CA Unpub Decisions

A modification decision.

This is a single case involving two petitions filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 against J.V. (minor).
The first petition was filed on August 4, 2008, and charged the minor with false imprisonment by force in violation of Penal Code section 236.[1] The minor admitted the crime and was placed on probation. The second petition was filed on August 17, 2009, and charged the minor with simple kidnapping in violation of section 207, subdivision (a). The juvenile court found the allegations true. The minor challenges that finding based on insufficiency of the evidence. In addition, the minor contends that the terms of his probation must be amended because a minute order improperly added extra terms not set forth in the oral pronouncement.
We remand the matter so that the juvenile court can clarify the terms of probation. In all other respects, we affirm.

After David Kelemen, a former Navy machinist mate, developed mesothelioma, an asbestos-related cancer, he and his wife, Paula Kelemen, filed suit against numerous manufacturers of asbestos-containing products, alleging negligence and strict liability. Defendant John Crane, Inc. (JCI) was the only remaining defendant at trial.
After a three-day trial, the jury found JCI liable for negligence and strict liability. Ultimately, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs for compensatory and punitive damages.

David Mahler was convicted of the second degree murder (Pen. Code,[1] § 187) of Kristen Baldwin and of assault with a firearm against Donald Van Develde (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). We are compelled to reverse the murder conviction because the trial court improperly instructed the jury on felony murder, and nothing in the jury verdict establishes that the jury relied instead on a proper legal basis to convict Mahler of murder. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.

This is the second appeal involving these parties. This time, appellants Jay Bharat Developers, Inc. (Jay Bharat), Jay Bharat Resorts, Inc., Bipin Morari (Morari), and Chandrakant Patel (Patel) challenge a trial court order confirming an arbitration award entered against them and in favor of respondents Jim Minidis, Lynn Minidis, RedBrick Pizza Worldwide, Inc. (RedBrick Pizza), and RedBrick Pizza, Inc. They assign several errors to the trial court's order. First, appellants contend that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by deciding trademark issues that were expressly excluded by the parties' arbitration agreement. Second, they argue that respondents were judicially stopped from arbitrating the trademark issues. Third, they claim that the arbitrator was not authorized to grant respondents an award of attorney fees on their trademark claims. Finally, appellants assert that the trial court judgment is erroneous because it is silent as to Patel.
We are not convinced by appellants' arguments. Accordingly, we affirm.

Defendants and appellants, Shawna Louise Loos, Randy Morgan and Richard De La Cerra, appeal the judgments entered following their convictions for selling or attempting to sell a person, with a prior prison term enhancement (De La Cerra only) (Pen. Code, §§ 181, 667.5).[1] De La Cerra was sentenced to a four-year prison term; Loos and Morgan were granted probation.
The judgments are affirmed.

By this petition for an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) petitioner S.K., the mother of P.R., seeks to overturn the order of respondent Superior Court of San Francisco terminating reunification services and setting a hearing to terminate her parental rights in accordance with Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] S.K. contends that substantial evidence does not support the court's finding that reasonable reunification services were provided by real party in interest San Francisco Human Services Agency (Agency). Having already approximately 24 months of reunification services, petitioner contends the court abused its discretion by not ordering that even more services be provided to her. We conclude these contentions have no merit, and deny the petition on its merits.

A.S. (the minor) appeals from a dispositional order of the juvenile court entered after a finding that he had committed attempted vandalism and an order that he pay $3,000.02 in restitution. The minor's appointed counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, raising no issue for appeal and asking this court to make an independent review of the record. The minor was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief. We have received no such brief. After independently reviewing the record, we find no error or cause for further briefing and therefore shall affirm.

Dwight H. appeals from his convictions of battery (Pen. Code, § 242) and vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(2)(A)). Dwight asserts in his notice of appeal that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict under Welfare and Institutions Code section 701.1. However, his appointed counsel on appeal raises no issues and asks this court to conduct an independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.

Appellant Kareem Abdul-Olateju, also known as Kareem O. Abdul, appeals in pro per from an order (1) denying him the opportunity to relitigate a challenge to the personal service of the original paternity complaint in June 2008, on grounds of res judicata; and (2) establishing a child support arrearage of $16,785.41 as of June 30, 2010, interest included. We affirm the order.

Quartus Hinton appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter. He contends the court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on purported juror misconduct and newly discovered evidence. We will affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

A jury convicted defendant Edward Swisshelm of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a); all statutory references are to the Penal Code unless noted), driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) and with a blood alcohol content greater than .08 percent (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)), and driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)). The Legislature in 2010 amended section 487 to raise the minimum threshold amount to $950. Although the jury convicted Swisshelm in 2009, he contends the amendment applies retroactively. Because the evidence of trial established the value of the stolen property did not exceed $950, Swisshelm asserts we must reduce his conviction to petty theft. The Attorney General concedes the 2010 amendment to section 487 applies retroactively, but argues the prosecution should be given the opportunity to charge Swisshelm with petty theft with priors (§§ 666, 484), assuming he meets the statutory criteria. For the reasons explained below, we agree the amendment to section 487 applies retroactively and remand for the prosecution to elect whether to charge Swisshelm with petty theft with prior theft convictions.
I

Three times, juries have found Glen Maurice Johnson guilty of second degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and accessory to murder for his role in a shooting in Bakersfield on September 20, 2002. On appeal after his first trial, we reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial because the court's erroneous instruction on reasonable doubt impermissibly lowered the prosecution's constitutional burden of proof. (People v. Johnson (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 976 (Johnson I).) On appeal after his second trial, we reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial because the prosecutor's withholding of discovery about his sole eyewitness violated Johnson's constitutional right to due process. (People v. Johnson (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 776 (Johnson II).)[1]
On appeal after his third trial, Johnson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the court's evidentiary rulings and instructions, the prosecutor's conduct, his attorney's competence, the propriety of convictions of both second degree murder and accessory to murder, and three sentencing enhancements. We strike those three enhancements from the judgment but otherwise affirm the judgment.