CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Brent Ray Close entered a plea of no contest to infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)--count I)[1] in exchange for a stipulated sentence of four years in state prison and the dismissal of the remaining counts and allegations. The court sentenced defendant accordingly. The court awarded 90 actual days and 44 conduct days for a total of 134 days of presentence custody credit.
Defendant appeals. His request for a certificate of probable cause (§ 1237.5) was denied. He contends the trial court failed to award one-for-one presentence custody credits. We agree and shall modify the judgment.

Cynthia (Williams) Sieker (Wife) appeals, in propria persona, from a court order reducing her monthly spousal support from $2,500 per month to $500 per month. Wife's brief is rambling, irrelevant and largely unintelligible. What we can discern from her brief is that Wife is unhappy with several orders of the trial court. As an initial matter, we note that a notice of appeal must be filed on or before 180 days after entry of the order appealed from. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(3).) Wife's notice of appeal was filed on November 3, 2010. Accordingly, Wife's appeal is timely only as to orders issued on or after May 7, 2010.
The record on appeal reflects that only three orders were issued by the court on or after May 7, 2010; all of them related to the hearing on Terry Williams's (Husband) motion to modify spousal support, heard on July 20, 2010.[1] Those orders made prior to May 7, 2010, are final and are not subject to challenge on appeal.

Defendant Barry Thomas Mickle was convicted of two counts of lewd and lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14 years. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison.
Defendant contends on appeal that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress sexually explicit images and web addresses found on a computer seized from his residence, and abused its discretion and violated his due process rights in admitting such evidence; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of prior sexual acts with substantially older victims; and (3) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during his closing argument.

We grant petitioner Matthew Felix Vargas's petition for writ of habeas corpus. Vargas shows that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the validity of the gang enhancement on the ground that the prosecution improperly relied on criminal conduct that took place after the charged offense to prove a â€

Two brothers, B.D., who was six years old, and C.D., who was three years old, were detained from their mother after she was arrested for possession and use of methamphetamines, which she admitted, and they were released to the care of their non-offending, noncustodial father. Mother did not contest dependency jurisdiction over the children or their placement with father. On appeal, father does not contest the jurisdictional findings but contends the trial court abused its discretion at disposition by not terminating jurisdiction, presumably with a family law order awarding him legal and physical custody, and by ordering that he submit to three random drug tests. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion but, instead, followed the law in placing the children with their noncustodial parent under the supervision of the Department of Children and Family Services until the court could determine whether continued supervision was necessary; thus, we affirm the disposition orders.

The juvenile dependency court sustained a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b),[1] alleging that illicit drug use by Melissa S. (Mother) rendered her unable to care for her children. On appeal, Mother contends the court's findings must be reversed because the court abused its discretion in denying a mid-adjudication request for a short continuance. We affirm the dependency court's findings.

Appellants Ventura County Public Defender Steve Lipson and County of Ventura appeal from a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the Ventura County Civil Service Commission (Commission) to determine whether to grant William Markov a hearing to rescind a pay reduction imposed when he was removed from the position of Senior Attorney Public Defender.[1] (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085.) We affirm.

Joann M. (Mother), the biological mother of Johnny R., born in October 2006, appeals from the juvenile court's orders denying her petition for modification (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388)[1] and terminating her parental rights. (§ 366.26.) She contends the trial court erred when it took judicial notice of findings and orders it had made in a dependency case involving Johnny R.'s sibling and that its summary denial of her section 388 petition was an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

A modification decision.

Defendant Carlos Jose Pimentel was charged by information with one count of possession of a firearm by a felon (former Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a), Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 4 [repealed]; Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 501.5 [reenacted]). He was previously convicted of possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). He was convicted by jury, granted probation for a term of 36 months, and ordered to serve 365 days in jail. On appeal, defendant challenges his probation conditions that he not â€

A jury convicted defendant Vance Terence Harris of the carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a))[1] and robbery (§ 211) of 93-year-old Clement Fletcher and found in regard to each crime that defendant had personally inflicted great bodily injury on a victim 70 years of age or older (§ 12022.7, subd. (c)). On the carjacking conviction, the trial court selected the nine-year upper term and imposed a consecutive five-year sentence for the great bodily injury enhancement for a total sentence of 14 years. Pursuant to section 654, the court stayed imposition of sentence on the robbery conviction.
In this appeal, defendant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain any of the jury's findings. Instead, he contends that the trial court's selection of the upper term for the carjacking conviction was improper for two reasons. First, he claims that â€

Darryl Burghardt was convicted of attempted first degree murder (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 187/664); shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246); two counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)); and misdemeanor battery (§ 242). The jury found true a gang enhancement allegation (§186.22) with respect to each felony count. Burghardt appeals, contending that (1) the convictions and gang enhancement findings must be reversed because of improper opinion testimony by the gang expert; (2) the gang enhancement findings must be vacated because the jury was improperly instructed; (3) if he forfeited his objections to the expert witness's testimony or instructional error by failing to object at trial, trial counsel was ineffective; and (4) the trial was compromised by the cumulative effect of these errors. We vacate the findings on the gang enhancement allegations but otherwise affirm.

Following a jury trial, the City of Inglewood (the City) appeals from the judgment in favor of respondent Oscar Mejia, a sergeant in the Inglewood Police Department (the Department). The City also appeals from the trial court's order awarding attorney fees and costs to Sergeant Mejia.
Sergeant Mejia brought suit against the City and the Department for retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (n)). We reverse, finding the evidence did not support the jury's verdict that he was the subject of actionable retaliation. We also reverse the order awarding attorney fees and costs.

Appellant Jann Cobler appeals from the following: (1) an order granting respondent Highlands Owners Association's (Association) motion for attorney fees and costs and denying Cobler's motion for the same; (2) an order awarding Association additional attorney fees and costs; and (3) an action of the court taking Cobler's motion to enforce liability on the bond off calendar. She argues she is entitled to her attorney fees and costs under Civil Code section 1354 as a matter of law because Association voluntarily dismissed the complaint, even though it did so only after Cobler complied with a preliminary injunction it obtained. We conclude that it was proper for the court to determine which party prevailed as a practical matter and we find no abuse of discretion in the court's determination that Association was the prevailing party. Thus, we affirm both awards of attorney fees and costs to Association. We also conclude that it was proper for the trial court to take Cobler's motion to enforce liability off calendar since the motion was stayed pending her appeal from the attorney fees and costs awards.