P. v. Reese
Filed 1/16/13 P.
v. Reese CA2/7
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule
8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JEMAL SUYIN
REESE,
Defendant and Appellant.
B240339
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
YA079971)
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County, Alan B. Honeycutt, Judge. Affirmed.
Patrick
Morgan Ford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M.
Roadarmel, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________
INTRODUCTION
A
jury convicted defendant Jemal Suyin Reese on one count of
(cocaine) in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision
(a). In a bifurcated proceeding, the
trial court found defendant had suffered a prior serious or violent felony
conviction for voluntary manslaughter
within the meaning of the “Three Strikes†law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds.
(a), (b)-(i), 1170.12) and had served a separate prison term for a felony (
prison term of seven years.
On
appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in declining
to dismiss his prior strike in the interest
of justice. Defendant also asks that
we review an in camera proceeding conducted by the trial court to determine
whether it properly concluded there was no discoverable material to which he
was legally entitled under Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 and
Cal.3d 531. We affirm.
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Refusing To Dismiss
Defendant’s Prior Strike Allegation.
It
is well established that “in ruling whether to strike or vacate a prior serious
and/or violent felony conviction allegation or finding under the Three Strikes
law . . . or in reviewing such a ruling, the court . . .
must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present
felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the
particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be
deemed outside the [Three Strikes] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and
hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one
or more serious and/or violent felonies.â€
(People v. Williams (1998) 17
Cal.4th 148, 161.)
We
review the trial court’s decision not to dismiss a prior strike allegation
under Penal Code section 1385 for abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376.) “[T]he
three strikes law not only establishes a sentencing norm, it carefully
circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart from this norm and requires the
court to explicitly justify its decision to do so. In doing so, the law creates a strong
presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both
rational and proper. [¶] . . .
[¶] . . . ‘[I]t is not enough to show that reasonable people might
disagree about whether to strike one or more’ prior conviction
allegations. . . .
Because the circumstances must be ‘extraordinary . . . by
which a career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very
scheme within which he squarely falls once he commits a strike as part of a
long and continuous criminal record, the continuation of which the law was
meant to attack’ [citation], the circumstances where no reasonable people could
disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme
must be even more extraordinary.†(Id.
at p. 378.)
Several
factors emphasized by defense counsel, and acknowledged by the trial court,
arguably supported defendant’s request to dismiss the prior strike allegation
in the interest of justice, based on his post-conviction behavior: Notwithstanding his lengthy history of drug
abuse, defendant seemed sincerely remorseful and intent upon remaining drug
free and becoming a productive member of society. Additionally, defendant appeared committed to
his newly-found religious faith and to caring for his son and ailing
mother. Defendant had also successfully
participated in vocational training and substance abuse treatment programs
while in county jail. According to defendant
and his counsel, defendant intended to continue his rehabilitative efforts.
On the other hand, as the trial court found in declining to
exercise its discretion to dismiss the prior strike allegation, there were no
extraordinary circumstances by which defendant could have been deemed to fall
outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law.
Defendant was 40 years old at the time of the offense, and while his
criminal history was not lengthy, it was serious. It also reflected defendant’s failure to take
advantage of several opportunities to rehabilitate himself. In 1992, defendant was sentenced to 11 years
in state prison for voluntary manslaughter involving substance abuse. After his release, defendant was arrested for
possession of a controlled substance, for which he was convicted and sentenced
in 1999 to a state prison term of 32 months.
In 2002, while defendant was on parole for that conviction, he was again
arrested and convicted for possession of a controlled substance. This time he was sentenced to an eight-year
term in state prison. Following his
release on parole, defendant was arrested and convicted a third time in the
present case for possession of a controlled substance.
In light of this record of recidivism (see Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(2) [sentencing court properly considers defendant’s numerous prior
convictions as a circumstance in aggravation]), defendant’s
circumstances are not so extraordinary that he must be considered to fall
outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law.
The trial court acted well within its broad discretion in concluding the
interest of justice would not be served by dismissing defendant’s prior strike
allegation.
Defendant
contends his motion to dismiss his
prior strike allegation was improperly denied because it contained information
that mistakenly pertained to another individual concerning an unrelated
case. Defendant posits the trial court
must have relied on this erroneous information, having failed to mention or
question it at the hearing. While the
motion filed on defendant’s behalf did not correspond to defendant’s criminal
history and the circumstances of his current conviction, there is nothing to
suggest this had any effect on the trial court’s decision. Indeed, the record shows the court considered
letters in support of defendant’s character, documents from vocational, life
skills and treatment programs for substance abuse, medical records of
defendant’s mother, and defendant’s oral and written statement to the
court. Additionally, the court
considered the prosecutor’s opposition to the motion, which accurately set
forth defendant’s criminal history and the circumstances of his current
conviction. The court also entertained
argument from the prosecutor and defense counsel, both of whom addressed
defendant’s prior crimes, his current offense, the probability of his
recidivism and his rehabilitative efforts.
The trial court considered the relevant factors, there was a basis for
the court’s decision not to dismiss defendant’s prior strike allegation, and we
find no abuse of discretion in that decision.
(See People v. Carmony,
B. The Trial Court Did Not
Abuse Its Discretion in Finding No Discoverable Pitchess Material.
Defendant
filed a Pitchess motion for pretrial discovery of information in the personnel records of
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputies David Duarte and Rahn Hunter concerning
any complaints or allegations of acts of dishonesty and any exculpatory or
impeachment materials within the meaning of Brady
v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 [83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215]. The trial court found good cause as to Deputy
Duarte, but denied the motion as to Deputy Hunter.
custodian of records, the court determined there was no discoverable material
to be provided to the defense.
Pursuant to People
v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, defendant requested we examine the
transcript of the in camera hearing after the trial court determined defendant
had demonstrated good cause to discover Pitchess
material with respect to Deputy Duarte pertaining to
allegations of dishonesty. We have
reviewed the sealed record of the proceedings, which adequately describes the
documents reviewed, and conclude the trial court satisfied the minimum requirements
in determining whether there was discoverable information; no abuse of
discretion occurred. (Id. at p. 1229.)
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
JACKSON,
J.
We concur:
WOODS, Acting P. J.
ZELON, J.
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in the record of the hearing on the discovery motion.
