CA Unpub Decisions

Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, this opinion reverses the trial court's award of $750 to LexisNexis Risk Solutions, Inc., (LexisNexis) in attorney fees against Justin Cox (Cox). The attorney fees were incurred filing a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum issued by Cox in pro. per. requiring LexisNexis to appear and produce documents at a trial in which Cox was defending himself against criminal charges. The trial court granted the motion to quash and, finding that â€

Defendant Eddie Tiran got drunk, got mad at one of his best friends, and went on a violent rampage. He forced the friend to play Russian roulette; he tried to run over the friend with a truck; he chased the friend with a knife, saying â€

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Lee Glynn Anthony of possessing methamphetamine for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.) Defendant admitted two prior possession-for-sale convictions (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c)) and one prison prior (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).[1] He contends the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a $1,000 Penal Code section 1202.4 restitution fine without considering the relevant factors, and that the abuse of discretion violated his right to due process. Without conceding the due process allegation, the People concede the trial court abused its discretion by not considering and applying the relevant factors. We find no abuse of discretion; thus, we do not address the due process claim and we affirm.

E.R. was adjudicated to be a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 after he pleaded no contest to assaulting a homeless man.[1] He contends the juvenile court's order that he pay victim restitution to the hospital that treated his assault victim must be stricken because the hospital was not a direct victim under section 730.6, subdivision (k). E.R. also contends that two of his conditions of probation, which limit with whom he may associate, must be modified to add a knowledge element. Both of his contentions have merit and we will modify the judgment accordingly.

Following a bench trial, the trial court extended the mental health commitment of defendant Anthony Dawayne Lee Turner. (Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subd. (b)(1); undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) On appeal, defendant contends (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that defendant has serious difficulty in controlling his dangerous or violent behavior, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for self-representation, and (3) the trial court erred in failing to afford him a jury trial. The People agree that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for self-representation.

Akbar Fathali appeals from a family court order on Fathali's motion for modification of child support and other issues, as well as Rozita Dayani's motion to remove restrictions on travel with their child. Fathali contends, among other things, that Dayani was not truthful in her testimony to the family court, and that the facts do not support the family court order. He also challenges a $7,500 rent credit awarded to Dayani, and argues that the family court should have admitted into evidence a certified translated judgment of the Iran Court.
Fathali's appellate brief lacks the required legal analysis and citation to authority, and he fails to establish error. We will affirm the family court order.

Plaintiff Henry Kroeger sued the California Department of Parks and Recreation (Department) for alleged employment discrimination based on disability and medical condition in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). (Gov. Code, § 12940.)[1] The trial court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Kroeger failed to establish a triable issue of material fact regarding whether he was otherwise qualified, i.e., whether he could perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation.[2]
Kroeger contends on appeal that he established triable issues of material fact regarding whether he was otherwise qualified and whether the Department failed to adequately engage in an interactive process for reasonable accommodation. (§ 12940, subds. (a), (m), (n).)
We conclude that the Department met its initial burden on summary judgment by showing that the job required precise radio dispatcher communications in emergencies, that Kroeger had a hearing impairment preventing him from engaging in precise communication, and that turning up the volume on the communications equipment would interfere with the other dispatchers in the same room who shared the equipment. The burden then shifted to Kroeger to show a triable issue regarding whether he could perform the job with reasonable accommodation, but Kroeger failed to identify a specific accommodation that would have allowed him to perform the job.

We consolidated these two appeals involving trust and conservatorship proceedings under the Probate Code. (Undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code.)
In appeal No. C062865 (the trust case), appellant Raymond P. Harris, acting in propria persona, appeals from a judgment after bench trial, in which the probate court (1) removed him as trustee of his mother's trust, the Carmen Jeanette Jones Revocable Trust, due to his self-dealing with trust property (§ 15642), (2) rejected his claim of right to the property, and (3) ordered him to pay attorney fees to respondents Terry Harris and Joyce Harris (conservators), who had been appointed as conservators of Carmen Harris's person and estate. (Because several parties share the Harris surname, for clarity, we will use only first names.) As we will explain, appellant's arguments fail to establish grounds to reverse the judgment. We affirm the judgment in appeal No. C062865.

A jury convicted defendants Ricky Devon Taylor V and Rodney Charles Buckley, Jr., each of two counts of attempted murder, and found true the gang enhancement that these offenses were committed in association with a criminal street gang. (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)[1] Buckley's sentence was further enhanced based on findings that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm during both attempted murder offenses, causing great bodily injury. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d); two enhancements, each 25 years to life). These two firearm enhancements were also applied to Taylor based on his status as a principal in the attempted murders, his gang enhancement finding, and Buckley's (i.e., another principal's) firearm discharges. (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)(1)).[2]
On appeal, the two defendants principally contend the evidence is insufficient to show a â€

A modification decision.

Michael Eugene Lynch appeals a $16,500 victim restitution order, imposed as a condition of probation, after his plea of no contest to operating a chop shop and taking a motorcycle. (Veh. Code, §§ 10801, 10851, subd. (a); Pen. Code, §§ 1202.4 subd. (f); 1214.5.)[1] The trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed appellant on probation for three years, subject to several conditions, including the payment of victim restitution. Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him "to pay for amounts not shown to have been caused by his criminal conduct." We disagree and affirm.

Appellant Christian Aguirre was charged with and convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)) and possession of a controlled substance with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a)). Appellant was also charged with three other felonies, but the jury could not reach verdicts on these charges. The trial court ultimately dismissed the charges. The court denied probation and sentenced appellant to a total of seven years in prison. His appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no issues. Appellant was notified that he could file his own brief and to date has not done so. We have reviewed the entire record and find no arguable issues, and we therefore affirm.

Petitioner G.R. (mother) is the mother of three boys who were declared dependents of the juvenile court after the court found that mother's male companion ‑‑ who is the father of the youngest child ‑‑ had physically abused the children, that mother had failed to protect them, and that mother had herself physically abused the oldest child. At the conclusion of a contested 18-month review hearing, the juvenile court expressed outrage with the â€

Arthur Santiago Crespin appeals from a judgment of conviction after he was found guilty of petty theft with priors and possession of a methamphetamine pipe. Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), appellant's counsel filed an opening brief requesting that this court review the record and determine whether any arguable issues exist on appeal. We have reviewed the entire record and find no arguable issue. We affirm.