CA Unpub Decisions

Juvenile court dependents Nicholas R., Marcos R., Jasmine R. and Ivan R. (together, the children) appeal the six-month review hearing order continuing reunification services for their parents, Diana G. and Eduardo R. (together, the parents). We affirm.

A jury convicted Skyylr Frank Hamilton of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664)[1] (count 1); violence to prevent a person from leaving a gang (§ 186.26, subd. (c)) (count 2); assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) (count 3); battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)) (count 4); participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) (count 5); and giving false information to a peace officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a)) (count 6). As to counts 1 through 4, the jury made true findings that Hamilton (1) committed the crimes to promote a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)); (2) personally used a deadly weapon (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23), 12022, subd. (b)(1)); and (3) personally inflicted great bodily injury (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), 12022.7, subd. (a)). Hamilton admitted a prior strike.
The trial court sentenced Hamilton to a prison term of 33 years four months.
Hamilton contends (1) that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain testimony by an expert on Hispanic criminal street gangs; (2) insufficient evidence supports the verdicts on counts 1, 2 and 5 and the true findings on the gang enhancement; and (3) the punishment for the gang enhancement with respect to count 2 (preventing a person from leaving a gang in violation of § 186.26, subd. (c)) should have been stricken because it is a lesser included offense of the substantive crime. We find no merit to Hamilton's arguments, and accordingly we affirm the judgment.

In this action for breach of an insurance contract, the trial court granted summary judgment to defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers) on the ground that the action was barred by the one-year limitation period contained in the policy because plaintiff Joseph D. Elias did not commence the action until more than a year after Farmers “clearly and unequivocally” denied his claim. On appeal, Elias contends the trial court erred because “the date of denial was an issue of fact which was not subject to determination and resolution in a summary judgment motion.” Finding no merit in this argument, we will affirm the judgment.

Defendants Jonathan Gary Shaw and Tara Shaw[1] were each convicted of possession of a controlled substance and possession of a device used for smoking a controlled substance after submitting their case based on a preliminary examination transcript. Jonathan was also convicted of possession of a deadly weapon.

By this appeal, plaintiff Jeff Greenwood (Greenwood) seeks reinstatement as a deputy with the El Dorado County Sheriff’s Department (Department). Greenwood’s dismissal was ordered by Sheriff Jeff Neves, and sustained by the El Dorado County Civil Service Commission (Commission). Greenwood then filed a
petition for writ of administrative mandamus to overturn the Commission’s decision. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) The trial court denied relief, and Greenwood timely filed this appeal.
Greenwood went to comfort a fellow officer who evidently had long-term trauma from an on-duty shooting in which she and
two other deputies had been wounded, and their assailant was killed. Greenwood witnessed the off-duty officer smoking marijuana and offering it to him, but did not timely report her. He later called a dispatcher to complain about the ensuing internal affairs investigation, and disparaged the Department and undermined his own credibility during that recorded conversation.
On appeal, Greenwood contends his termination was too harsh a penalty for his transgressions. Our task is not to determine whether we would have reached the conclusion that his misconduct warranted dismissal, but rather to determine whether the penalty imposed by the Sheriff and affirmed by the Commission represents an abuse of discretion. As we shall explain, we find no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by disqualifying plaintiff’s lawyer and his law firm from representing her in a wrongful termination lawsuit after the lawyer directed plaintiff to review almost 40,000 e-mails purloined by one of the lawyer’s other clients from their mutual employer, the Gateway Unified School District? The lawyer, Robert E. Thurbon, argues he should not have been disqualified as a matter of law because the three e-mails he read were not privileged, the potentially privileged e-mails were segregated and sealed by independent counsel, and the remaining e-mails were public records and discoverable. The trial court rejected Thurbon’s logic that the “ends justify the means.” We conclude the trial court chose a difficult but justifiable course in the exercise of its inherent authority to protect the integrity of the judicial process by refusing to dismiss plaintiff’s lawsuit, as requested by the district, but removing the lawyers who fell short of practicing the high ethical standards expected of servants of the law. We affirm.

Following his convictions for embezzlement (Pen. Code, § 508)[1] and grand theft (§ 487, subd. (b)(3)), the court ordered defendant to pay $40,000 in victim restitution and denied his section 17, subdivision (b) motion to reduce the felony convictions to misdemeanors. On appeal, defendant contends the restitution order and denial of his motion constituted abuses of discretion. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Billy David Mulkey was charged with the second degree murder of Keith Hendricks. ( ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 27 s UFKKFG000004 xpl 1 l "Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)" Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)[1] -- count I.) As to the second degree murder charge, it was further alleged that defendant intentionally and personally discharged a firearm (a rifle). ( ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 33 s UFKKFG000077 xpl 1 l "§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d)" § 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d).) Defendant was also charged with three counts of assault with a firearm (a shotgun) involving three alleged victims: Amanda Cavagnaro, Brian Maudlin, and Everett Hawkins. ( ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 22 s UFKKFG000078 xpl 1 l "§ 245, subd. (a)(2) --" § 245, subd. (a)(2) -- counts II, III & IV.) The case proceeded to a jury trial at which defendant testified. Only defendant and the victim were present at the time of the shooting, so defendant was the only eyewitness to what occurred when the victim was killed. The jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder and found true the firearm allegation. The jury acquitted defendant on the remaining charges.

Orlando E. (father) has filed a petition for extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452), challenging an order of the juvenile court denying his request to have his child Ariana E. placed with Patricia O. (paternal grandmother).[1] The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) opposes father’s petition, and counsel for Ariana has joined in that opposition. We deny the petition.

Real party in interest Craig Hunt (Hunt) was charged by information with four counts: count 1, kidnapping to commit a robbery on October 1, 2011 (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1));[1] count 2, first degree residential robbery on October 1, 2011 (§ 211); count 4,[2] first degree burglary on October 30, 2009 (§ 459); and count 5, first degree residential robbery on October 30, 2009 (§ 211). The People petition for a writ of mandate to overturn the order of the superior court, granting Hunt’s section 995 motion to set aside count 1. We grant the petition.

In 1997, defendant was convicted of one count of attempted murder, four counts of robbery, and four counts of assault with a firearm. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664, 211, 245, subd. (a)(2).)[2] The court found he had suffered five prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law. (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i).) With the acquiescence of the prosecutor, the court vacated the attempted murder conviction. In addition to the sentences for the firearm enhancements, defendant received four consecutive 25-year-to-life terms for the four robberies. We modified the sentences for the firearm enhancements and affirmed the judgment. (People v. Martinez (Feb. 25, 1998, B110602) [nonpub. opn.].)

H.B. appeals from the order entered March 21, 2012, terminating his parental rights pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. We appointed counsel to represent him on appeal.
On May 15, 2012, counsel filed a brief in which he informed us that he had found no arguable issues. That same day, we notified appellant he had 30 days within which to submit any contentions that he wished us to consider. Appellant has not presented any issues for the court’s consideration.

In connection with its order terminating dependency jurisdiction over 10-year-old Joe R., Jr. and nine-year old Christian R., on November 7, 2011 the juvenile court, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.4,[1] granted joint legal custody of the children to their mother, Sonia P., and their father, Joe R., Sr. and full physical custody of both children to Joe Sr. with monitored visitation for Sonia. On appeal Sonia contends the court erred in denying her shared physical custody and requiring her visitation to be monitored. We affirm.

Appellant Deandre Lee Morgan was convicted of carjacking and evading an officer. In his first appeal, we conditionally reversed the judgment of conviction, remanded the matter with directions to the trial court to resolve appellant’s motion for a new trial pursuant to the correct legal standard, and directed that the judgment be reinstated if the court denied the new trial motion. Upon remand, the court denied the motion. In the instant appeal, appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed an opening brief raising no issues. Following our independent examination of the entire record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), we conclude that no arguable issues exist, and affirm.