CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Ali Darian appeals from two orders denying his claims to exempt an investment account from levy as a retirement account. But he offered insufficient evidence to meet his burden of showing the account is exempt. We affirm.

Ex-husband Tien Manh Dinh (husband) appeals from a further judgment on reserved issues in a marital dissolution action, claiming the trial court wrongly awarded ex-wife Doan Thuy Dinh (wife) an equal community property share of certain real property and authorized excessive spousal support and child support awards. We reverse the judgment in part. The court committed legal error by basing its division of property on an alleged oral transmutation of husband's separate property into community property. Moreover, the court abused its discretion by awarding retrospective spousal support without identifying the relevant time period in which wife was entitled to spousal support.

Plaintiff Zurich Specialties London, Ltd., (Zurich) brought this equitable contribution action to compel defendant Century Surety Company (Century) to pay its share of the defense and indemnity costs Zurich incurred on behalf of their mutual insured, Star Sheet Metal (Star). Century appeals from a judgment in Zurich's favor, arguing the trial court erred because the defense and indemnity costs incurred on Star's behalf did not exceed the deductible established by Century's policy and therefore Century had no obligation to contribute to either Star's defense or indemnification.

Defendant Benjamin Lloyd Finley was convicted of one count of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child under the age of 14 years and was found to have a prior felony conviction, which was both a prior serious felony and a prior strike conviction.
On appeal, Finley contends that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a sufficient inquiry to determine whether good cause existed to discharge a juror. We affirm the judgment.

Defendants Troy Dorman and Elan Senior Living, Inc. appeal from a default judgment of $252,697.50 entered against them and in favor of plaintiff Michelle Bettencourt after the trial court denied defendants' motion to set aside their defaults under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.[1] Defendants' motion was made on the ground they did not receive notice of the proceedings that led to their defaults because, among other things, they had moved to a new address and the moving papers were served at the old address. Plaintiff opposed the set-aside motion, arguing that defendants' failure to inform their own attorney of the change of address was inexcusable and that it was proper for plaintiff to serve her moving papers to the address set forth in the order granting defendants' attorney's motion to withdraw as attorney of record. The trial court agreed with plaintiff, denied defendants' motion for relief under section 473 and proceeded to enter the default judgment. Defendants appeal on several grounds, including that the address to which plaintiff served her dispositive motions was not only incorrect, but also legally invalid for purposes of service of notice on defendants. As explained hereafter, we agree with defendant on these points and accordingly reverse. Because notice of the dispositive motions was never given, the defaults were void and must be set aside along with the default judgment.

In this matter, we have reviewed and considered the petition and the record. Real party in interest has filed an informal response indicating that it does not oppose issuing the writ. We have determined that resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, and that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, a challenge to an â€

K.P. appeals findings and orders entered at a permanency plan and selection hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 and a modification hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.

Raymundo Melero and his wife, Rosa Melero (collectively the Meleros), filed a complaint in which they alleged that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) fraudulently induced them to enter into mortgage loans that they could not afford. The Meleros brought claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligence, and unfair competition (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200),[1] among other causes of action.
Wells Fargo filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted the motion and entered a judgment of dismissal. On appeal, the Meleros contend that they adequately stated a fraud claim based on alleged misrepresentations by Wells Fargo that the loans had "consistent low monthly payments amortized over thirty years," and that the loans "would be affordable" and "would benefit" them. With respect to their negligence cause of action, the Meleros claim that they adequately alleged that Wells Fargo breached a duty to truthfully assess the affordability of the loans. Finally, the Meleros maintain that they adequately stated a claim for unfair competition based on Wells Fargo's fraudulent and unfair conduct. We reject each of the Meleros' claims and affirm the judgment.

In this juvenile delinquency case, Levi E. (the minor) was found to have committed the following offenses: driving under the influence; driving without a license; possession of less than 28.5 grams of marijuana; a curfew violation; and riding a bicycle in the dark without the required bicycle light. The juvenile court declared the minor a ward of the court and committed him to the care and custody of his mother, under the supervision of the probation department.
The minor contends on appeal there is insufficient evidence to support the true finding on possession of marijuana. We affirm.

Ernesto H., the father of 17-year-old Jessica H., 15-year-old Janet H. and 13-year-old Stephanie H., appeals from the juvenile court's findings that the children are persons described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b),[1] (c) (as to Janet only), (d) and (j) (as to Jessica and Stephanie), and the ensuing disposition orders, based on Janet's subsequently recanted charge that Ernesto had sexually molested her. Ernesto contends the findings are not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

E.G. (mother) appeals from the trial court's order denying her petition under section 388 of the Welfare and Institutions Code[1] in the dependency proceeding concerning her now five-year-old son, D.G. Father is not a party to this appeal. Mother contends that because her section 388 petition showed both significantly changed circumstances and that reunification was in D.G.'s best interests, the dependency court abused its discretion in denying her petition. Mother also contends the trial court's failure to enforce its visitation orders requires reversal. We find no error or abuse of discretion and therefore affirm.

Carlos E. (Father) appeals from the order terminating family reunification services for himself and his biological daughter, Carlie E., born in January 2008. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21.)[1] He contends the juvenile court applied the wrong legal standard in determining whether to continue reunification services and that there was no substantial evidence supporting the finding that reasonable services were ever offered to him. We affirm.

Matthew Cate, Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, appeals from the trial court's order granting Victor Diaz's petition for writ of habeas corpus following then Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger's reversal of the decision of the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) to grant Diaz parole. We agree with the trial court that some evidence does not support the Governor's conclusion that Diaz constitutes a current threat to public safety and thus affirm.

Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.
Harvey B. (Father) appeals from the October 28, 2010 jurisdictional and December 28, 2010 dispositional orders of the juvenile court adjudging minor Lucas S. a dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect).[1] Father urges that the family law court was the proper forum rather than the juvenile court. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's jurisdictional findings sustaining the amended petition, which he contends was defective on its face. And Father claims that his due process rights were violated when the juvenile court amended the section 300 petition to conform to proof. Father further contends the juvenile court's dispositional orders removing Lucas from his custody and requiring Father to complete individual counseling with an emphasis on sexual abuse for perpetrators were improper.[2]