CA Unpub Decisions

Timothy Woods was charged with robbery, burglary, and petty theft with a prior theft-related conviction. He was convicted of robbery, acquitted of burglary, and the petty theft charge was dismissed. He contends the robbery conviction must be reversed because (1) there were references to his criminal background during trial testimony, and (2) there is insufficient evidence to establish he had the intent to permanently deprive the victim of his property. Court reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

D.E. appeals following the juvenile court's removal from her care of her three sons, 16-year-old T.N.W., 15-year-old T.R.W. and 14-year-old R.W., and her two daughters, 11-year-old I.W. and 6-year-old A.L. D.E. contends the true findings on supplemental dependency petitions (Welf. & Inst. Code, 387)[1] were unsupported by substantial evidence and the juvenile court abused its discretion by granting the children's modification petition ( 388). Court affirm.

This opinion constitutes this courts third instance of addressing this case. In this courts second opinion, we directed the trial court to vacate its order dismissing the charges against defendant (Pen. Code, 1385),[1]and instructed the court to set a hearing for defendants motion for a new trial. (People v. Perez (Oct. 17, 2008, E044302) [nonpub. opn.].) The trial court granted defendants motion for a new trial. ( 1181.) The Riverside County District Attorneys (the district attorney) Office contends that the trial court abused its discretion by granting defendants motion because (1) the court considered impermissible factors when rendering its decision; (2) the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard; and (3) the courts order is not supported by substantial evidence. Court affirm the order granting a new trial in part, and reverse in part.

Defendant and appellant Russell Lloyd Walkner appeals following his guilty plea to one count of corporal injury to a spouse. (Pen. Code, 273.5.) Court affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Michael Lee Curtis of carjacking (Pen. Code, 215, subd. (a);[1]count 1), second degree robbery ( 211, 212.5, subd. (c); count 2) and assault with a deadly weapon ( 245, subd. (a)(1); count 3), and found true allegations that in committing the count 1 and count 2 offenses appellant personally used a deadly weapon ( 12022.3, subd. (b)). The court imposed a prison term of four years, consisting of the three-year lower term on the count 1 substantive offense and one year on the accompanying weapon-use enhancement. The court imposed concurrent two-year terms on each of counts 2 and 3, and stayed the count 2 enhancement. On appeal, appellant contends the court, in ordering appellants sentences on counts 2 and 3 to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed on count 1, violated the section 654 proscription against multiple punishment. Court affirm.

Appellant Larry Hall was employed by respondent Western Oilfield, doing business as Rain for Rent (hereinafter Rain), until August 2, 2006, when he was summoned to Rains business office, arrested and charged with extortion. He and a coworker, Rick Gifford, had a preliminary hearing and were held to answer on November 6, 2006 to charges of conspiring to defraud Rain of money by false pretenses, attempt to extort money from a Rain contractor (Patrick Holmes), and attempted grand theft. More than a year later, in or about February 2008, the charges against Hall were dismissed.
On August 1, 2008, Hall filed this civil action against Rain, Rains internal audit manager Debra Wogan, and Holmes. Hall alleged causes of action against all three defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress (first) and malicious prosecution (second). The complaint alleged a third cause of action against Holmes for intentional interference with contract. Holmes filed a Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 special motion to strike Halls complaint (commonly called an anti-SLAPP motion). Rain and Wogan also filed a special motion to strike. The superior court denied Holmess motion, but granted the motion filed by Rain and Wogan. Hall now appeals from the order granting the Rain and Wogan special motion to strike the allegations of the complaint against them. (Code Civ. Proc., 904.1, subd. (a)(13).)

On October 23, 2007, appellant, James Hugh Forest, was charged in an information with second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211, subd. (a)(1), counts 1, 2, 3, 5 & 6)[1]and attempted second degree burglary ( 664 & 211, count 4). All six counts alleged appellant used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b). Early in the proceedings, appellant was represented by attorney Ernest Kinney. Kinney last appeared as appellants counsel on January 24, 2008.[2] Daniel K. Martin made two appearances on behalf of Mr. Kinney in March 2008. On May 22, 2008, Kinney was relieved as counsel of record and Michael G. Idiart briefly represented appellant.

M.A. (Father), father of J. and A., appeals from the juvenile courts findings and orders made at the 12-month review hearing. Father contends (1) the court erred in finding a substantial risk of detriment to A. if she were returned to his care, (2) he was denied reasonable reunification services with regard to visitation with J., and (3) the juvenile court erred by delegating authority to J. to decide whether visitation with Father would occur. Court affirm.

Petitioners are the maternal grandparents of two dependent children (the C. children) whom respondent Kern County Superior Court freed for adoption (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, subd. (c))[1]in February 2009. The grandparents were considered the childrens prospective adoptive parents in that they had cared for the C. children off and on since 2007 and had taken steps towards adopting them.

In October 2009, real party in interest Kern County Department of Human Services (the department) removed the C. children from their grandparents care after learning the maternal grandmother hit another grandchild and reportedly often hit the children in her care. The grandparents formally objected to the C. childrens removal and requested the courts review. The superior court denied the grandparents objection in November 2009 and found the removal was in the C. childrens best interests. The grandparents seek writ review ( 366.28) of the superior courts decision. On review, Court deny the grandparents petition.

James Donald Cook, Jr., appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of possession of a controlled substance and possession of a firearm by a felon. He argues insufficient evidence supports his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, and the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of indicia of drug sales and childrens items found in his home. Neither of his contentions have merit, and Court affirm the judgment.

We find no merit to defendants contention the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial, permitted the admission of gang evidence and enhanced his punishment pursuant to Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1). (Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.) At defendants request in his appellate brief, we have independently reviewed the record of the March 7, 2007 in camera hearing conducted in the trial court under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, and conclude it contains no information sought in defendants pretrial motion. Defendants request that we remand his case to the trial court for the purpose of postconviction discovery is denied. Court affirm.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Peter L. Spinetta, Judge. (Retired judge of the Riverside Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed in part and reversed in part for resentencing.

D.E. (Father) and C.B. (Mother) appeal from the order terminating parental rights to their son, D.E. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26.)[1] Father contends he was not given adequate notice of the proceedings, the juvenile court erred by summarily denying his section 388 petition, and he was entitled to reunification services. Father and Mother both contend the juvenile court erred by failing to apply the parental benefit exception to termination of parental rights. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Court find no error and affirm the order.

Defendant was convicted by jury trial of eight counts of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, 459, 460, subd. (b)), and the trial court found true allegations that defendant had suffered three prior strike convictions (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and served prison terms for four prior felony convictions (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). He was committed to state prison to serve an indeterminate term of 200 years to life consecutive to a determinate term of 32 years. On appeal, his sole contention is that his mistrial motion should have been granted after a prospective juror made remarks in the presence of the sworn jury about defendants possible involvement in a prior offense. Court conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate defendants Sixth Amendment rights in denying his mistrial motion. Court therefore affirm the judgment.