CA Unpub Decisions

Paul P. (Father) appeals an order of the juvenile court terminating his parental rights to his children, P.P. and N.P. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26.) He claims that the Santa Barbara County Child Welfare Services (County) did not comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. 1901.) Court conclude, among other things: 1) substantial evidence supports the finding that Father's children were not members or entitled to membership in any Apache Indian Tribe, and 2) Father has not shown that the court erred by making an ICWA non-applicability finding at a post-judgment hearing where Father decided to represent himself. Court affirm.

probation and executing a previously suspended state prison sentence. Rogers contends he was denied his rights to counsel of his choice and to due process by the trial courts refusal to grant his newly-retained counsel a continuance to prepare for the probation violation hearing. Court affirm.

G.S. and M.S., the paternal great-grandparents ("Great-grandparents"), appeal an order of the juvenile court denying their modification petition requesting placement of the child with them. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 388.) court affirm.

Robert F. Ensminger appeals the judgment entered following his guilty plea to transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a)), possession of methamphetamine ( 11377, subd. (a)), and use of a false compartment to store a controlled substance ( 11366.8, subd. (a)). He also admitted serving four prior prison terms (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, he was sentenced to a total term of nine years four months in state prison. The trial court denied his request for a certificate of probable cause.
Because appellant pleaded guilty prior to trial, the relevant facts are derived from the preliminary hearing transcript. On August 27, 2008, appellant was stopped by the police for a traffic violation. After it was discovered that appellant was on parole, his vehicle was searched. Methamphetamine, two scales, and cash were found inside the vehicle. Some of the contraband was found in a hidden compartment that appellant revealed to the parole agent who conducted the search.

A jury found defendant Dan Vincent Christiansen guilty of two counts of attempted murder of a peace officer (counts 1 and 2), two counts of assault with a firearm on a peace officer (counts 3 and 4), and one count of discharge of a firearm with gross negligence (count 5), and found he personally discharged a firearm in the commission of counts 1 through 4. The jury also found the attempted murders were deliberate and premeditated. The court sentenced defendant to 20 years plus 15 years to life in prison with the possibility of parole. On appeal, defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation. He also contends the trial court erred when it denied his request for a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter. Court affirm the judgment.

Following a contested hearing, the probate court denied the claims of appellant Shirley Whitney against the estate of her ex-husband Mark Whitney (the decedent) for amounts she claimed were owed to her under a 1995 entry of judgment in the Whitneys marital dissolution action. Whitney argues there was insufficient evidence to support the judgment.
Although Court conclude the probate court made two mistakes that were reflected in its ruling, Court find that notwithstanding these mistakes, there was sufficient evidence to support the judgment. Specifically, the trial court mistakenly believed Whitney received a greater percentage of the sale proceeds of an office building than she actually received, and mistakenly credited as testimony a statement made by the estates attorney. Nevertheless, the inferences drawn by the court from the circumstances surrounding the sale of the office building and the distribution of the sales proceeds were reasonable, and those inferences together with the probate courts determinations regarding credibility are sufficient to support the judgment. Court shall therefore affirm the judgment.

This case comes to us on retrial after we reversed defendant Daniel James Harpers convictions because the trial court repeatedly and erroneously told defendant that he had the right to have an attorney reappointed, leading him to enter a waiver of counsel that was not knowing and intelligent. (People v. Harper (Jan. 24, 2008, C052464) [nonpub. opn.], pp. 1-2.)
In this appeal, defendant raises issues relating to sentencing enhancements and presentence credits. Finding merit only in his credits argument, we modify the judgment and affirm the judgment as modified.

J.F. Shea Construction, Inc., a contracting and construction materials business (Shea), and Mount Shasta Tomorrow, a nonprofit environmental organization (Mount Shasta), filed a petition for writ of mandate and a complaint for declaratory relief against the County of Siskiyou and Siskiyou County Board of Supervisors (together the County). Shea and Mount Shasta alleged the Countys approval of the application of Eagle Peak Rock & Paving, Inc. (Eagle Peak) for a conditional use permit for a temporary portable asphalt batch plant violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, 21000 et seq.), and conflicted with a section of the Countys Zoning Code. Contending the action was moot, the County and Eagle Peak filed motions to dismiss the case. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss based on mootness and on a finding that Shea and Mount Shasta lacked standing to bring the action. Shea and Mount Shasta appeal the ensuing judgment of dismissal. Since dismissal was proper based on mootness, Court need not address standing. Court shall affirm the judgment.

Defendant James Dale Powell was angry at his girlfriend Erica Gibson for going to a bar. He met her at the bar, where she agreed to enter his vehicle. Defendant struck Gibson in the face as he drove to a home in Oroville. Arriving at the residence, defendant ordered Gibson into a backyard shed, then pushed her into a wall, and struck her twice in the head and face.
Defendant next ordered Gibson into the front yard, telling her she cannot play head games with him or she will get hit. Defendant left her in the yard as he retrieved a gun scope. Returning, defendant pushed the scope into Gibsons nose and said, No more head games.
Defendant went to the front of the house and sat on Gibsons car. The homes residents arrived, telling defendant he was not welcome, and kept him from retrieving his clothes. Defendant ordered Gibson into the car and, after she entered, defendant threw a wrench at the car and cracked the windshield. He next ordered Gibson into the house to get his clothes. She entered but refused to leave the house, pleading with the residents to hide her.

A jury convicted James Palmer Kramer of burglary (Pen. Code, 459)[1] and petty theft ( 484) of merchandise at a Home Depot store. The trial court sentenced Kramer to three years' formal probation with the condition, among others, that he serve 120 days in local custody.
Kramer contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying two of his motions in limine to exclude evidence; (2) the trial court improperly sustained certain hearsay objections; (3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury with CALJIC Nos. 361 and 362; (4) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel; and (5) insufficient evidence supports the petty theft conviction. Court conclude that Kramer has not identified any prejudicial error, and accordingly Court affirm.

Plaintiffs, cross-defendants and appellants Center Associates, L.P., et al. (Center) and their individual principals and an affiliated business (together Appellants or Center),[1]appeal the trial court's denial of their special motion to strike the second amended cross-complaint (SACC), an anti-SLAPP motion. (Code Civ. Proc.,[2] 425.16.) The SACC was filed by defendants, cross-complainants and respondents, William Altman, et al. (referred to as Respondents, the homeowners or the residents), who are homeowners of 33 of the 48 units in a Clairemont condominium project (the condos). The homeowners were sued by Center for declaratory relief (interpretation of the governing documents affecting their property), and responded with the SACC's claims for breach of contract, invasion of privacy, abuse of process, and other theories.

A jury convicted Rodney Lydell Tillis of human trafficking (Pen. Code, 236.1, subd. (a)),[1] pandering by encouraging ( 266i, subd. (a)(2)) and sexual penetration by a foreign object ( 289, subd. (a)(1)). Thereafter, Tillis waived a jury trial on the priors and admitted two prior felony convictions, for which he had served one prior prison term ( 667.5, 668, 1203, subd. (e)(4)). The trial court sentenced Tillis to a total prison term of 15 years. On appeal, Tillis contends his convictions should be reversed because of instructional errors, insufficiency of the evidence and various sentencing errors. Court agree that the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to properly instruct the jury on the elements of pandering by encouraging. That error translated into prejudicial instructional error on the crime of human trafficking as well. We therefore reverse Tillis's convictions for pandering and human trafficking. In all other respects, Court affirm the judgment.

A jury found Michael R. Gray guilty of burglary (Pen. Code,[1] 459) (count 1) and petty theft ( 484, subd. (a)) (count 2). Gray waived his right to a jury trial on allegations of two prior theft convictions ( 666) and three prior prison terms ( 667.5, subd. (b)) and admitted all of the priors. The court sentenced him to five years in prison: the two-year middle term for burglary, a concurrent term for petty theft with a prior theft conviction, and one year for each prior prison term. Gray appeals, contending the sentence for petty theft with a prior must be stayed ( 654) because both counts resulted from one indivisible course of conduct. The People properly concede the point.

Christopher Bey was charged with two robberies occurring on two different occasions. Bey represented himself at trial, and the jury acquitted him of one of the robberies. Challenging his conviction for the other robbery, he contends the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to sever the trials of the two robberies; (2) admitting suggestive identification evidence; and (3) refusing to give a special instruction to disregard his demeanor in court. As to sentencing, he argues the court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss his strike prior convictions. Court reject his contentions of error. The parties agree there is a clerical error in the abstract of judgment. Court affirm the judgment with directions to correct the abstract of judgment.