CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Tracy Donell Lee appeals from a judgment imposing a state prison sentence following his no contest pleas to criminal charges alleged in two separate informations. The sole issue on appeal is whether the use of juvenile adjudications to enhance a defendants sentence under Californias Three Strikes law violates the federal constitutions Sixth Amendment, given that juveniles do not enjoy a right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings in this state. Court affirm.

Respondent Amisha Chhipwadia entered into a relocation agreement in 2000 with a local hospital under which she agreed to set up a medical practice in the hospitals service area in exchange for its guarantee to her of a fixed monthly collection amount for 12 months. At about the same time, Chhipwadia orally agreed with appellant Sheldon Zitman to join his medical practice; he agreed to pay her a fixed monthly salary, in exchange for which she assigned to him any payments she received from the hospital under the relocation agreement. Disputes arose later between the parties, resulting in a lawsuit by the hospital against Chhipwadia (the prior suit). Chhipwadia cross-complained against the hospital and Zitman, and he in turn cross-complained against her. That cross-complaint was based upon a purported written contract between Chhipwadia and Zitman that Chhipwadia contended was a sham. Zitman dismissed his cross-complaint without prejudice shortly before trial.

In July 2008, a petition was filed alleging that Jesse A., a minor (17 years old at the time of the petitions filing), came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The petition charged the minor with one count of second degree robbery and alleged that he personally used a knife in the commission of the offense. The petition also alleged that the minor committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang. After a contested hearing, the court sustained the petition and found the personal-use allegation true. On the Peoples motion, it dismissed the gang allegation. The minor was declared a ward and placed on probation subject to various terms and conditions. On appeal, the minor challenges six of the conditions, claiming that five of them are overly broad and unconstitutional and should be modified in a manner that would allow them to pass constitutional muster. The minor argues that the sixth conditionproscribing the minor from frequenting any locations of gang activity or participating in any such activityis constitutionally infirm and should be stricken.

Defendant Isrreal Islas Lopez was sentenced to prison following a guilty plea. As part of his sentence, the court ordered defendant to pay a restitution fund fine of $6,400. Defendant seeks a remand for resentencing, arguing that the court was unaware of its discretion to waive the fine. Court reject defendants argument and Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant of possessing methamphetamine for sale and possessing narcotics paraphernalia. (Health & Saf. Code 11378, 11364, subd. (a).) We appointed counsel to represent defendant in this court. Appointed counsel has filed an opening brief which states the case but raises no specific issues. On September 1, 2009, we notified defendant by letter of his right to submit written argument in his own behalf within 30 days. He has not submitted an argument to this court. Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), we have reviewed the entire record and we have concluded that there is no arguable issue on appeal. (See also People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 124.) Therefore, Court affirm.

Christine Barrett appeals from the trial courts order for commitment under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500, which determined, after a court trial, that she was mentally retarded and a danger to herself and others and on that basis committed her to the Department of Developmental Services for a period of one year.[1] Barrett contends that she was deprived of her rights to due process and equal protection because the record does not show that the court advised her of her right to a jury trial and it reflects no express waiver of that right. Section 6500 does not contain a statutory right to a jury trial. But it is established that such a constitutional right exists for the civil commitment of a mentally retarded person under this section. It has also been held that based on due process and equal protection principles, a court is required to make an advisement of the right to a jury trial when proceeding under section 6500 and if the right is waived, to obtain an express waiver on the record. We conclude that due process and equal protection do not require the court to affirmatively advise the proposed committee under section 6500 of his or her right to a jury trial and because commitment proceedings are civil in nature, the right may be waived as in civil proceedings generally by the failure to request a jury. Here, the record does not show either whether the court advised Barrett of her right to jury trial or whether she expressly waived that right, personally or through counsel. Nor does the record show that Barrett made a jury-trial request, either personally or through counsel. We accordingly conclude that on this record, Barretts right to a jury trial was waived. And even if the court were required to and did not advise Barrett of her right to a jury trial and obtain an express waiver of that right, on this record, any such error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Court accordingly affirm.

For at least two millennia, it has been a standing reproach to mankind that the poor are always with us. The most distressing urban manifestation of the intractability of this problem is homelessness. Here, a defendant convicted of second degree robbery contends that the inherently prejudicial topic of his status as a homeless person so permeated his trial as to command reversal, because it was (1) misconduct for the prosecutor to mention the topic, and (2) incompetence for his trial counsel not to prevent the topic from becoming known to the jury. Court reject these contentions, and affirm.

Jennifer Ann Rich was tried by jury and found guilty of felony possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)) and misdemeanor being under the influence of methamphetamine (id., 11550, subd. (a).) Granted Proposition 36 probation for drug treatment (Pen. Code, 1210 et seq.), Rich appeals the judgment of October 16, 2008, claiming error and cumulative prejudice from (1) the exclusion of third party culpability (TPC) evidence and (2) prosecutor misconduct in exploiting the TPC ruling to mislead the jury. Court affirm, finding no such error or prejudice.

Defendant M.H. appeals from a dispositional order continuing him as a ward of the court and committing him to a county rehabilitation facility for 270 days after he was found to have committed first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, 459, 460, subd. (a)).[1] Defendants counsel has filed an opening brief that raises no issues and asks this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was notified of his right to file a supplemental brief, but has not done so. Court find no arguable issues and affirm.

Defendant and appellant, Miguel Angel Vargas, appeals the judgment entered following his conviction, by jury trial, for assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)). Vargas was sentenced to state prison for a term of two years. The judgment is affirmed.

Equity Title Company (Equity) appeals from a judgment entered after a jury trial. The jury found Equity liable to David R. (David) and Constance M. (Constance) Schott (collectively, the Schotts) on their claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract. The jury awarded the Schotts damages of $2,936,985. As to the breach of contract claim, Court find that the trial court erred in: (1) determining that the contract was ambiguous, and (2) submitting this cause of action to the jury without any guidance as to Equitys contractual obligations. Court therefore reverse the judgment as to breach of contract and remand for further proceedings on this cause of action. Court reverse the judgment on the fraudulent misrepresentation cause of action because substantial evidence does not support the jurys verdict.

Father appeals from a judgment ordering him to assume custody of his dependent children, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2,[1] under supervision of the juvenile court. Father claims that the trial court erroneously failed to award him custody and terminate jurisdiction, but we find no abuse of discretion in the dispositional order. The evidence of Fathers history of, and continuing potential for, domestic violence toward Mother supported the finding that there was a need for juvenile court supervision of the children while in Fathers custody. Because the trial court applied the correct statute and the evidence supports the determination of the need for continuing juvenile court jurisdiction and supervision of Fathers custody of the children, we imply the findings required by section 361.2, subdivision (c). Court affirm the judgment.

Mother appeals that portion of a dispositional order requiring her to participate in a drug rehabilitation program. She claims that she denied using drugs, there was no evidence she used drugs, and the sustained section 300 petition contained no allegation of her drug use. She therefore claims that the juvenile courts dispositional order erroneously required her participation in a drug rehabilitation program and should be reversed. There was evidence, however, that Father sold drugs; that 575 Ecstasy pills were found in Mothers home in locations accessible to her two infant children; that Mother was involved in sales and distribution of Ecstasy, Ketamine, and marijuana, and took orders and counted money for sales of those narcotics; that $10,000 in currency was recovered from the home; and that although Mother denied using drugs, she also denied involvement in drug trafficking, which denial was contradicted by evidence produced when law enforcement agencies wire-tapped a phone conversation which recorded Mother handling money for drug sales. Therefore it was not unreasonable for the dispositional order to require Mother to participate in a drug rehabilitation program. Court find no abuse of discretion and affirm the judgment.

The juvenile court sustained a petition under Welfare and Institutions section 602 alleging that Justin G. (minor) committed assault with a deadly weapon, a knife, upon Henry T. in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1). The juvenile court placed minor at home on probation.
Minor appeals on the ground that the record does not support the juvenile courts finding that minor committed a violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1).