CA Unpub Decisions

Jeffery Adams entered a guilty plea to one count of possessing a forged item (Pen. Code,[1] § 475, subd. (a)). Prior to the entry of his guilty plea, Adams filed a motion to suppress evidence under section 1538.5. Following a contested hearing the court denied the motion. Adams was granted probation subject to 421 days custody, with credit for 421 days served.
Adams filed a timely notice of appeal.
Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) raising possible, but not arguable issues. We offered Adams the opportunity to file a brief on his own behalf, but he has not responded.

Juan Chuc entered a negotiated guilty plea to three lewd act counts. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) Less than one month later, Chuc moved to withdraw his plea, but the court denied the motion. On appeal, Chuc contends the court abused its discretion in denying his motion. We reject this contention and affirm.

Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Darth K. Vaughn for Real Party in Interest.
In this writ proceeding, petitioner Voyager Associates, Inc. (Voyager), a successor company to Thompson Plastics, Inc. (TPI), an Alabama corporation, challenges the denial of its motion to quash the service of summons and cross-complaint of real party in interest Tyco Fire Products, L.P. (Tyco) on grounds California lacked jurisdiction over petitioner and its CEO, Bernard Thompson, also an Alabama resident. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 418.10.) In denying the motion to quash, the court relied exclusively on an insurance and indemnification clause in the parties' contract, which it interpreted as permitting jurisdiction in California.
We issued an order to show cause on June 5, 2013, and now grant the writ petition because the indemnity clause provides an insufficient basis to permit a California court to exercise jurisdiction in this matter. The service of summons and cross-complaint should have been quashed for lack of personal jurisdiction in California.

Gilbane Building Company (Gilbane) petitions for writ of mandate challenging the trial court's overruling of its demurrer to San Diegans for Open Government's (SanDOG) first amended complaint. In that complaint, SanDOG asserted claims against Gilbane and other construction companies seeking to disgorge all monies those companies allegedly illegally received from contracts with the Sweetwater Union High School District (the District). Gilbane contends the trial court erred in overruling its demurrer because (1) SanDOG does not have standing on its own and cannot rely on the standing of its members; and (2) SanDOG cannot pursue its action because it failed to allege it made a demand on the District to sue and the District refused. We reject Gilbane's arguments and deny the petition.

Gary L. Peavy appeals, in propria persona, from an order denying his petition brought under Government Code section 946.6 for leave to file a late tort claim against the California Men's Colony. (Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition because Peavy failed to establish the elements of section 946.6 relief by any competent evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.

Daniel Samaniego appeals from a default judgment entered against him in the lawsuit brought against him by Joseph John Weseloh III. We conclude that Samaniego's appeal is without merit, and we accordingly affirm the judgment.

C.W. (mother) appeals from an order denying her request to regain custody of K.M. (daughter) from V.S. (maternal grandmother). Mother contends we must reverse the order because the court did not find mother was an unfit parent and the court based its decision on a flawed Family Court Services report. We discern no reversible error on the record provided and affirm the order.

Jeraldin Kuerbiss appeals from a one-year restraining order prohibiting her from contacting her former boyfriend, Jonathan Gonzalez. In processing the appeal, we noted the restraining order expired by its own terms on November 18, 2013. We solicited supplemental briefs from the parties on whether the appeal is moot and should be dismissed. Neither party responded.
Under well-established principles, this appeal is moot and must be dismissed. "If relief granted by the trial court is temporal, and if the relief granted expires before an appeal can be heard, then an appeal by the adverse party is moot." (Environmental Charter High School v. Centinela Valley Union High School Dist. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 139, 144.) "[A]ppellate courts as a rule will not render opinions on moot questions: '[W]hen, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and without fault of the [respondent], an event occurs which renders it impossible for [the reviewing court] if it should decide the case in favor of [appellant], to grant [appellant] any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal.' " (Ebensteiner Co., Inc. v. Chadmar Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1178-1179.)
The restraining order challenged by Kuerbiss has expired. Thus, her appeal is moot and must be dismissed.

Plaintiff Charles Jajdelski appeals from a judgment in favor of defendant Kaplan, Inc. (Kaplan) after the court sustained Kaplan's demurrer to Jajdelski's first amended complaint (FAC), without leave to amend, for failure to state a claim under the whistleblower protection provisions of the California False Claims Act (CFCA). (Former Gov. Code, § 12653, repealed and replaced by Stats. 2012, ch. 647, §§ 4 & 5.) Jajdelski contends that the court erred in finding that he did not sufficiently allege (1) actions in furtherance of a false claims action, (2) a reasonable suspicion of a false claim, or (3) a reasonable possibility that Jajdelski's actions would lead to a false claims action. Jajdelski further contends that the court abused its discretion in denying him leave to amend his complaint following this finding. Kaplan argues that the judgment is correct on the grounds stated by the court and on alternative grounds. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Kevin Lamar Smith appeals from a judgment of conviction after a jury convicted him of one count of pandering and one count of pimping. Smith asserts that in order for his pandering conviction to be upheld, there must be evidence that he encouraged the prostitute with whom he was involved to change her business relationship by ceasing to work as a prostitute for another person and working for him as a prostitute, instead. Smith claims that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for pandering because, he contends, the evidence demonstrates that the prostitute in question decided to leave her pimp and form a relationship with him of her own volition and without his inducement or encouragement. Smith also challenges his conviction for pimping, arguing that the trial court prejudicially erred in not instructing the jury with a pinpoint instruction he requested that would have told the jury, in effect, that if it found that the prostitute gave Smith her money for the purpose of holding it for her and not for his support, then the jury would have to find him not guilty of pimping.
We conclude that both of Smith's arguments are meritless. Smith's contention that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for pandering is based on a misinterpretation of recent Supreme Court authority concerning the pandering statute. With respect to the trial court's rejection of Smith's proposed pinpoint jury instruction, the trial court appropriately rejected Smith's requested pinpoint instruction because the proffered instruction was ambiguous and provided an incorrect description of the law pertaining to the offense of pimping. We therefore affirm the judgment.

In October 2011, Charlotte May pled guilty to possessing a firearm within 10 years of being convicted of violating Penal Code[1] section 422 (criminal threats) (§ 12021, subd. (c)(1)). On March14, 2012, the court reduced the offense to a misdemeanor and sentenced May to probation.
On June 28, 2012, May admitted violating probation. The court reinstated probation on modified terms and conditions.
May filed a timely notice of appeal. May did not obtain a certificate of probable cause.
Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) raising possible but not arguable issues. We offered May the opportunity to file her own brief on appeal but she has not responded.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of the underlying offense are not relevant to this appeal. The "facts" of this appeal relate to the terms of the grant of probation and the original probation order and the acts leading to violation of probation.
The March 2012 grant of probation required that May not violate any laws except minor traffic offenses. In June 2012, May pled guilty to driving on a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a)), a misdemeanor.

Defendant and appellant April Hawkins, acting in propria persona, appeals from an order of the trial court denying her motion to modify an existing civil harassment restraining order. On appeal, she vigorously disputes the allegations of wrongdoing set forth in the applicant's request for the restraining order.
Although Hawkins has provided us with a reporter's transcript of one of the hearings on her motion to modify, she has not provided a reporter's transcript of the initial hearing on the request for a restraining order or complete transcripts of what occurred at a later hearing on her motion to modify. Given this limited record, we must presume that Hawkins was given an adequate opportunity to dispute the accusations made against her, that entry of the restraining order in the first instance was proper and that the trial court acted properly in denying her motion to modify.
Accordingly, we affirm the order denying Hawkins's motion to modify.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Grant Hurlbert of four counts: residential burglary, with the enhancing allegation that a person other than an accomplice was present within the residence at the time of the burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459 & 667.5, subd. (c)(21); count 1); evading police with reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 2); unlawful taking and driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 3); and resisting an officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1); count 4). The jury also found the enhancements true and found Hurlbert had suffered one prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.2, subds. (a)-(d) & 667, subd. (a)(1)) and served two prison priors (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).[1]
On appeal, Hurlbert contends his conviction on count 1 should be reversed because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he intended to commit burglary when he entered the victim's residence. He also contends the trial court erred when it imposed a one-year prior prison term enhancement and a five-year prior serious felony enhancement based on the same prior conviction.
As we explain, we reject Hurlbert's first contention but, as do the People, we agree with his second contention.

A jury convicted Jorge Jimenez of four counts of forcible rape (Pen. Code,[1] § 261, subd. (a)(2)); one count of forcible penetration with a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A)); one count of kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)); and one count of false imprisonment (§§ 236 & 237, subd. (a)). The victim of each of these crimes was the mother of two of his children, C.R., with whom he had a long and violent history. Jimenez was sentenced to an aggregate term of 30 years to life plus 12 years.
On appeal, Jimenez contends the judgment must be reversed because the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the prosecution to introduce evidence of prior uncharged acts of domestic violence, in admitting expert testimony on domestic violence and in instructing the jury on the import of the evidence of the uncharged domestic violence. Jimenez also challenges the $10,000 restitution fine that appears in the court's minutes and the abstract of judgment.
As we explain, we reject Jimenez's challenge to his conviction. Given the role domestic violence played in the crimes Jimenez committed against C.R., the trial court acted well within its discretion in admitting evidence of the uncharged domestic violence. Moreover, the trial court properly admitted expert testimony on domestic violence and properly instructed the jury on the use of evidence of prior domestic violence.
We nonetheless remand to the trial court so that it can clarify a conflict in the record with respect to the amount of the restitution fine it imposed.