CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Jaime Rodriguez appeals from an order denying his motion for additional presentence conduct credits pursuant to the 2009 amendment to Penal Code section 4019. Although defendant was convicted in 2008, and his conviction was final long before the 2009 amendment went into effect on January 25, 2010, he contends that the amended statute should be applied retroactively to him, and that a failure to do so violates equal protection. We affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Manuel Gurrola appeals a judgment following a grant of a motion by defendant and respondent City of Los Angeles (the City) for judgment on the pleadings.
Gurrola knowingly purchased two damaged vacant lots at a tax sale. Gurrola then sued the City for inverse condemnation, seeking compensation for the cost of stabilizing the property in order to be able to develop the land with single family homes.
The essential issue presented is whether Gurrola stated a cause of action against the City for inverse condemnation.
We conclude the trial court properly held Gurrola lacked standing to sue for inverse condemnation because he purchased the property in its damaged state. The â€

Ruben Correa, Jr. appeals from the judgment after he was convicted by jury of resisting a peace officer (count 4; Pen. Code, §148, subd. (a)(1)).[1] The jury deadlocked on three other counts and, on retrial, a second jury found appellant guilty of street terrorism (count 1; § 186.22, subd. (a)), being a gang member with a concealed firearm in a vehicle (count 2; § 12025, subds. (a)(3), (b)(3)), and exhibiting a firearm in the presence of a peace officer (count 3; § 417, subd. (c)). The trial court denied probation and sentenced appellant to two years state prison. We affirm.

Defendant Hector Lisandro Sanchez appeals from the judgment entered following his negotiated no contest plea to a charge of possessing cocaine base for sale and admission of strike and prior narcotics conviction enhancement allegations. Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to vacate his admission of the strike allegation. We dismiss the appeal because defendant failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause.

Defendant James Darrell Adams appeals from an order suspending criminal proceedings and committing him to the State Department of Mental Health for placement in a locked facility. (Pen. Code, § 1369, subd. (a).) In an information filed on April 29, 2010, the Santa Clara County District Attorney charged defendant with one count of vehicle theft with a prior conviction. (Veh. Code, §10851, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 666.5.) The information further alleged that appellant had previously been convicted of violating Vehicle Code section 10851 and had suffered five prison priors. (Pen. Code, §§ 666.5, 667.5, subd. (b).)

In this appeal the parents of M.H., born in May 2003, challenge the summary denial of their Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petitions requesting termination of a guardianship for their daughter and reinstatement of reunification services.[1]
After an 18-month reviewing hearing in March 2008, the juvenile court terminated services seeking to reunify R.H. (mother) and H.H. (father) with M.H. After a contested section 366.26 hearing, the court selected a permanent plan of legal guardianship and did not terminate parental rights. In August 2008, the couple with whom M.H. had been placed for two years was appointed her legal guardians.
In August and September of 2010, the Santa Cruz County Human Resources Department (Department), mother, and father each filed section 388 petitions seeking termination of the guardianship. The Department also sought to place M.H. with paternal relatives in Colorado. Mother also sought renewal of reunification services to her. She opposed an out-of-state placement. Father also sought either increased visitation or immediate placement of minor with him with family maintenance or reunification services. He opposed an out-of-state placement. At a hearing on October 5, 2010, the juvenile court summarily rejected the section 388 petitions by parents and continued the hearing on the Department's petition.

By this appeal defendant Francisco Reyes challenges various aspects of a sentence imposed after the trial court revoked probation and sentenced him to state prison. He contends that the trial court erred by (1) imposing a restitution fine exceeding the amount imposed when probation was originally granted, (2) denying full retroactive effect to statutory amendments increasing the amount of credit granted for presentence confinement; and (2) calculating the number of days of actual presentence confinement. We find merit in the first point and the third, which respondent concedes. We will therefore direct certain modifications to the judgment and affirm the same as so modified.

Plaintiff Robel Fekade became embroiled in a dispute with a neighbor over a gate on an easement for ingress and egress over the neighbor's property. Plaintiff tendered a claim to his title insurer, First American Title Insurance Co. (First American), which denied it after an investigation. Plaintiff brought this action against the neighbor, First American, and others. First American moved for summary judgment on the grounds that, as a matter of law, the claim was not covered by its policy and it had acted reasonably in denying it. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment for First American. Since its analysis of the case appears entirely correct, we will affirm.

Petitioner Edward Henry Harrell challenges former Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger's reversal of the parole board's decision to grant him parole. He contends there is insufficient evidence to support the Governor's finding he poses an unreasonable risk of danger to the public, but we disagree. Therefore, we deny his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

After abandoning her newborn infant in a dumpster outside her apartment, defendant was convicted of attempted murder and felony child abuse. On appeal, she argues there was not substantial evidence to support the conviction for attempted murder, the trial court erroneously failed to admit testimony, and that she should have been granted probation. We find no error and affirm.

Appellants Antonio Portillo and Harvey Ulloa were convicted of attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon and street terrorism for participating in a group attack on Joshua Lowe. The jury also found true allegations the attack was carried out for the benefit of a criminal street gang. On appeal, we reject appellants' claims that their convictions should be reversed due to insufficient evidence, evidentiary error and prosecutorial misconduct. However, we do agree with them that the trial court should have stayed their sentences for street terrorism. Accordingly, we will modify their judgments to stay those sentences. In all other respects, we affirm.

A jury convicted Cesar Gerardo Muro of one count each of attempted murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) [count 1]),[1] assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b) [count 2]), possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1) [count 3]), and street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a) (section 186.22(a)) [count 4]). The jury found true several enhancement allegations, including the allegation Muro committed counts 1, 2, and 3 to benefit a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1) (section 186.22(b)(1)).) The trial court sentenced Muro to 54 years to life in prison.
We conclude (1) substantial evidence supported a finding Muro did not act in imperfect self-defense; (2) the jury was correctly instructed on issues of malice and attempted voluntary manslaughter, and any error by the trial court in failing to give an excessive force/attempted voluntary manslaughter instruction was harmless; (3) substantial evidence supported Muro's conviction for street terrorism under section 186.22(a); (4) substantial evidence supported the jury's true finding on the gang enhancement allegation under section 186.22(b)(1); and (5) the trial court erred by not staying execution of sentence on count 4 pursuant to section 654.
Accordingly, we direct the trial court to modify the judgment to stay execution of sentence on count 4 and in all other respects affirm.

The trial court sentenced defendant Suzanne Amelia Carlson to 15-years-to-life in prison and imposed a $6,000 restitution fine after a jury found her guilty of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); unless otherwise indicated all further statutory references are to the Penal Code), and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated with a prior conviction (§ 191.5, subd. (d)). Defendant also pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), driving on a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.5, subd. (a)), and driving while in possession of marijuana (Veh. Code, § 23222, subd. (b)). The court imposed a concurrent sentence and fines for these charges.
Defendant contends the trial court erred by refusing to give CALCRIM No. 626, which states voluntary intoxication resulting in unconsciousness can reduce a charge of murder to involuntary manslaughter. In a related argument she attacks her conviction on count 2, claiming it is inconsistent to allow unconsciousness to reduce one's criminal culpability on a murder charge to mere criminal negligence while a charge of gross vehicular manslaughter requires proof of gross negligence. Alternatively, defendant argues the court erred in allowing the jury to find her guilty of both murder and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated for the same act. Finally, she asserts that, since the trial court stayed her prison term for gross vehicular manslaughter under section 654, it erred by imposing a restitution fine for that offense. The Attorney General concedes the last argument's merit, but otherwise claims no error occurred.
We shall modify the judgment to reduce the restitution fine to $3,000, but otherwise affirm the judgment.

On August 25, 2010, appellant, Raymond Glen Wagner, entered into a plea agreement in which he would admit one count of committing an automobile theft with a prior automobile theft conviction (Pen. Code, § 666.5, subd. (a), count one)[1] in case No. BF133375A and one count of operating a chop shop (Veh. Code, § 10801, count one) in case No. BF133357B. Appellant would admit a prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (a)-(e) & 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The remaining allegations in both cases would be dismissed and appellant would receive a stipulated sentence of seven years.