CA Unpub Decisions

Delorez R. (mother) appeals orders of the juvenile court made at the
12-month review hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.21, subd. (f).) Mother contends the children should have been returned to her care or, in the alternative, the juvenile court should have granted mother unmonitored visitation. Court reject mothers contentions and affirm the orders of the juvenile court.

Jason L. Ardoin appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial which resulted in his conviction of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211). The trial court granted Ardoin probation for a period of three years. Court affirm the judgment.

Shannon Butler appeals the judgment entered after she pled guilty to first degree murder (Pen. Code,[1] 187, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced her to an indeterminate state prison term of 25 years to life. Because appellant pled guilty, the relevant facts are derived from the preliminary hearing transcript and probation report. Appellant and codefendants Nancy Braswell and Matthew Toerner met as United States Navy Seabees while stationed in Port Hueneme. The victim, John Marmo, was Braswell's ex-husband. Appellant believed that Braswell had been wronged by Marmo and the judicial proceedings related to the dissolution of their marriage. Appellant expressed this to several colleagues and asked them to help her obtain a gun and find someone willing to kill Marmo.

Tommy Arron Armijo appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1))[1] and his admission that he previously had been convicted of a felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law ( 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The trial court sentenced Armijo to two years, eight months in state prison. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant George J. Scrima pled no contest to grand theft. (Pen. Code, 487, subd. (a).) In exchange, three related counts were dismissed with a Harvey waiver. Imposition of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on probation on the condition, among others, that he serve 360 days of incarceration with one day of credit for time served. The trial court issued a certificate of probable cause.

Because defendant pleaded guilty and waived preparation of a probation report, our statement of facts is taken from the California Highway Patrol report.
On October 2, 2008, a California Highway Patrol officer observed a pickup truck exceeding the speed limit on a highway near Burney. After stopping the truck and contacting the driver, defendant Charles Lee Newell, the officer suspected that defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance. After failing a series of field sobriety tests, defendant was arrested for driving under the influence. Inside his right front pants pocket, the officer found a wad of currency wrapped around a small plastic baggie that contained a white crystal-type substance.

Defendant pleaded guilty to driving under the influence with prior convictions (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (a), 23550, subd. (a)), admitted three qualifying prior convictions, and admitted a 1981 conviction of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)) that was alleged as a second strike (Pen. Code, 1170.12, 1192.7, subd. (c)(31)). In exchange, five related counts and an unrelated case were dismissed.

Appellants, the mother and father of the minor, appeal from the juvenile courts order terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 395; undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) The father claims the minors attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by also representing the minors siblings. The mother contends the juvenile court erred by failing to find an exception to adoption based on her beneficial parental relationship with the minor. Additionally, appellants argue that the exception to adoption for substantial interference with a childs sibling relationship applies. Concluding these arguments are without merit, Court shall affirm.

In 1988 a jury convicted Mark Lugo of one count of first degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 187, 12022, subd. (b)), and this court affirmed the conviction on appeal. (People v. Lugo (Nov. 30, 1990, D009831) [nonpub. opn.].) The trial court sentenced Lugo to an indeterminate term of 26 years to life in prison with the possibility of parole. Lugo's minimum parole eligibility date was March 17, 2005. In August 2008 the California Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) held a hearing to consider setting a date for Lugo's release on parole. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board determined that Lugo was currently unsuitable for release on parole, and that he would be unsuitable for at least the next two years. Lugo filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the superior court, challenging the Board's decision as a violation of his right to due process of law because it was lacking in factual support. The superior court denied the petition. Lugo now raises this same contention in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before this court.

Nancy I. appeals juvenile court orders summarily denying her Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 388 petition for modification and terminating her parental rights to her minor daughter Carly O. under section 366.26. Nancy contends she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her section 388 petition because the court indicated, on the Form JV-183, that it would hold a hearing. She also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding the beneficial parent child relationship exception did not apply to preclude terminating her parental rights. Court affirm the orders.

George D. appeals a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to his minor son, Hunter W., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. (Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.) George contends his due process rights were violated because the court failed to enforce its visitation order, thereby foreclosing his opportunity to establish a beneficial parent child relationship with Hunter. Court affirm the order.

Defendant Donnell Lavert Robinson was tried four times for acts committed during a home invasion. The only conviction now remaining is assault with a firearm. On appeal, he contends (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial on the ground that the court failed to give a unanimity instruction; (2) the conviction was barred by the merger doctrine; (3) the conviction was barred by collateral estoppel; and (4) the trial court erred at sentencing by failing to determine that defendant had served his entire sentence and releasing him on parole. Court affirm.

A jury found appellant Asencion Rojas guilty of one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling (Pen. Code,[1] 246); one count of assault with a semiautomatic firearm ( 245, subd. (b)), with a finding that appellant personally used a handgun ( 12022.5); one count of carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle while an active participant in a criminal street gang ( 12031, subd. (a)(2)(C)); and two counts of having a concealed firearm in a vehicle ( 12025, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced appellant to 15 years to life for his conviction of shooting at an inhabited dwelling pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4). The court imposed a concurrent term totaling 20 years for appellants conviction of assault with a semiautomatic firearm and the associated enhancements. The sentences on the remaining counts were stayed pursuant to section 654. On appeal, appellant contends: (1) insufficient evidence supports the gang enhancements; (2) the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury that the defining primary activities of a criminal street gang could include non-statutorily enumerated offenses; and (3) the trial court committed sentencing error with respect to his conviction of shooting at an inhabited dwelling. Court disagree with appellants contentions and affirm the judgment.

Defendant was convicted by jury of rape (Penal Code, 261, subd. (a)(2)),[1]attempted sexual penetration by a foreign object ( 664, 289, subd. (a)(1)), first degree burglary ( 459), and intimidating a witness or victim by force or threatened use of force ( 136, subd. (c)(1)). Defendant appeals, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction of attempted sexual penetration, because there was no substantial evidence the act was committed for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse; the jury was improperly instructed that, if defendant tried to hide evidence or discourage someone from testifying against him, his conduct might show consciousness of guilt; and the burden of proof instruction failed to comply with the requirements of the United States Constitution. Court find no error and affirm.

Defendant Efren Feliciano Silva sexually assaulted R.G. on her fourth birthday and on two prior occasions. He was convicted of numerous sex crimes as a result of these assaults. He appeals, claiming the evidence is insufficient to support the jurys finding of the use of force, violence, menace, fear, and/or duress in one count. In addition, he argues the trial court was not aware of its sentencing discretion and erred in imposing consecutive sentences or, alternatively, his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the imposition of consecutive sentences. Appellant also claims and respondent concedes the evidence was not sufficient to support the trial courts order requiring defendant to reimburse the county for the services of appointed counsel and was insufficient to support the order requiring defendant to pay for the cost of the sexual assault examination. With the exception of these concessions, Court will affirm.