CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
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Adam M. Clark (father) appeals in propria persona from two trial court orders: (1) an order refusing to find Laura K. Hernandez (mother) in contempt; and (2) an order awarding mother primary physical custody of the parties' minor child. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment.
Father has elected to proceed on a clerk's transcript. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.121.) Thus, the appellate record does not include a reporter's transcript of either hearing in this matter. This is referred to as a †|
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In this case a subcontractor sued the owner of a development project for tortiously interfering with a contract between the subcontractor and the contractor and sued the contractor for failure to pay him monies due on the contract. The court awarded the subcontractor damages for breach of contract against the contractor and damages for tortious interference with the contract against the developer. We will affirm the judgment.
The contractor does not contest the award of contract damages. Rather the principle question is whether defendants John Foggy (Foggy) and Rocklin 65, L.L.C. (Rocklin 65) were strangers to the contract as that term is clarified in Woods v. Fox Broadcasting Sub., Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 344.[1] The trial court rejected the arguments that Foggy and Rocklin 65 were agents of the contractor, Seaberg, either for purposes of reviewing invoices or for purposes of obtaining payment from the construction financer. We find substantial evidence to support the conclusion and will affirm the judgment. |
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Father Oscar S., Sr., appeals from the dependency court order assuming jurisdiction over his children, M.S. and O.S. Because there is sufficient evidence that father's acts of abuse directed at them, at their mother, and at a half sibling, posed a risk of harm to the two minors, we affirm the order.
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Father Oscar S., Sr., appeals from the dependency court order assuming jurisdiction over his children, M.S. and O.S. Because there is sufficient evidence that father's acts of abuse directed at them, at their mother, and at a half sibling, posed a risk of harm to the two minors, we affirm the order.
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In August 2008, police arrested the minor Christian G., then 15 years old, for committing one felony and three misdemeanor offenses: commercial burglary, obstruction or delaying a police officer in the performance of official duties, possession of tools to commit vandalism and possession of less than an ounce of marijuana (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 148, subd. (a)(1), 594.2, subd. (a), Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (b)). After the minor admitted he had committed commercial burglary as alleged, the juvenile court found count 1 true and declared the offense a misdemeanor. The juvenile court declared the minor to be a ward of the court and ordered him home on probation. The remaining allegations were dismissed.
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Plaintiff Emanuel Aframian appeals from a judgment of dismissal following the trial court's order sustaining the demurrer of defendant Haroun Shabatian (Shabatian) without leave to amend. He contends that he adequately pled his claim for fraudulent transfer against Shabatian.
Although the pleading is poorly drafted and we are sympathetic to the trial court's frustrations, we conclude that plaintiff alleged the elements to proceed with his claims against Shabatian. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order. |
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Appellants K. K. (Mother) and Hector D. (Hector), parents of Michelle and Moses K., contend the juvenile court's decision to terminate parental rights at the hearing held under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 must be reversed because the court precluded appellants from introducing evidence relevant to the sibling relationship exception and that the court applied the incorrect standard in reaching its determination.[1] Appellants further contend that the court erred in denying a request to transfer custody to Hector's parents and a request for a sibling attachment assessment study under Evidence Code section 730. Mother separately contends that the notice sent pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. (ICWA)), was defective and that contrary to the court's ruling, Michelle and Moses met the definition of Indian children.[2] We conclude that the requests for transfer of custody and an attachment study were properly denied, that under the evidence presented, Michelle and Moses were not Indian children, and that no ICWA violation occurred. We further conclude that although the court erred in rejecting certain evidence proffered at the hearing, reversal is not required.
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Marlon Enrique Gonzalez appeals from the trial court's order denying his motion to vacate his 2004 conviction (petition for writ of error coram nobis). We affirm.
Charged with three felony counts in August 2004, Marlon Enrique Gonzalez agreed to accept a negotiated plea of guilty to making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422)[1] (count 2). In return, imposition of sentence would be suspended, and Gonzalez would be placed on formal probation. Gonzalez rejected the People's alternative offer of pleading guilty to engaging in unlawful sexual intercourse (§ 261.5, subd. (c)) (count 1) in return for a 16-month state prison sentence. In connection with the plea, the prosecutor informed Gonzalez, †|
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Marc David Holland appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial which resulted in his conviction of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)),[1] and sexual penetration by a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)), during each of which he tied or bound the victim (§ 667.61, subd. (b)), two counts of corporal injury to a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) and the trial court's finding that, within the previous seven years, he had been convicted of corporal injury to a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (e)(1)). The trial court sentenced Holland to 15 years to life, plus 4 years in state prison. We affirm.
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Christopher Earl Perera appeals from the judgment entered upon his conviction by jury of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211).[1] The jury acquitted appellant of first degree burglary (§ 459) and found to be untrue the allegations that he personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b) and that a principal was armed with a firearm within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). The trial court sentenced appellant to the midterm of three years in state prison. Appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the lesser included offense of theft, (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the defenses of (a) claim of right, (b) mistake of fact, and (c) defense of others, and (3) the instructions as a whole were confusing and misleading on the issue of aider and abettor's after-acquired intent.
We affirm. |
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Defendant and appellant AT&T Mobility II, LLC (AT&T) appeals from a trial court order denying its motion to compel arbitration of the claims asserted against it by plaintiff and respondent Ring Ring, Inc. (Ring Ring). We agree with the trial court's finding that there is no valid arbitration agreement between AT&T and Ring Ring. Accordingly, we affirm.
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On March 19, 2009, Merceline Onyango set a fire outside an office door at the Hollywood YMCA homeless women's transitional shelter where she was living. Onyango, who was from Kenya, had just been served with an eviction notice because she refused to follow some of the shelter's rules and was disruptive. Inside the office were Program Director Elizabeth Olguin and Case Manager Kendra Sheppard. The two women first heard someone pounding on the office door with such force that the walls began to shake, causing items hanging on the walls to fall. They then heard Onyango screaming â€
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