found no arguable issues to raise in this appeal. Counsel requested and this court granted leave for father to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error does exist. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844.)
Father has since written this court to ask that we reverse the termination order because he feels he has been unjustly treated during earlier phases of Ryan’s dependency. On review, we conclude father’s letter does not amount to a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists.

K.M. (mother) appealed from an order terminating parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to her one-year-old son, N.[1] After reviewing the entire record, mother’s court-appointed appellate counsel informed this court she found no arguable issues to raise in this appeal. Counsel requested and this court granted leave for mother to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error does exist. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844.)
Mother has since submitted a letter to this court. However, her letter is identical to one she previously submitted in her earlier appeal from an order denying her request to terminate N.’s legal guardianship and regain custody of the child (In re N.H., F063970). This court reviewed those claims and determined they did not amount to a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error did exist. We see no reason to repeat that review here.
An appealed-from judgment or order is presumed correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is appellant’s burden to raise claims of reversible error or other defect and present argument and authority on each point made. If appellant fails to do so, the appeal should be dismissed. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.) Mother has raised no claim of error or other defect against the termination order from which she appealed.

Appellants B.H. (father) and K.M. (mother) appealed from December 2011 orders denying their petitions to terminate a legal guardianship established under Welfare and Institutions Code section 360 for their 13-month-old son N., and to place N. with them.[1] After reviewing the entire record, the parents’ court-appointed appellate counsel each informed this court that there were no arguable issues to raise on appeal. Counsel requested, and this court granted, leave for each parent to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error does exist. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844.)
Each parent has since submitted a letter raising virtually identical issues. The parents challenge the representation they received leading up to the order creating the guardianship. They also claim the judge was unfair to them and sided with the legal guardian. The parents additionally criticize the legal guardian for essentially interfering with their visits with N. Further, the parents claim they completed everything that the court asked of them. The parents conclude by requesting to file a supplemental brief raising these issues.
On review, we conclude none of the parents’ claims amount to a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error does exist.

J.B. (Mother) appeals after the termination of her parental rights to minor S.O. at a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] hearing. Mother appeals on the ground that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) notice was insufficient.[2] We agree that the notice provisions of ICWA were not adequately complied with and will remand the matter for that limited purpose. We otherwise find no error.
I

Defendant and appellant Willie Marshall Fant walked out of a Home Depot store with merchandise without paying for it. When he was confronted just outside the store by a Home Depot employee, he fought the employee and another who came to the aid of the first. He injured both employees, then fled in a waiting car. During the fight, the stolen merchandise fell to the ground and was left there. Defendant was later apprehended.
Defendant was charged with and convicted by a jury of two counts of robbery (counts 1-2; Pen. Code, § 211) and one count of attempted mayhem (count 3; Pen. Code, §§ 664, 203). Thereafter, defendant admitted allegations of one prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) and one prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). He was sentenced to a total term of eight years in prison and ordered to pay a restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4), a parole revocation fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.45), a criminal conviction assessment fee (Gov. Code, § 70373), and a court security fee (Pen. Code, § 1465.8).
On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte as to lesser included offenses of theft and attempted robbery. He also contends the abstract of judgment is incorrect because it indicates that the court security fee is $120 when the court orally imposed the amount of $100.
We reject these arguments and affirm the judgment.

Krystal S. appeals orders terminating her parental rights to her daughter, Miley S. She contends the juvenile court's finding that Miley is not an Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) was not supported by substantial evidence because Miley's alleged father, B.G., was never asked whether he has Indian heritage. We hold there is no merit to her contention and affirm the orders.

Defendant William Evans pleaded guilty to forging a financial document unlawfully and with the intent to defraud (Pen. Code, § 475, subd. (a)). On appeal, Evans contends his pretrial request to represent himself was erroneously denied and that the denial was constitutional error requiring reversal of his conviction without analysis of prejudice.[1] We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.

Adriana Astorga appeals from an order denying her motion to vacate a guilty plea entered in 1999 to felony marijuana possession for sale. Astorga contends: (1) the court erred in denying her motion as untimely because the six-month time limitation in Penal Code section 1018 (undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code) was directory rather than mandatory; and (2) the trial court failed to adequately advise her of the consequences of her plea, as required by section 1016.5. We reject Astorga's arguments and affirm the order.

Appointed counsel for defendant Kao Seng Saeteurn asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) We find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant. We note that the trial court did not identify all fines and fees on the record, and that the abstract of judgment does not specify all the fines and fees imposed upon defendant. Nor does the abstract reflect the date of conviction. Therefore, we remand the matter to the trial court to set forth the fines and fees on the record, and to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the fines and fees imposed upon defendant and the date of conviction. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

A modification decision.

Defendant Troy Bryan Labani pleaded no contest to grand theft and admitted the theft involved property of over $100,000 in value, rendering him ineligible for probation. As part of the plea agreement, it was agreed that should the amount of restitution be determined to be less than $100,000, he would be entitled to withdraw his admission to that enhancement and to the probation ineligibility condition.
After a hearing, victim restitution was set at $111,640.09, plus a 10 percent administrative fee. Defendant now contends the restitution amount should be reduced by $21,020, and accordingly, he also should be permitted to withdraw his enhancement admission and agreement regarding the probation ineligibility condition.[1] We shall affirm.

Arthur James Ross, Jr., stands convicted of crimes involving multiple victims: false imprisonment (Pen. Code,[1] § 237, subd. (a)) (count 1); second degree robbery (§ 211) (count 2); three counts of attempted second degree robbery (§§ 211, 664) (counts 3, 4, 5); and two counts of semiautomatic firearm assault (§ 245, subd. (b)) (counts 6 and 7). The jury also found as to all counts that a principal was armed with a firearm. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court found defendant was previously convicted of a serious felony. (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12.) He was sentenced to 20 years, 8 months in state prison. Defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to vacate the judgment and correct an unauthorized sentence.