CA Unpub Decisions

On April 28, 1974, habeas petitioner Michael Harris was arrested for shooting one person to death and wounding another after an argument in a bowling alley and, two weeks later, shooting an erstwhile acquaintance to death after another confrontation. On September 30, 1974, Harris pleaded guilty to one count of first degree murder and admitted use of a firearm in connection with the first homicide. He pleaded guilty to second degree murder and admitted use of a firearm in connection with the second. Harris is serving an indeterminate life term with the possibility of parole. He has been incarcerated for 35 years. On May 14, 2004, the Board of Parole Hearings (hereafter Board) found that Harris was unsuitable for parole because he would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from prison, and denied him parole for two years.

Appellant E. C. and respondent M. K. are the parents of W. K., who has been adjudged a dependent of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b).[1] Appellant appeals from an order denying her application for a restraining order against respondent ( 213.5). For the reasons stated below, the order is affirmed.

R.R. (mother) appeals from orders of the juvenile court terminating parental rights to her son J.R. and her daughter T.G. and selecting adoption as the permanent plan for both children. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26.)[1] On appeal, mother claims that the orders must be reversed because the court did not comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act. (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq., 224 et seq., hereafter ICWA.) Mother also argues that the court erred in terminating her parental rights to T.G. because the order will result in T.G.s losing her relationship with her full brother R.G. We conclude that the court erred in failing to comply with the ICWA in a timely manner but that the errors do not warrant reversal. We further conclude that the evidence supports the courts implied finding that the benefits of adoption outweighed the risk that T.G.s relationship with R.G. could be lost. Accordingly, court affirm the orders.

In a property dispute between neighboring landowners who were also parties to a failed construction contract, a jury found against appellant Sandra Terzian-Feliz and for respondents Vartan and Margarita Ajamian on all causes of action. Terzian-Feliz appeals the judgment ordering her to pay $13,000 in net damages to the Ajamians. She challenges (1) the trial courts nonsuit on her breach of contract cause of action; (2) the sufficiency of evidence supporting the jurys award of damages on the Ajamians breach of contract claim; (3) the jury finding that she had not established a prescriptive easement to use the Ajamians driveway; (4) the trial courts nonsuit on her cause of action for an implied easement over the same driveway; and (5) the jurys determinations of express and prescriptive easements in favor of the Ajamians over her property. Court affirm the judgment.

Vincent Timmons joined three codefendants in a plea deal that resolved numerous kidnapping, sexual assault, gang, and firearm charges, plus enhancements, for their guilty pleas to one count each of forcible kidnapping (count 1; Pen. Code, 207, subd. (a)) with an admitted gang enhancement ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(c)), and aggravated assault (count 12; 245, subd. (a)(1)), for fixed aggregate prison terms of 14 years.Five weeks later, on the eve of sentencing, Timmons announced a desire to withdraw his plea. He filed a written motion ( 1018) claiming coercion from threats by a codefendant. The People opposed the motion, and the court denied it. Sentenced to the agreed 14-year term (less 815 days of credit), Timmons secured a certificate of probable cause ( 1237.5; People v. Cuevas (2008) 44 Cal.4th 374, 379, 381) and appeals challenging the denial. Court uphold the denial and affirm the resulting judgment.

Sheldon Caughey, doing business as Sausalito Yacht and Ship, sued Cara Dibnah to recover a commission on Dibnahs sale of her motor yacht to a third party. Caughey alleged that the commission was due under an open listing agreement he had entered into with Dibnah in 2004. After a court trial, the trial court found that Caughey was not entitled to a commission because he breached his fiduciary duties to Dibnah in several respects. Caughey appealed from the ensuing judgment, which Court now affirm.

Defendant Robert Anthony Ventura was convicted by a jury of making a criminal threat against his former girlfriend. He contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on the need for unanimity, the effect of defendants voluntary intoxication, and the definition of sustained fear required for a criminal threat conviction; (3) the court should have granted a mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct; and (4) he received ineffective assistance from his counsel. None of defendants contentions support reversal, and therefore affirm the judgment.

Defendant Michael A. Barnes (appellant) appeals an order denying his special motion to strike the complaint filed by plaintiff Margaret A. Seltzer (respondent) pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16). Appellant contends the trial court erred in concluding respondents two causes of action against him do not arise from speech or petitioning activity, where his alleged conduct was the negotiation of a settlement agreement in a prior case. Court agree. Moreover, because appellant may not be held liable for the alleged conduct under the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, 47, subd. (b)), respondent has failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on her causes of action for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. court reverse the trial courts order and remand with directions to the trial court to grant appellants section 425.16 motion to strike.

In 2000, appellant, an immigrant from Ghana, enrolled in the University of California San Franciscos School of Pharmacy (hereafter UCSF and School). Due to various and sundry subsequent alleged failings by him regarding examinations, attendance and the like, in 2004 he was excluded from the list of graduating students and, in January 2005, dismissed from the school. Several years after all these events, i.e., in July 2008, appellant filed a four-cause-of-action first amended complaint (FAC) against the Regents. The Regents demurred to that complaint, and the matter was briefed and argued to the San Francisco Superior Court (the Honorable Patrick Mahoney). That court granted the Regents demurrer without leave to amend as to all causes of action because of appellants failure to exhaust the administrative process. Appellant appeals but Court affirm the trial courts order and resulting judgment.

A modification decision.

Richard Dobbs appeals from a judgment of dissolution that determined support and the division of his and his former wife Toninas property following their 29-year marriage. He contends that the court erred in (1) determining that certain credit card debt was a community debt subject to an equal division by the parties; (2) calculating the amount and retroactivity of spousal support; and (3) ordering Richard to pay for all of Toninas attorney fees. court conclude that the amount and retroactivity of the spousal support award requires reconsideration in light of factors that we shall discuss, but Court shall affirm the judgment in all other respects.

This is the second time we have addressed this dispute. In this appeal, attorney Leodis C. Matthews and his firm Matthews & Partners (collectively Matthews) appeal from a judgment entered after the trial court denied a motion to vacate a judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 663 (Section 663). Court affirm.

Defendants Issac Gilbert Rangel (Rangel) and Michael Eugene Perez (Perez) appeal from judgments of conviction entered after a jury trial. Perez also petitions this court for a writ of habeas corpus. Rangel and Perez were both convicted of robbery (Pen. Code, 211) and evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, 2800.2, subd. (a)). The jury further found true the allegation that during the commission of both offenses, a principal was armed with a firearm ( 12022, subd. (a)(1)). Rangel was also found to have personally used a firearm during the commission of the robbery ( 12022.53, subdivision (b)). Rangel was also convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon ( 12021, subd. (a)(1)).

Plaintiff Terrance Ponchak appeals from the judgment dismissing this action following the sustaining of defendants demurrers to his third amended complaint. The principal issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrers without leave to amend on the ground that Ponchak failed to establish a contract had been formed, and his ability to state the other claims rested on the existence of a viable contract. Court find no error, and affirm.