CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant R.H. (mother) is the mother of M.B., born in March 2003, and S.B., born in January 2004. Mother appeals from the juvenile courts order terminating her parental rights at a hearing held pursuant to section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Mother contends the court erred in denying her motion to have minors great-aunt assessed for placement. Court affirm the judgment in full.

Jonathan Martin Arellano, by and through his guardian ad litem Antonio Arellano, (plaintiff) appeals from the trial courts grant of a motion for summary judgment in favor of defendants the Regents of the University of California, UCI (the University of California at Irvine) Medical Center, and Dr. Terry Shibuya (defendants) as to his claim for medical malpractice. Plaintiff contends the trial court erred by denying his requests for a continuance of defendants motion

In May 2007, Rick Stanford sued Costa Mesa Police Officer Matt Olin for false arrest and false imprisonment based on Stanfords arrest on July 6, 1999 and resulting eight-day incarceration. The trial court granted Olins motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Stanford appeals from the resulting judgment. Court affirm.
Stanfords claims against Olin arose out of his acts in the course and scope of his employment as a police officer. Therefore, timely presentation of a claim against Olins employer, the City of Costa Mesa, and timely institution of a lawsuit after denial of the claim were a prerequisite to suing Olin. (Gov. Code, 905, 905.2, 915, subd. (a), 945.4, 945.6, subd. (a)(1), 950.2.) (All further code citations are to the Government Code, except as noted.) Stanfords claim against the City of Costa Mesa, presented in 2002, was untimely. His lawsuit against Olin, filed over four years after denial of Stanfords claim, was untimely too.

Petitioner Peter Sostre challenges an order by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) that he must comply upon parole with Jessicas Law, which restricts registered sex offenders from residing near schools and parks where children gather. He contends the residency restriction is being applied to him retroactively and ex post facto. He further contends the residency restriction is unconstitutionally vague and an unreasonable parole condition.
ourt reject petitioners ex post facto claim. The California Supreme Court has held the residency restriction applies prospectively to those parolees who have both been released on parole and moved into a restricted zone after Jessicas Laws 2006 effective date. (In re E.J. (Feb. 1, 2010, S156933) __ Cal.4th __ (E.J.) [p. 17].) Petitioner is such a parolee, and so the law is being applied to him prospectively.

Minor J.M. appeals from a juvenile court order continuing him on probation following his successful completion of the Juvenile Treatment Courts (hereafter JTC) substance abuse program, due to an outstanding victim restitution balance. The minor contends that, despite the outstanding balance, he was entitled to dismissal of his probation pursuant to the agreement he signed in order to participate in the JTC program. Court agree. Court will therefore reverse the courts order and remand the matter to the juvenile court with directions to enter an order of dismissal.

Defendant Ochoa appeals from a judgment and sentence to state prison following his no contest pleas. Court appointed counsel to represent defendant in this court. Appointed counsel has filed an opening brief which states the case but raises no specific issues. We notified defendant of his right to submit written argument in his own behalf within 30 days, to which he has not responded. Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), Court have reviewed the entire record, and court have concluded that there is no arguable issue on appeal. (See also People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 124.) Therefore, Court will affirm.

Defendant Jose Daniel Rodriguez appeals from his conviction after jury trial for numerous sex offenses against four children on a variety of grounds, seeking reversal of his conviction and remand to the trial court for a new trial with directions to preclude certain evidence. Court affirm the trial court judgment, with the abstract of judgment modified to correct two undisputed errors

L.P. (Mother) challenges an order of the San Francisco City and County Superior Court, Juvenile Division, made November 20, 2009, in which the court set a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to select a permanent plan for the minors T.A. (born March 1995), D.A. (born January 1999), and C.A. (born May 2000). Mother contends the juvenile court erred in failing to extend her reunification services so that she could complete an inpatient substance abuse treatment program. As discussed below, conclude there was no prejudicial error and deny Mothers petition on the merits.

Appellant Frederick Earl Hendricks, an African American, sued his employer Los Angeles Unified School District (the district) for racial discrimination and retaliation after he was passed over for promotion to the position of police detective. The district obtained summary judgment, from which appellant now appeals. Court find that appellant failed to establish any triable issues of material fact as to his two claims and affirm.

A modification decision.

Raul Enciso was convicted on three counts of corporal injury to a spouse, cohabitant or childs parent (commonly referred to, and referred to hereafter, as domestic violence) (Pen. Code, 273.5). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found Enciso had suffered one prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), and he had served two separate prison terms for felonies ( 667.5, subd. (b)). He was sentenced to prison for an aggregate term of 14 years. On appeal, Enciso contends the trial court erred by failing sua sponte to give a unanimity instruction. Alternatively, he claims defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a unanimity instruction if the trial court were not obligated to do so.Court affirm.

Defendant, Saul Vallin, appeals from his convictions for two counts of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, 459) and two counts of theft ( 484, subd. (a)) and the special finding that a person was present during one of the burglaries. ( 667.5, subd. (c)(21).) Defendant argues: there was insufficient evidence to support two separate first degree burglary convictions and the finding that the victim was present in the residence; the prosecutor committed misconduct; and, if the prosecutorial issue has been forfeited, defense counsel failed to provide effective representation. Court reverse the special finding that the victim in count 1 was present within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21) during the burglary, modify defendants presentence credits and otherwise affirm the judgment.

Paul P. (Father) appeals an order of the juvenile court terminating his parental rights to his children, P.P. and N.P. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26.) He claims that the Santa Barbara County Child Welfare Services (County) did not comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. 1901.) court conclude, among other things: 1) substantial evidence supports the finding that Father's children were not members or entitled to membership in any Apache Indian Tribe, and 2) Father has not shown that the court erred by making an ICWA non-applicability finding at a post-judgment hearing where Father decided to represent himself. Court affirm.

Defendant, Saul Vallin, appeals from his convictions for two counts of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, 459) and two counts of theft ( 484, subd. (a)) and the special finding that a person was present during one of the burglaries. ( 667.5, subd. (c)(21).) Defendant argues: there was insufficient evidence to support two separate first degree burglary convictions and the finding that the victim was present in the residence; the prosecutor committed misconduct; and, if the prosecutorial issue has been forfeited, defense counsel failed to provide effective representation. Court reverse the special finding that the victim in count 1 was present within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21) during the burglary, modify defendants presentence credits and otherwise affirm the judgment.