CA Unpub Decisions

Following the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, Rosario Oleo pleaded guilty to several drug-related offenses, and was sentenced to five years of formal probation. On appeal, Oleo contends the methamphetamine found in the glove compartment of his car should have been suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search. We affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant Van de Kamps Coalition filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief against respondents the Board of Trustees of Los Angeles Community College District (Board) and the Los Angeles Community College District (LACCD), alleging that the Board and the LACCD failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) (CEQA) in connection with the leasing of a campus site. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on the ground that the action was time-barred.
We affirm. The decisions made in 2010 that appellant challenged in the petition and complaint were actions toward the implementation of a 2009 project approval and did not trigger the running of a new limitations period under Public Resources Code section 21167, subdivision (d).

This appeal is from the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and disposition orders as authorized by Welfare and Institutions Code section 395.[1] In capsule format for purposes of this introduction, on March 29, 2011, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed its petition alleging that appellant mother (Trina M.) had medically neglected 10-year-old S.B. (minor) by failing to provide appropriate insulin and diet to control a diabetes condition which could ultimately result in kidney failure and that the alleged medical neglect further endangered her older siblings, O.P. and E.P.[2]
Appellant's sole contention on appeal is that substantial evidence did not support the court's finding of jurisdiction pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b).
For the reasons hereafter stated this court affirms the findings of the juvenile court pertaining to the jurisdiction and disposition orders.

The minor, S.O., appeals from May 23, 2011 jurisdiction and disposition orders. The juvenile court found the minor committed: second degree robbery of Claudia Fletes (Pen. Code,[1] § 211), a felony; assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury on Ms. Fletes (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), a felony; and petty theft from J.C. Penney (§ 484, subd. (a)), a misdemeanor. The minor was placed in a camp community placement program for a period not to exceed six years. We modify the May 23, 2011 jurisdiction order and affirm as modified.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Ronald Michael Beilke of two counts of misdemeanor conflict of interest in violation of Government Code section 87100.[1] Appellant contends that his conviction on one count must be reversed because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the difference between a direct financial interest and an indirect financial interest for the purpose of determining whether a conflict of interest exists. He further contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on both counts.
We affirm. The trial court did not have a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the effect of an indirect financial interest, as there was no evidence to support the giving of the instruction appellant now proposes. Moreover, substantial evidence supported the verdict.

Appellant Nicolai Hahui Savu appeals from one of four orders denying his class certification motion in a lawsuit against both his former landlord and apartment manager, respondents 12300 Sherman Way, LLC (Sherman Way) and Cirrus Asset Management, Inc. (Cirrus).[1] The trial court found that the class was not ascertainable, that appellant was not a typical class member, and that appellant was not an adequate class representative. We conclude these findings are not supported by substantial evidence, and direct the trial court to certify the class.

In these consolidated appeals, Russell Lee Gooch appeals from postjudgment orders denying (1) his motion to terminate a protective order, and (2) his motion to modify the sentence on the ground that it violates the proscription against multiple punishment of Penal Code section 654.[1] We conclude that both orders are nonappealable. We therefore dismiss both appeals.

Tool, a rock band, was formed in approximately 1990; its members are Adam Jones, Maynard James Keenan, Danny Carey and Justin Chancellor; Tool is a partnership, and Tool Dissectional, LLC and Tool Touring, Inc. are the corporate entities through which the band conducts its business (the named insureds; collectively Tool). The American Insurance Company (AIC) and Clarendon National Insurance Company (Clarendon) issued entertainment insurance policies to Tool.
In the underlying action, Cameron De Leon (and his corporation) sued Tool for copyright infringement of his artwork and defamation. Clarendon agreed to defend Tool under a reservation of rights. During the pendency of the underlying action, Clarendon filed a complaint against Tool and Doe insurance defendants for declaratory relief and related causes of action. Then Tool filed a cross-complaint against Clarendon for breach of contract and related causes of action. Tool later filed amended cross-complaints adding AIC and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul) as cross-defendants. After a series of orders and rulings, the trial court found AIC did not have a duty to defend the underlying action. Tool contends AIC had a duty to defend under the AIC policy (Policy). Tool also challenges the court's orders relating to its motion for leave to file another amended cross-complaint. We reverse.

A jury found Kevin Johnson guilty of first degree murder with firearm allegations also found true. He was sentenced to a term of 50 years to life in state prison. Johnson appeals, claiming insufficiency of the evidence and sentencing error. We affirm.

A jury found Kevin Johnson guilty of first degree murder with firearm allegations also found true. He was sentenced to a term of 50 years to life in state prison. Johnson appeals, claiming insufficiency of the evidence and sentencing error. We affirm.

Defendants Zions First National Bank (Zions) and Matthew Peterson (Peterson) appeal from an order denying their motion to compel arbitration. They challenge the trial court's determination that plaintiff Allen Othman (Othman) was not a party to the contract containing the arbitration provision and therefore was not bound by it. We affirm.

The City of West Covina and West Covina police officer Enrique Macias appeal from the judgment entered after a jury found that Macias caused the wrongful death of David Mendoza through the unconstitutional use of excessive force while Mendoza was in custody at a hospital. We reject appellants' contentions that: Macias was entitled to qualified immunity for his conduct; the jury's verdict was excessive; and that an inadvertent instructional error was prejudicial. We therefore affirm the judgment.

Ricky D. Matthews appeals a probate court order distributing to real party in interest the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board (board) $12,167.15 he inherited from an estate administered by respondent Elvira J. Orly (Orly).[1] The amount goes to partially satisfy a $15,000 lien by the board for victim restitution fines against Matthews in two criminal cases. Acting as his own attorney while serving a life term in state prison for one of those cases, Matthews claims that the distribution was unauthorized, like a restitution order in People v. Willie (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 43, 52 (Willie). We disagree and affirm the order.

Amanda P., mother of Julia B. and Ashley B., appeals from orders leading up to and following the termination of dependency jurisdiction for the two children, including the dismissal order. She complains that her boyfriend, the abuser of one of the children, should have been given therapeutic visitation with the children, and that the court erred in terminating jurisdiction with a continuing restraining order prohibiting him from having contact with the children for one year. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying therapeutic visitation, dismissing the petition, and issuing a continuing protective order.