P. v. McKnight
Filed 12/12/12 P. v. McKnight CA1/3
TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
TIMOTHY McKNIGHT,
Defendant and Appellant.
A123119
(San Mateo
County
Super. Ct.
No. CIV407542)
Timothy
McKnight challenges his recommitment as a sexually
violent predator (SVP) under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 6600
et. seq.
(SVPA, or the Act). He contends the Act
denies him equal protection of the law
because persons committed under it are treated more harshly than MDO’s
(mentally disordered offenders) or persons found not guilty by reason of
insanity (NGI’s). The recent case of
1325 (McKee II) is dispositive of
McKnight’s claim. We therefore affirm
his recommitment.
This case was last before us in 2010, when we
considered and rejected a number of challenges to a petition to extend
McKnight’s commitment under the SVPA. (
court for proceedings on McKnight’s equal protection claim consistent with
2010,
the Supreme Court granted the People’s petition for review and transferred this
case back to us with directions to vacate our decision and suspend further
proceedings pending finality of the proceedings on remand in
Following remand, after a 21-day evidentiary hearing, the
trial court in McKee found that the
People met their burden to justify the disparate treatment of SVP’s. (McKee
II, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330.)
The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed. It concluded that SVP’s are differently
situated than MDO’s and NGI’s, and their different treatment under the Act is
necessary to further compelling state interests. (Id.
at pp. 1347–1348.) “[W]e conclude
the People on remand met their burden to present substantial evidence,
including medical and scientific evidence, justifying the amended Act’s
disparate treatment of SVP’s (e.g., by imposing indeterminate terms of civil
commitment and placing on them the burden to prove they should be released).
[Citation.] The People have shown that,
‘notwithstanding the similarities between SVP’s and MDO’s [and NGI’s], the
former as a class bear a substantially greater risk to society, and that
therefore imposing on them a greater burden before they can be released from
commitment is needed to protect society.’
[Citation.] The People have shown
‘that the inherent nature of the SVP’s mental disorder makes recidivism as a
class significantly more likely[;] . . . that SVP’s pose a greater risk [and
unique dangers] to a particularly vulnerable class of victims, such as
children[;]’ and that SVP’s have diagnostic and treatment differences from
MDO’s and NGI’s, thereby supporting a reasonable perception by the electorate
that passed Proposition 83 that the disparate treatment of SVP’s under the
amended Act is necessary to further the state’s compelling interests in public
safety and humanely treating the mentally disordered.†(Id.
at p. 1347.) The Supreme Court
denied review and McKee II is now
final.
McKnight
argues that McKee
He first maintains that he is differently situated from Mr. McKee
because he was not convicted of crimes against children. But, as the above-quoted passage indicates, the
analysis and holding in McKee II do
not turn on concerns specific to child predators. McKnight also argues the Supreme Court
intended that the post-McKee I remand
would resolve the equal protection issue only as applied to Mr. McKee. This, too, is erroneous. McKee I
recognized that the People could attempt to justify the Act’s disparate
impact in a variety of ways, and that these included showing that SVP’s as a
class are significantly more likely
to reoffend than MDO’s or NGI’s, showing they pose a greater risk to children
(in which case the equal protection analysis would apply only to child
predators), or by other, unspecified means.
(McKee I, supra, 47 Cal.4th at
p. 1208.) In light of that recognition,
the Court transferred the multiple “grant and hold†cases under
to vacate their prior opinions and suspend further proceedings until the
multiplicity of proceedings.†(See,
e.g., People v. Johnson, review
granted Aug. 13, 2008, S164388, italics added; People v. Riffey, review granted Aug. 20, 2008, S164711;
2008, S166167; People v. Garcia,
review granted Oct. 16, 2008, S166682;
People v. Glenn, review granted
Feb. 10, 2010, S178140.)
remand, McKee concluded that
differences between SVP’s
their different treatment under the Act.
It is plain that McKee II is
not to be restricted to Mr. McKee alone or only to those SVP’s convicted of
crimes against children, like his, but rather its holding applies to the class
of SVP’s as a whole.
We
agree with the Fourth District’s equal protection analysis. McKnight’s claim that the
appellate court failed to independently review the trial court’s determination
is frivolous. (See McKee II, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1339–1347.) We therefore conclude that McKnight’s
recommitment under the SVPA does not violate his equal protection rights.
The judgment is affirmed.
_________________________
Siggins,
J.
We concur:
_________________________
McGuiness, P.J.
_________________________
Pollak, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1]
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code
unless otherwise designated.
