In re Juan P.















Filed 2/6/13 In re Juan P.
CA2/2













NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE
OFFICIAL REPORTS







California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115>.





IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA



SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT



DIVISION TWO




>

In re JUAN P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.	B238119 (Los Angeles County
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JUAN P., Defendant and Appellant.	Super. Ct. No. YJ35227)

APPEAL from a judgment of
the Superior Court
of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Los Angeles
County. Wayne C.
Denton, Commissioner. Affirmed.



Susan
L. Ferguson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.



Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson, Kim
Aarons, and Connie Kan, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Minor and appellant, Juan P. (minor), appeals from a judgment of
the juvenile court entered after the court sustained a petition filed pursuant
to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 (petition or section 602
petition). Minor contends that the judgment
is not supported by substantial evidence. We find no merit in minor’s contention and
affirm the judgment.

>BACKGROUND

Procedural
history

The
People filed a section 602 petition alleging in count 1 that minor made criminal
threats in violation of Penal Code section 422.href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">^[1] The petition was later amended to add count
2, attempted criminal threats, in violation of section 664/422. At the adjudication and disposition hearing,
the juvenile court sustained count 1, declared it to be a felony, and dismissed
count 2. On July 14, 2011, the court declared minor to be a
ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, and placed
him at home on probation on specified terms and conditions. Minor filed a timely notice of appeal.

Prosecution evidence

On October 27, 2010,
while minor was a student at Hamilton High School, he was on campus in the
company of other students, one of whom had his cellphone out in violation of a
school rule. Physical education teacher,
Larry Williams (Williams), testified that when he asked that student to give up
his cellphone, minor intervened and said, “I don’t like you. We had you last
year.” The student with the cellphone
then disappeared into the crowd as minor kept speaking to Williams. Williams decided to “just let it go” as such
incidents occurred on a regular basis.

The following day, as
Williams came out of the school office at the end of a passing period, he
noticed that two students from his class were “hanging out” in the quad with
minor. As this behavior was unacceptable
to Williams, he told his students to go to class. Once again, minor intervened. He came close to Williams’s face and said, “I
told you I didn’t like you.” Minor then
cursed at Williams, said, “I’ll fuck you up,” and told Williams he knew someone
from another gang who had “messed up” a Shoreline member, adding, “I’m going to
get him to do the same thing.” Williams
understood minor’s statement as meaning that minor knew a gang member who had
beaten a member of his rival gang, the Venice Shoreline Crip gang, and that he
would have this person beat Williams.
When security guards approached, Williams asked them to take minor away.

Although Williams
testified that he considered minor’s behavior to be “a lot of bravado” and that
he was not afraid of minor, he also testified that he was concerned for his
safety, took minor’s threats seriously, and believed that minor would have
someone beat him. Williams was still
concerned for his safety at the time of the adjudication hearing. He explained that he came from an area with
many young gang members and that his mother still lived there. A rumor had circulated at Hamilton High
School that Williams was a member of the Venice Shoreline gang. Williams said he was “fed up” with students
identifying him with gang life. He was
concerned for his safety, as he had known of many innocent people who had been
injured or killed due to gang association or “hearsay.” Minor dressed, spoke, and carried himself
like a gang member, which contributed to Williams’s concern that “something
could happen.” Williams considered
consistent reporting and holding students accountable to be a safety
precaution.

>DISCUSSION

Minor contends that the
evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he made a criminal
threat. In particular, minor contends
that the evidence established that his threats were not genuine threats or
intended to be taken as threats, but were mere angry or emotional outbursts. He also contends that there was insufficient
evidence that the victim experienced sustained fear.

A challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a juvenile court judgment sustaining criminal allegations
is reviewed under the same standard of review applicable to any criminal
appeal. (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026.) Thus, we review the
whole record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine
whether it discloses evidence that is “reasonable, credible, and of solid value
-- such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.” (>People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557,
578; see also Jackson v. Virginia (1979)
443 U.S. 307, 318-319; In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1372.) “‘[W]e must presume in support of the judgment the existence of
every fact the trier of fact could reasonably have deduced from the
evidence. [Citation.]”’ (In
re V.V., supra, at p. 1026.) “The same standard applies when the
conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]”
(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) We do not reweigh the evidence or resolve
conflicts in the evidence. (>People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149,
1181.)
Reversal on ground of insufficient substantial evidence “is
unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)

A criminal threat is a
statement, willfully made with the specific intent that it be taken as a
threat, which threatens to commit a crime that will result in death or great
bodily injury to another person “even if there is no intent of actually
carrying it out.” (§ 422, subd.
(a).) The threat must “on its face and
under the circumstances in which it is made, [be] so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a
gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and
thereby causes that person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her
own safety . . . .” (>Ibid.)

Intent

Minor contends that the
threat was not intended to be taken seriously, because the words used were
equivocal, ambiguous, or conditional, and the circumstances showed no more than
an angry outburst.

The intent required by
section 422 is not the intent to actually carry out the threatened crime, but
the intent that the victim receive and understand the threat. (People
v. Wilson (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 789, 806.)
When the words of a threat are equivocal, ambiguous, or conditional, the
intent that the words be taken as a threat must be determined from all the
surrounding circumstances. (>People v. Butler (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th
745, 753-755.)

Minor suggests that these
circumstances mirror those in In re
Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132 (Ricky
T.), where the minor “mouth[ed] off” after his teacher accidently hit him
while opening the classroom door, by saying that he was going to get the
teacher or ‘“kick [his] ass.”’ (Id.
at pp. 1135-1136, 1140.) The student was
sent to the school office and the police were not called until the following
day. (Id. at pp. 1135,
1138.) Because the minor was not violent
or physically aggressive and had no history of disagreements, prior quarrels,
or even hostile words with the teacher, the appellate court held that the
circumstances did not support a finding that the minor’s words were a true
threat. (Id. at p. 1138.)

The circumstances of this
case were different from those in Ricky T. Here, the victim worked with adolescent boys
on a regular basis as a physical education teacher. Williams recognized gang-style attire and
“gang talk” among students, and minor dressed, spoke, and carried himself like
a gang member. Minor had spoken to the
victim in a hostile manner the day before the threat and then uttered his
threat while close to Williams’s face.
Williams came from a gang-dominated neighborhood, still had family
there, and had known of many innocent people who had been injured or killed due
to gang association or “hearsay.”
Williams was already the subject of such hearsay; it was rumored among
his students that he associated with the Venice Shoreline Crip gang. Williams testified that minor’s words caused
him to be concerned for his safety. Such
circumstances amply supported the conclusion that minor’s words were a threat
to have Williams physically assaulted by a gang member.

Moreover, minor’s
reference to the Venice Shoreline gang as a rival to his friend’s gang was a
good indication that minor had heard the rumor about Williams’s association
with Venice Shoreline and thus knew that Williams would understand the
significance of minor’s words as a threat.
Such circumstances support the reasonable inference that, unlike the student
in Ricky T., whose words just came out
in a moment of anger, minor chose a threat likely to instill fear in this
victim, and that minor intended his words be taken seriously as a threat.href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">^[2]

Sustained
fear

Minor
contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Williams
was in fear of imminent death or great bodily injury or that his fear was
sustained. A threat is criminal only if
it causes the victim
“reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her
immediate family’s safety . . . .” (§
422, subd. (a).) “‘[S]ustained’ . . .
means a period of time that extends beyond what is momentary, fleeting, or
transitory.” (People v. Allen (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156.)

Minor
makes much of Williams’s testimony that he was not afraid of minor at the time
of the threat or at the time he gave testimony.
We agree with respondent that Williams’s testimony expressed fear
despite his claim that he was not specifically afraid of minor. A victim’s denial that he was afraid may be
mere bravado. (People v. Borra (1932) 123 Cal.App. 482, 485.) Thus, fear may be inferred from the
circumstances of the crime even when the victim denies that he was afraid. (See People
v. Renteria (1964) 61 Cal.2d 497, 498-499 [robbery; store clerk denied
fear].) Williams testified that he was
concerned for his safety and that he thought it was possible that minor would
follow through with his threat to have a gang member friend assault
Williams. Williams’s concern was based
on his experience with gang culture during his childhood and his knowledge of
innocent people being killed or injured by gang members because of mere
rumors. We find such circumstances
sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that minor’s threat caused Williams
to experience fear -- a fear a high school teacher may be reluctant to express
especially in the presence of one of his students.

Further,
Williams’s fear was not “momentary, fleeting, or transitory.” (People v. Allen, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1156.)
Williams’s concern that he would be physically assaulted by minor’s gang
member friend persisted and continued until the time he gave testimony, more
than one year later.

Minor contends that Williams’s fear
was not genuine, as demonstrated by his failing to testify that he took
precautions such as changing his locks or driving a different route home. Minor suggests that Williams was merely
angry, because he was “fed up” with and “sick and tired” of the rumor regarding
his gang association. In essence, minor
contends that sufficient evidence supports a finding contrary to the judgment
of the juvenile court. (In re Ryan N., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p.
1372.) The test on appeal is not as
minor suggests, whether there was substantial evidence in his favor; “‘reversal is not warranted merely because
the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary
finding. [Citations.] The test on appeal is whether there is
substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact; it is not
whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]’”
(Ibid.) As we conclude
that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings, we reject
minor’s arguments.

>DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.





___________________________,
J.

CHAVEZ

We concur:



__________________________,
P. J.

BOREN



__________________________,
J.

ASHMANN-GERST