CA Unpub Decisions

Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, a jury found defendant Phil Douglas Reese, Jr., guilty of possessing child pornography. The trial court sentenced him to three years in prison.
Defendant appeals, contending the court erred in denying the motion to suppress because the traffic stop that led to the discovery of the child pornography on his laptop computer was pretextual and therefore invalid. Additionally, defendant argues the evidence should have been suppressed because the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [173 L.Ed.2d 485], which was decided after the search of his vehicle, applies retroactively, rendering the search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
We conclude defendant forfeited his argument pertaining to the validity of the traffic stop by failing to raise it in the trial court. Additionally, we conclude the officers reasonably relied on binding precedent when they searched defendant's vehicle and laptop incident to his arrest; accordingly, under the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Davis v. United States (2011) 564 U.S. ___ [180 L.Ed.2d 285] (Davis), the exclusionary rule does not apply to the evidence against defendant. Therefore, we affirm.

In May 2010, defendant Walter Lewis Schmidt pled no contest to second degree burglary and admitted two prior prison terms. In exchange for his plea, the remaining charges and enhancements were dismissed and it was stipulated that defendant would be sentenced to state prison for a term of five years, to run concurrently with time he was serving on a parole violation. Defendant was sentenced forthwith in accordance with this agreement. Defendant appealed.
We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and, pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, requesting the court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. Defendant was advised by counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief.

A jury found defendant Jushawn Stapleton guilty of assault with force likely to create great bodily injury, two counts of making criminal threats, attempted false imprisonment by violence, misdemeanor assault, and possession of a deadly weapon. The jury also found true the allegation that defendant personally used a deadly weapon when committing one count of making criminal threats. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of four years and eight months in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by reducing the burden of proof during closing argument. Defendant also contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on misdemeanor battery as a lesser included offense of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. Finding neither of defendant's claims have merit, we affirm.

A jury found defendant Gaudencio Mozo guilty of sexual intercourse or sodomy with P. R., a child 10 years of age or younger; lewd and lascivious acts with A. B., a child under the age of 14 years; two counts of lewd and lascivious acts with P. R.; and two counts of lewd and lascivious acts with L. M. In connection with each count, the jury found a multiple-victim enhancement to be true.
Sentenced to state prison for an aggregate term of 85 years to life, defendant appeals. He contends the trial court abused its discretion in applying the Marsden[1] standard to, and refusing to rule on, his motion to discharge retained counsel. In the alternative, he claims that he was denied legal representation at a critical stage of the proceedings. We reject these contentions. Defendant also contends, and the People concede, that the true finding for the multiple-victim allegation attached to the count alleging sexual intercourse or sodomy must be stricken as contrary to the plain language of Penal Code[2] section 667.61. We accept the concession and vacate the true finding.

Mother, Lisa Alfar, appeals from a court order awarding father, Joseph Alfar, joint legal custody of the parties' minor children. We find the trial court acted within its discretion and shall affirm the order.

After denial of his motion to suppress, defendant entered a negotiated plea of no contest to possessing a forged driver's license (Pen. Code, § 470b; further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code), five counts of passing a false check (§ 470, subd. (d)), two counts of possessing a fictitious check (§ 476), three counts of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), two counts of false impersonation (§ 529, subd. 3), possession of personal identifying information of 10 or more persons (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(3)), and three counts of burglary (§ 459). He also admitted four special allegations for prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court thereafter denied defendant's motion to withdraw his plea and sentenced him to an aggregate state prison term of 17 years, 8 months.
Defendant appeals, challenging the denial of his motions to suppress and to withdraw his plea. He also contends his sentence on several counts must be stayed pursuant to section 654, consecutive sentences were not validly imposed on some counts, and he is entitled to additional presentence credits. We reject defendant's challenges to his motions but agree in part on his other contentions. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part.

In 2008, Christine Jean Apodaca pleaded guilty to petty theft with a prior conviction. (Pen. Code, § 666.)[1] The trial court suspended execution of a four-year term in state prison and placed appellant on probation. Among the terms and conditions of her probation was the requirement that she participate in drug court. In 2010, after she had successfully completed drug court but while she was still on formal probation, appellant was charged with various drug-related offenses in two separate cases, filed five months apart. She pleaded guilty to bringing a controlled substance into a jail (§ 4573) and possession of a controlled substance. (§ Health & Safety Code, § 11377 subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced her to a term of three years in state prison for the violation of section 4573, plus two years for her prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) It imposed a concurrent term of three years for the violation of Health & Safety Code section 11377. In the 2008 case, the trial court revoked appellant's probation and sentenced her to a concurrent term of three years.

Vanessa V. (mother) appeals from the judgment terminating parental rights to her twin children, Jazmine R. and Juan R. (the children), and ordering them to be placed for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26)[1] The children are presently six years old. Mother contends that the juvenile court erroneously found inapplicable the exceptions to the termination of parental rights that apply where: (1) "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship," and (2) "[t]here would be substantial interference with a child's sibling relationship." (§ 366.26, subds. (c)(1)(B)(i) & (c)(1)(B)(v).) We affirm.

Anne S. (mother) appeals from an order terminating parental rights to her daughter, K.S., under section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.[1] She contends it was an abuse of discretion to find that the exception to termination under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), was inapplicable. We affirm.

Appellant Cindy Q. (Mother) is the mother of L.R. (born July 2008). L.R.'s father, Henry R. (Father), is deceased. Mother has six other children (Trina R., Nikko P., Samantha A., Amanda A., Gilbert A., and Michael C.), none of whom is the subject of this appeal. Mother appeals the order terminating her parental rights as to L.R. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] We affirm the judgment (order of the juvenile court).

In one of two contracts, there is a term in the choice-of-law clause that â€

Dadson Washer Service, Inc. (Dadson) appeals from the trial court's order granting Claudia D. Villatoro's motion for relief from entry of a default judgment. (§ 473.)[1] Dadson contends that the trial court abused its discretion by granting relief because Villatoro failed to establish excusable neglect and failed to justify her delay in seeking relief. We agree and therefore reverse the trial court's order.

This is Hugo Ivan Sanchez's third appeal following his conviction for assault with a firearm and shooting at an occupied vehicle. We have twice remanded the case for the trial court to conduct in camera reviews of the personnel records of two Bell Gardens police officers involved in the investigation of the crimes for which Sanchez was convicted. Unfortunately, we must remand the case yet again for the trial court to fully comply with its obligations under Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 and Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).

This is Hugo Ivan Sanchez's third appeal following his conviction for assault with a firearm and shooting at an occupied vehicle. We have twice remanded the case for the trial court to conduct in camera reviews of the personnel records of two Bell Gardens police officers involved in the investigation of the crimes for which Sanchez was convicted. Unfortunately, we must remand the case yet again for the trial court to fully comply with its obligations under Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 and Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).