CA Unpub Decisions

This is the second appeal involving these parties. In the prior appeal, Harold Tennen, the Harold and Roberta Tennen Family Trust, and CDI Management, Inc. (collectively Tennen) challenged a trial court order denying their motion for attorney fees and costs. They argued that the trial court erred in its application of Code of Civil Procedure section 998. Michael Finstad (Finstad) did not file a respondents brief. On August 6, 2008, this court reversed the trial courts order, finding that [b]ecause [Tennen] obtained a more favorable result than the one set forth in their section 998 offer to compromise, they [were] entitled to recover their postoffer attorney fees and costs. (Tennen v. Finstad (Aug. 6, 2008, B202404) [nonpub. opn.] (Finstad I).) The matter was remanded for the trial court to determine the reasonable amount of Tennens postoffer attorney fees and costs. (Finstad I, supra, B202404.)

jury convicted defendant Scott Keith Ernst of the following offenses against Kathleen M. arising from a home invasion incident: attempted voluntary manslaughter (after being charged with attempted murder); torture; first degree robbery; conspiracy to commit robbery; assault with a deadly weapon; criminal threats; and mayhem. (Pen. Code, 664/192, subd. (a), 206, 211, 182/211, 245, subd. (a)(1), 422, & 203, respectively.) The jury also convicted defendant of second degree robbery and carjacking against Lori S., during his flight from the home invasion. ( 211, 215, subd. (a).) Lastly, in a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found that defendant had served two prior prison terms. ( 667.5, subd. (b).)
Sentenced to a life term for the torture ( 206/206.1) and to a determinate term for certain of the other offenses, defendant appeals. He contends (1) the trial court erroneously shackled him during pretrial proceedings, and (2) the prosecution unconstitutionally deprived him of certain photographic evidence. He also contends the trial court: (3) improperly refused to appoint standby counsel for trial; (4) erroneously struck the testimony of his supposed criminal companion; (5) erroneously instructed on eyewitness identification, (6) on conspiracy, and (7) on the three theories of criminal liability; and (8) unfairly treated him disparately.

In March 2009, a jury convicted defendant Yaphette Menefee of identity theft from an elder (Pen. Code, 368, subd. (d)‑‑count one), unauthorized use of anothers personal identifying information ( 530.5, subd. (a)‑‑count two), and receiving stolen property ( 496, subd. (a)‑‑count three). She admitted a 2001 kidnapping ( 207, subd. (a)) strike conviction ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12).
Defendant was sentenced to state prison for six years (double the middle term) on count one. Sentence on counts two and three was stayed pursuant to section 654. She was awarded 169 days of custody credit and 84 days of conduct credit, and ordered to pay a $200 restitution fine ( 1202.4, subd. (b)), a $200 restitution fine suspended unless parole is revoked ( 1202.45), a $60 court security fee ( 1465.8), a $90 court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, 70373), a $263.85 main jail booking fee (id., 29550.2), and a $28.75 main jail classification fee (ibid.).

In this tort and breach of contract action involving an allegedly wrongful disbursement of funds from a real estate transaction escrow account, the question presented is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed sanctions in the total amount of $10,000 upon the two appellants, who were represented by attorney Noel Spaid, under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. The appellants are (1) MJB Development Group (MJB), a California partnership that was the seller of the real property that is the subject of this case; and (2) Michael Winn, one of MJB's two general partners. The two respondents are (1) Diamond Escrow, Inc. (Diamond Escrow), an escrow company that is no longer in business; and (2) Michael Crews, an individual who is an owner of the corporate buyer of the property (Michael Crews Development II, Inc., hereafter referred to as MCD) and an alleged owner of Diamond Escrow.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, John S. Meyer, Judge. Judgment reversed; order affirmed in part and reversed in part with directions.
egatta Bay, LLC (Regatta Bay), John Dell Wright and Philip Lee Keesling appeal a $5,909,660 judgment entered against them after a jury trial on Coronado City View, LLC's (CCV) complaint for negligent and intentional misrepresentation and related counts. Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding that their conduct caused CCV to incur damages related to delay in the construction of its development project. Wright and Keesling also contend they have no personal liability for the conduct of Regatta Bay, a limited liability company.

In April 2008 the court ordered a psychiatric examination of Shareef to determine his competency to stand trial. In June 2008 the court issued an order finding him competent to stand trial.
In December 2008 the court ordered a second psychiatric evaluation of Shareef. In January 2009 the court judged Shareef to be mentally incompetent to stand trial and committed him to Patton State Hospital, under section 1370, for a maximum period of three years, with credit for one year served. The court further ordered, under section 1370, subdivisions (a)(2)(B)(ii)(I) and (II), that Shareef be forcibly medicated with antipsychotic medication during his commitment to attempt to restore his competence to stand trial.

Michael Joseph Beaudette appeals a judgment following his jury conviction of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a)). On appeal, he contends: (1) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine a defense character witness regarding a prior uncharged act committed by Beaudette; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to present the testimony of a witness regarding that prior uncharged act; (3) the trial court erred by refusing to give an instruction on voluntary intoxication; (4) the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's finding that he premeditated and deliberated the killing of the victim; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to dismiss the allegation he had one prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). The People assert the trial court erred by filing an abstract of judgment that did not reflect its oral judgment and by issuing a second erroneous abstract of judgment.

Destini H. and E.H. She contends the juvenile court's finding that E.H. is adoptable is not supported by substantial evidence, and the court erred by not applying the sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights and adoption. Court affirm the orders.

Crystal G. appeals orders made at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearings regarding her son, Zachary G. She contends there was insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (j). Court affirm the orders.

Proceedings for extraordinary relief after reference to a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Garry G. Haenhle, Judge. Petition denied.
Veronica V., mother of Kevin J., seeks review of a juvenile court order terminating reunification services after 18 months and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Veronica challenges the court's finding that she was provided reasonable reunification services. She further contends the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that returning Kevin to her custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to him. Court deny the petition.

Kofi Obeng-Amponsah (Obeng-Amponsah) sued White Mountain Services, LLC, (WMS) for a variety of issues related to a mortgage and real property. The trial court (1) granted WMSs motion for a judgment on the pleadings, without leave to amend (Code Civ. Proc., 438);(2) denied Obeng-Amponsahs motion for reconsideration; and (3) denied Obeng-Amponsahs motion to set aside the dismissal and the judgment on the pleadings. Obeng-Amponsah contends the trial court erred by (1) denying Obeng-Amponsahs motion to strike WMSs allegedly untimely answer; (2) granting WMSs motion to set aside its default; (3) granting WMSs motion for a judgment on the pleadings; (4) denying Obeng-Amponsahs motion to set aside the dismissal and judgment on the pleadings; and (5) denying Obeng-Amponsahs motion for reconsideration. Court affirm the judgment.

The People appeal dismissal (Pen. Code, 1385) following the trial court granting defendants motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, 1538.5). Court review whether the Fourth Amendment was violated, and whether the good faith exception precludes suppression. Court reverse with directions.

jury convicted defendant, Joseph Frias, of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)), and one count each of unlawfully taking/driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)) and leaving the scene of an accident (Veh. Code, 20001, subd. (a)). He was sentenced to prison for five years, eight months and appeals, claiming the sentencing court erred in imposing the upper term for his first aggravated assault. Court disagree and affirm the judgment.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Joshua Chapman pled guilty to one count of resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, 69). The trial court sentenced him to two years in state prison, but suspended the sentence and placed him on probation for a period of three years, under specified conditions. Defendant subsequently admitted violating his probation. The court then imposed the previously suspended two-year state prison term.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal following the sentencing hearing. Court affirm.