CA Unpub Decisions

This is the second time this controversy has come before us. Appellant Anahid Mnaskanian (Mnaskanian), an injured clerical employee, sued her employer 21st Century Insurance Company (21st Century), under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) for failure to accommodate her physical limitations. A jury found 21st Century liable and awarded Mnaskanian as damages her past and present economic and noneconomic losses plus punitive damages, after which the trial court awarded Mnaskanian her attorneys fees. On 21st Centurys appeal, we reversed the awards for past and future noneconomic damages and punitive damages on the ground that they were not supported by any evidence, reversed the award of attorneys fees on the ground that it was excessive, and remanded the cause to the trial court with directions to enter a reduced judgment and redetermine the amount of attorneys fees anew. (Opinion, pp. 2, 17.)

Natasha Tania Karaitiana was convicted by a jury of attempted first degree burglary, a felony. On appeal, she claims prejudicial error in the trial courts failure to instruct the jury that evidence of oral out-of-court statements is to be viewed with caution. She also contends there was insufficient evidence to support the jurys verdict, and that the court improperly calculated presentence custody credits when she was sentenced. Her first two contentions are without merit, but the last is correct. Court affirm the judgment as modified to reflect the correct presentence custody credits.

This is the second time we have addressed issues relating to the dissolution of appellant Laura Fettig. In the present case, Fettig appeals from a judgment awarding her attorney, respondent Craig M. Lytle, attorney fees.

Sergio DeSantiago appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1)) and found not guilty of attempted murder (Pen. Code, 664/187(a)). He admitted that he suffered two prior convictions for serious or violent felonies within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d); 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and served a prior prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). He was sentenced to prison for 25 years to life and contends the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to strike two of his strike convictions, which would have made him eligible for a one-strike sentence. For reasons stated in the opinion, Court affirm the judgment.

Defendants Roya Dardashti, M.D., and her medical practice, Roya Dardashti, M.D., Inc., appeal from the denial of their special motion to strike the first amended complaint of plaintiffs Peter Cheski, M.D., and his medical practice, Peter Cheski, M.D., Inc. The motion was made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, commonly referred to as the anti-SLAPP statute. Court affirm.

A petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 (undesignated section references are to that code) charged appellant, Jorge B., in count 1 with possessing marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11359), and in count 2 with giving a false identity to a peace officer (Pen. Code, 148.9). After the juvenile court denied appellants motion to suppress evidence under section 700.1, appellant admitted count 1 and the court dismissed count 2. The court then granted deferred entry of judgment, pursuant section 790 et seq., and ordered appellant home on probation for 12 to 36 months. Appellant filed a notice of appeal, which stated he was appealing from the denial of his motion under section 700.1

Petitioner City of Hermosa Beach (the City) seeks a writ of mandate directing respondent superior court to grant its motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication against real parties in interest Windward Associates and Macpherson Oil Company (collectively Machpherson). Court issued to all parties an order to show cause why the relief requested in the petition should or should not be granted. After reviewing briefs by the City and Macpherson, we conclude that the superior court correctly denied the Citys motion. As we will discuss, we find there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the Citys alleged breach of contract proximately caused Macphersons damages. The petition therefore is denied.

This case contains all the elements of a senseless gang murder: drugs and beer, goofy nicknames, numeric tattoos, machismo, taunting, retaliation, guns, a blameless victim, and what has become de rigueur in gang casesa gang expert who in this instance was permitted to opine on the history, psychology, and sociology of gangs of all ethnicities throughout the state, whether the charged crimes were committed for the benefit of the gang, and on an individual gang members intent when participating in gang-related activities.

At a court trial, defendant Marco Carranza was convicted of continuous sexual abuse and one count of lewd conduct, and acquitted of another count of lewd conduct. (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a), 288.5, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for 18 years. Defendant timely appealed.
On appeal, defendant contends no substantial evidence supports the continuous sexual abuse count, specifically challenging whether the evidence shows that at least a three-month separation occurred between the first incident of abuse and the last incident of abuse. Court shall affirm.

After an incident shrouded in mystery, 11-month-old D.C. was rushed to the hospital suffering from a severe head injury. Three people were present when D.C. was injured: her mother, Di.C. (Mother); Mothers boyfriend, defendant Leonardo Trejo Ortiz; and defendants sister, Alejandra Ortiz. Following a series of interviews, defendant was charged by information with two counts of child endangerment and one count of inflicting corporal punishment on a child. (Pen. Code, 273a, subd. (a), 273d, subd. (a).) A jury found defendant guilty of one count of child endangerment and one count of inflicting corporal punishment on a child, and not guilty of the remaining count of child endangerment. Sentenced to prison for 12 years, defendant appeals, contending the court erred in refusing to grant use immunity for Mothers testimony and defense counsel performed ineffectively in failing to request a pinpoint instruction on third party culpability. Court shall affirm the judgment.

In March 2008 a jury found Santos Manuel Alvarez guilty of five counts of workers' compensation insurance fraud within the meaning of Insurance Code section 1871.4, subdivision (a)(1), and one count of insurance fraud within the meaning of Penal Code section 550, subdivision (b)(3). In June 2008 the court placed Alvarez on three years' formal probation.

A jury convicted Glenn Osie Cole of intimidating a witness by force (Pen. Code,[1] 136.1, subd. (c)(1)); making a criminal threat ( 422) and battery ( 242). Cole admitted four prison priors within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b), one serious felony prior conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1) and two serious/violent (strike) prior felony convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). At sentencing the trial court struck the prison priors and the strike priors and imposed a determinate term of nine years in prison.
Cole appeals contending the trial court erred when it denied his motion for mistrial after a prosecution witness mentioned that Cole had previously been in prison. Court will find no abuse of discretion and affirm the judgment.

Defendant John Steel challenges the evidentiary basis for a protective order issued against him under the civil harassment statute (Code Civ. Proc., 527.6) to prohibit harassment of plaintiff Phil McConkey and his family. Steel also contends the court violated his constitutional due process rights by denying him cross-examination of McConkey, and by limiting his cross examination of another witness. Court affirm the order.

James C., father of dependent minor Jolie C., appeals a juvenile court order, made at a six-month review hearing, terminating his reunification services after finding reasonable services were provided or offered to him. James challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding he was provided with reasonable reunification services. He further contends the court erred by terminating his reunification services because: (1) there was no evidence that he failed to contact and visit Jolie; and (2) the court did not set a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing.