In re Renteria
Filed 2/24/12 In re Renteria CA6
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re EDWARD RENTERIA,
on Habeas
Corpus.
H036864
(Santa Clara
County
Super. Ct. No. 166167)
Edward
Renteria was convicted after jury trial in 1994 of the
in 1980 (Pen. Code, § 187),
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
and possession of a controlled substance
in 1993 (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), and was sentenced to
prison for 17 years to life. Following a
subsequent parole hearing on February
3, 2010, the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) found Renteria
not suitable for parole. On March 10, 2011, the superior court
granted Renteria’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and directed the Board to
conduct a new parole hearing within 100 days.
The warden where Renteria is incarcerated (the Warden) filed an appeal
and a petition for writ of supersedeas requesting a stay of the superior
court’s order. On May 31, 2011, we granted the Warden’s petition
for writ of supersedeas. For the reasons
stated below, we will reverse the superior court’s March 10, 2011 order and remand the matter to the
superior court with directions to deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Renteria’s Social and Criminal History
Renteria, who
was 54 years old at the time of the 2010 Board hearing, had four brothers and
two sisters, and he used to “get in fights” while growing up. His father worked two jobs and was a “loving
father.” His mother stayed at home and
took care of the children.
Renteria
started drinking around age 10, and by age 17 or 18 he was “always
drinking.” He joined the Marine Corps in
January 1973. During his service he was
a truck driver in Okinawa. He married Valerie and they had two
sons. When he was honorably discharged
in 1977, he found out that Valerie was seeing another man. Although Renteria told the Board that “we had
fights[, a]nd yes, I did push her around a little bit[, b]ut I never hit her,”
Valerie had reported that Renteria beat her after an argument when she was
pregnant.
Renteria
started using methamphetamine after his discharge from the Marines, while he
was working double shifts as a supervisor first at Ford Motor Company and then
at FMC Corporation. He told the Board
that he could become violent when he was under the influence of
methamphetamine, but that he did not use methamphetamine when he was with his
sons. Renteria sees his older son on a
regular basis, but he does not have a relationship with his younger son.
While
Renteria and Valerie were separated and before Valerie’s murder, Renteria met
and started dating his second wife. They
married after Valerie’s murder but divorced in 2007 without having any
children.
Renteria
spent time “in the brig for fighting” “a couple times” while in the
Marines. In May 1977, after his
discharge, Renteria was charged with assault and battery, disturbing the peace,
and misdemeanor DUI. He pleaded guilty
to misdemeanor DUI. In July 1984, he was
charged with assault to commit rape and sexual battery with serious bodily
injury, after he knocked a woman down on the street in front of her child and
fondled the woman’s breasts while straddling her. He was convicted by plea of false
imprisonment (§§ 236, 237) and assault with a deadly weapon not a firearm (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1)). In April 1988, he was
charged with two counts, and convicted of one count, of misdemeanor battery
(§ 242).
The
Commitment Offense
In 1980,
Renteria and Valerie were separated and she and their sons were living with her
parents. On Friday, March 7, 1980, Valerie went out to lunch with her
friends and she told them and family members that she was going to spend the
weekend with Renteria, and that there was a possibility that she and he were
going to reconcile. She dropped her sons
off at her aunt’s home for the weekend.
On March 8, 1980, Renteria picked up the boys and took them to his
parents’ home. He returned the boys to
Valerie’s parents’ home on the evening of March 9, 1980. A missing person’s report was filed on
Valerie on March 10, 1980, when she did not return home.
Defendant
told police that he went out with Valerie on the afternoon of March 7, 1980,
and he provided an alibi for that night, which his brother verified. In late March 1980, the police learned that
two checks from Valerie’s checking account had been returned with irregular
signatures. Both checks were made out to
cash, they were dated around the time of Valerie’s disappearance, Renteria had
cashed both checks at a liquor store, and he had signed the checks. In June 1980, Valerie’s skull and jawbone
were separately found in the backyard of a residence. In August 1980, her headless body was
discovered near Highway 101. The cause
of her death could not be determined. In
May 1993, detectives reopened the unsolved case. At that time, Renteria’s brother admitted
that Renteria’s alibi for the night of March 7, 1980, was false. Renteria was arrested at his home. At the time of his arrest, he was in
possession of methamphetamine.
Renteria
was convicted after jury trial in 1994 of the second degree murder of Valerie
(§ 187), and possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, §
11377, subd. (a)), and was sentenced to prison for 17 years to life. This court affirmed his conviction in an
unpublished decision. (
H013515).)
Renteria’s
Conduct While Incarcerated
Renteria
remained “disciplinary free” throughout his incarceration and he had been
assigned as a clerk in the Catholic chapel.
He had participated in various self-help groups, including two separate
veterans groups; Narcotics Anonymous; a 25-week Getting Out by Going In,
Freedom Before Release program; the Preventing Relapse program; and The Saving
Power of Nonviolence study program. He
also received numerous “laudatory chronos” from prison staff and volunteers.
Renteria’s
Parole Plans
Renteria
expected to live at the Veterans Residential Housing in Menlo Park. He also had housing offers from the Salvation
Army’s Harbor Light, from his father and a brother in San Jose, and at Options
Recovery Services. He had been offered a
full-time job with the St. Vincent de Paul Society, a job as a driver or
mechanic with an uncle’s company in Visalia, and a job as an administrative manager
with a nonprofit executive search firm.
Additional letters of general support were submitted by Renteria’s older
son, his sister, her husband, a retired correctional lieutenant, and the San
Quentin Catholic Services.
Renteria’s
most recent psychological evaluation was conducted in September 2009 by Roberto
Montalvo, PhD. The Board noted that Dr.
Montalvo stated in his report that, although a friend of Valerie’s reported
that Renteria had beaten Valerie after an argument when she was pregnant,
Renteria admitted sometimes pushing her but he denied that he ever hit
her. The Board noted that Dr. Montalvo
also reported that although Renteria attended many self-help programs while
incarcerated, and he strengthened his Catholic faith, “[a]n important missing element
in this self-exploration is any expression of insight he may have gained
regarding his life crime. If he has
begun to understand what caused him to commit the crime or even if he has
simply admitted to himself that he committed the crime[, e]vidence of this [is]
entirely absent due to his unwillingness to discuss his life crime.” “It is important to note that after his
conviction, he denied committing the offense and he expressed certainty that he
would be found innocent on an appeal.
Failing this, he has chosen to declare that he has accepted
responsibility for his offense and he feels remorse for all the consequences of
his behavior, yet he seems to avoid saying that he committed the crime, that he
murdered his wife. It is certainly
possible that Mr. Renteria silently continues to deny that he murdered his
wife. In choosing not to discuss his
life crime, it is not possible to gauge whether he has gained any insight into
his commitment offense or whether he has come to terms with the underlying cause.”
Dr.
Montalvo asked defendant if he was ever addicted to a drug. Defendant acknowledged having been addicted
to alcohol. He reported that he has
attended AA “off and on” over the years since his 1984 arrest and in
prison. Dr. Montalvo asked Renteria
whether alcohol or other drugs played a part in the commitment offense. Renteria acknowledged that they played a
minor part, but he was unwilling to explain in what way. During his 2004 psychological evaluation,
Renteria denied being under the influence of any “mind-altering substance” at
the time the commitment offense was committed.
Dr.
Montalvo used the Psychopathy Check List-Revised (PCL-R) and the
Historical-Clinical-Risk-Management-20 (HCR-20) to help estimate Renteria’s
risk for future violence in the community, and the Level of Service/Case
Management Inventory (LS/CMI) to assess his general risk for recidivism. Renteria’s PCL-R score placed him in the low
range when compared to other male offenders.
His HCR-20 score placed him in the low risk category for violent
recidivism. His overall LS/CMI scored
indicated that he is in the moderate category of incarcerated male offenders.
After
weighing all the data available from Renteria’s records, the clinical
interview, and the risk assessment data, it was Dr. Montalvo’s opinion that
Renteria represented a low-to-moderate risk for violent recidivism in the free
community. “Although Mr. Renteria is not
legally required to talk about the details of his offense or discuss his
motives for committing his offense, his choice not to do so suggests a lack of
insight into his life crime and an unwillingness to explore the source of his
rage toward his victim, which in turn raises his risk of violent
recidivism. [¶] Mr. Renteria’s risk of violent recidivism
would likely increase if he were to
lose his sobriety and resume his consumption of alcohol or his abuse of
methamphetamine. His risk would also
increase if he were unable to secure employment and move toward independent
living within one year. [¶] He could decrease
his risk of violent recidivism if he were to gain an understanding of what led
him to take a life and to mutilate in such a savage manner. Understanding the source of such anger can
decrease the risk of its repeated expression.”
Renteria
informed the Board at the outset of the hearing that he was asserting a claim
of factual innocence and that he would have nothing to say about the commitment
offense. The Board read into the record
a letter defendant wrote, which stated in part:
“In accepting responsibility for my offense, I no longer dispute the
facts no matter how the Panel views them.
Whether certain facts are true or not doesn’t lessen my guilt or
responsibility one bit. So instead of
discussing or arguing about the facts further, I simply accept whatever version
the Panel adopts and you’re free to consider the facts as you may. I can never express enough remorse for the
murder of Valerie or for the pain and suffering which [Valerie’s next of kin] have
endured over the years that have lost the chance of growing older with their
daughter and sister. Also, my two sons,
. . . who never had the chance of knowing the love of their mother, warmth and
tenderness to guide them and protect them and who still have this emptiness in
their hearts and who miss their mother dearly. . . . I would be remiss if I did not mention my
family or the many relatives, friends, co-workers, and community who still have
fond, loving memories of Valerie.”
The Board
asked Renteria what he was accepting responsibility for, and he responded, “If
I hadn’t left, we would have probably stayed together. If I would have worked harder at working
through this infidelity, we would have been together. And none of this – she’d probably still be
here today with us and I wouldn’t be sitting here.” The Board asked him what he was remorseful
for, and he responded, “For the kids.
For my kids not having a dad and mother together. To grow up with.” The Board asked, “No remorse for Valerie” Renteria responded, “Oh, there’s plenty
there. There’s a lot there also.”
The Board
noted that Renteria stated that he never hit Valerie, and asked him if he had
ever hit a woman. Renteria initially
answered no. When the Board then asked
about the 1984 charges, Renteria said that he did hit that woman “[t]wice –
several times. Several times. I was drunk.”
But he stated that that was the first time he ever hit a woman like
that. The Board asked Renteria, “if you
didn’t do this crime, [the commitment offense,] do you have any opinion about
who may have done it” Renteria
responded, “I have no opinion at all.”
Renteria
told the Board: “Everything that I have
done to this date has been geared toward helping people. That’s what I want to do. I’m 54 years old. It’s not like anybody’s going to hire me to
go out there and build cars again or do any type of construction work. I’ve completed a course, a three-month course
in alcohol, drug counselor training. I
need to go to my practicum so I can start the process of getting certified in
that and through the Veterans Administration at Menlo Park, I can do
that. . . . But
everything I’ve done, I’ve done so that I can better myself.”
Jeanette
Standridge, Valerie’s younger sister, spoke about her family and asked that the
Board again deny Renteria parole.
Orville Richards, Jr., Valerie’s brother, also spoke and stated that he
believed that Renteria “should serve life in prison.”
The Board
found Renteria not yet suitable for parole “because he currently poses an
unreasonable risk of danger if released from prison.” In making its determination, the Board
considered Renteria’s history of crime and violence; his statements that he did
not murder his wife, which were in direct conflict with the record; the “cruel,
dispassionate, [and] callous” facts of the murder; and his lack of
remorse. “Mr. Renteria’s mental state
does not lend itself to suitability at this time. He did invoke his not speaking about the
crime, which is certainly his right. He
continues to state he did not commit this murder of his wife, which is in
direct conflict with the record. He does
not take responsibility for the murder in the face of evidence that convicted
him of this crime. He continues to
minimize his behavior and contradicts himself stating that he takes
responsibility and does not dispute the facts, but I didn’t do it. He appears as an individual who believes that
he can program his way out of prison, yet over the years the record would
indicate no real insight into the causative factors of the murder. He did identify a couple of triggers into his
violent tendencies of the past but showed no depth of understanding.”
“This was a
cruel, dispassionate, callous murder in the second degree. . . . Certainly, the victim was abused and
mutilated, having her head severed. Mr.
Renteria had a previous violent record and had an assault to commit rape four
years after his wife’s murder. . . . His
remorse does appear to be manufactured and would sound like what he thinks
others would like to hear. He had a
criminal history that included violence.
His insight is pretty much nonexistent and he minimizes this murder of
his wife, stating he did not do it in the face of some pretty substantial
evidence to the contrary. Mr. Renteria
has programmed extensively, yet a closer look at that programming finds he’s
doing program in things that he wants to do, not necessarily in things that he
needs to do and I think he said it best stating earlier that he decided he was
going to do his time, not let his time do him.
So his substance abuse programming is not consistent and he was unable
to advise steps in that very program.
Alcohol and drugs were prevalent with him and this was a concern with
the last Hearing Panel and continues to be a concern today.”
The Board
also found that Renteria had been “disciplinary free” during his incarceration,
that he had participated in numerous self-help programs, that his parole plans
were “outstanding,” and that he had marketable skills and “a multitude” of support. It noted that the Santa Clara County District
Attorney and Valerie’s next of kin opposed parole. The Board recommended that Renteria
participate in additional substance abuse programs, and programs on
alternatives to domestic violence and having healthy relationships with women,
and that he “develop the insight and develop those areas that are very
significant and are linked directly to the life crime as it relates to insight
and minimization and remorse that we did not see substantially today.”
The
Superior Court Proceedings
On October 28,
2010, Renteria filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the superior
court. He contended that the Board’s
finding of parole unsuitability was not supported by “some evidence” of current
dangerousness. Specifically as relevant
here, Renteria argued that the Board’s finding that he does not accept
responsibility and lacks insight does not provide some evidence of current
dangerousness. The court issued an order
to show cause on November 18, 2010, stating that the Board violated section
5011, subdivision (b) “by denying [Renteria] parole because he would not admit
his guilt.” “The Board in this case felt
entitled to require a showing of ‘insight and remorse’ which could only
be made if [Renteria] relinquished his right not to admit guilt or discuss the
crime.” “For any inmate who exercises
the rights of PC § 5011, . . . it could be said that he consequently has not
articulated his ‘insight and remorse’ to the Board’s satisfaction. The Board may not punish [people] for
exercising their rights.”
On or about
January 20, 2011, the Warden filed a return to the order to show cause, arguing
in part that, “[a] review of the record shows that the Board’s decision was
based on an individualized and thorough review of the evidence regarding
[Renteria’s] previous record of violence, inconsistent statements regarding his
level of responsibility and remorse, and lack of insight into his relationship
with women, a causative factor of his violent behavior. . . . [Renteria’s] decision not to discuss the
crime and his claims of innocence per se were not factors relied upon by the
Board to find him unsuitable for parole.”
Renteria
filed his denial (traverse) on March 7, 2011, contending that “[i]n finding
[he] lacked insight, the Board relied heavily on [his] refusal to discuss the
commitment offense, which it cannot do. . . .
[His] history of violence and the circumstances of the commitment
offense have no current relevance to a finding he would be a danger to the
public if released given the passage of time, [his] extensive programming and
his exemplary record while incarcerated.
More fundamentally, the Board fails to explain any nexus between its
findings and the conclusion [he] would be a danger to the public if released. Therefore, the Board’s decision violated
[his] Due Process rights.”
On March
10, 2011, the superior court filed its order granting Renteria’s petition for
writ of habeas corpus and ordering that he be afforded a new hearing within 100
days. “Penal Code § 5011,
1008, In re Palermo (2009) 171
Cal.App.4th 1096, 1110, and In re Aguilar
(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1479, 1491 [are] controlling law which the Board is
mandated to honor. As quasi judicial
decisionmakers, [citation] the Board is required to respect and uphold the
controlling law and to look past its limitations in an effort to render a just
and honest decision on the merits of the evidence before it. It is noteworthy that at the trial court
level cases like Griffin v. California
(1965) 380 U.S. 609 and Doyle v. Ohio
(1976) 426 U.S. 610 provide similar rights to Defendants. Neither subtle resistance, nor even grudging
acceptance, is an appropriate response to the applicable law by a quasi
judicial decisionmaker.”
The Warden
filed a notice of appeal from the superior court’s order of March 10, 2011, on
May 4, 2011. On May 31, 2011, we granted
the Warden’s petition for writ of supersedeas and stayed, pending this appeal,
enforcement of the superior court’s order.
The Parties’ Contentions
The Warden
contends that “the Board properly denied parole based, in part, on Renteria’s
lack of insight into the murder of his [first] wife and his violence toward
women.” “Because Renteria’s
representations contradict the known facts, and because he was not forthcoming
about his prior violence against women, there is ‘evidence in the record
sufficient to at least raise an inference’ that Renteria lacks insight.” “In addition to lacking insight into his
violent acts against women, Renteria also failed to address his
substance-abuse-problem. . . . As a
result, there is some evidence of his current dangerousness.” The Warden additionally contends that the
superior court erroneously held that the Board violated section 5011. “[S]ection 5011 does not require the [Board]
to accept as true anything the prisoner says about the crime. Thus, while an inmate cannot be compelled to
talk about the crime, if he opts to discuss the commitment offense, or
explicitly denies ever[] committing the crime (as Renteria did here), the
[Board] must consider his version of the offense to assess the extent of his
‘personal culpability.’ (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 15, § 2236.) And, in
evaluating a prisoner’s parole worthiness, the Board has the authority to
assess credibility, weigh evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the
record.”
Renteria
contends that, “[i]n concluding [he] lacked insight, the Board indirectly
relied on [his] refusal to discuss the commitment offense, which was improper.
. . . Furthermore, in the light of [his] exemplary record while incarcerated,
the Board never explained any nexus between [his] history of prior violence and
the conclusion ‘he currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger if released
from prison.’ . . . Finally, the finding
[he] has failed to address his substance abuse problem is contrary to the
evidence in the record.”
Judicial
Review of Parole Unsuitability Decisions
“The granting
of parole is an essential part of our criminal
justice system and is intended to assist those convicted of crime to
integrate into society as constructive individuals as soon as possible and alleviate the cost of maintaining them in
custodial facilities. [Citations.] Release on parole is said to be the rule,
rather than the exception [citations] and the Board is required to set a
release date unless it determines that ‘the gravity of the current convicted
offense . . . is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more
lengthy period of incarceration . . . .’
(Pen. Code, § 3041, subd. (b).)”
(In re Vasquez (2009) 170
Cal.App.4th 370, 379-380.)
The general
standard for a parole suitability decision is that “a life prisoner shall be
found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the [Board] the
prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from
prison.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §
2402, subd. (a).)
title="">[2] “[T]he judicial branch is authorized to
review the factual basis of a decision of the Board denying parole in order to
ensure that the decision comports with the requirements of due process of law,
but . . . in conducting such a review, the court may inquire only whether some
evidence in the record before the Board supports the decision to deny parole,
based upon the factors specified by statute and regulation. If the decision’s consideration of the
specified factors is not supported by some evidence in the record and thus is
devoid of a factual basis, the court should grant the prisoner’s petition for
writ of habeas corpus and should order the Board to vacate its decision denying
parole and thereafter to proceed in accordance with due process of law.” (In re
Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 658 (Rosenkrantz);
In re Dannenberg (2009) 173
Cal.App.4th 237, 246 (Dannenberg).)
“When a
superior court grants relief on a petition for [writ of] habeas corpus without
an evidentiary hearing, as happened here, the question presented on appeal is a
question of law, which the appellate court reviews de novo. [Citation.]
A reviewing court independently reviews the record if the trial court
grants relief on a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging a denial of
parole based solely upon documentary evidence.
(In re Rosenkrantz, supra, 29
Cal.4th at p. 677.)” (
1192; In re Criscione (2009) 180
Cal.App.4th 1446, 1458.)
In making a
determination of parole suitability, the Board must consider “[a]ll relevant,
reliable information,” such as the nature of the commitment offense including
behavior before, during, and after the crime, and the prisoner’s social
history, mental state, criminal record, attitude towards the crime, and parole
plans. (Regs., § 2402, subd. (b).) Circumstances tending to indicate
unsuitability include that the inmate:
(1) committed the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel manner; (2) has a previous record of violence or assaultive behavior; (3)
has an unstable social history; (4) has previously sexually assaulted
another individual in a sadistic manner; (5) has a lengthy history of severe
mental problems related to the offense; and (6) has engaged in serious
misconduct while incarcerated. (
unsuitability for parole may still contribute to a finding of
unsuitability. (Id., subd. (b).)
Circumstances
tending to indicate suitability for parole include that the inmate: (1) does not have a juvenile record; (2) has
a stable social history; (3) has shown signs of remorse; (4) committed his or
her crime as a result of significant stress in his life, especially if the
stress had built up over a long period of time; (5) committed the crime as a
result of battered woman syndrome; (6) lacks any significant history of violent
crime; (7) is of an age that reduces the probability of recidivism; (8)
has made realistic plans for release; and (9) has participated in institutional
activities that indicate an enhanced ability to function within the law upon
release. (Regs., §2402, subd. (d).)
“[T]he
foregoing circumstances ‘are set forth as general guidelines; the importance
attached to any circumstance or combination of circumstances in a particular
case is left to the judgment of the [Board].’ ”
(Rosenkrantz,
§ 2402, subds. (c), (d).) “[P]arole
release decisions concern an inmate’s anticipation or hope of freedom, and
entail the Board’s attempt to predict by subjective analysis whether the inmate
will be able to live in society without committing additional antisocial
acts.” (Rosenkrantz, supra, at p.
655.) “ ‘Although a prisoner is not
entitled to have his term fixed at less than maximum or to receive parole, he
is entitled to have his application for these benefits “duly considered” ’
based upon an individualized consideration of all relevant factors.” (Ibid.) “Under the ‘some evidence’ standard of
review, [the Board’s] interpretation of the evidence must be upheld if it is
reasonable, in the sense that it is not arbitrary, and reflects due
consideration of the relevant factors.
[Citations.]” (
212 (Shaputis II).)
Section
5011, subdivision (b) provides that the Board “shall not require, when setting
parole dates, an admission of guilt to any crime for which an inmate was
convicted.” “The facts of the crime
shall be discussed with the prisoner to assist in determining the extent of
personal culpability. The [B]oard shall
not require an admission of guilt to any crime for which the prisoner was
committed. A prisoner may refuse to
discuss the facts of the crime in which instance a decision shall be made based
on the other information available and the refusal shall not be held against
the prisoner.” (Regs., § 2236;
Thus, an inmate need not admit his guilt or change his story to be found
suitable for parole by the Board. (
However, the Board may consider the inmate’s failure to take full
responsibility for past violence and his lack of insight into his behavior when
determining that the circumstances of the inmate’s commitment offense and
violent background continue to be probative to the issue of his current
dangerousness. (In re Shaputis (2008) 44
Cal.4th 1241, 1261, fn. 20 (Shaputis I).) “In determining whether an inmate may safely
be paroled, it is legitimate for the Board to take into account that the record
pertaining to the inmate’s current state of mind is incomplete, and to rely on
other sources of information. An inmate
who refuses to interact with the Board at a parole hearing deprives the Board
of a critical means of evaluating the risk to public safety that a grant of
parole would entail. In such a case, the
Board must take the record as it finds it.”
(Shaputis II,
“[T]he
fundamental consideration in parole decisions is public safety
[citations] . . . .”
(In re Lawrence (2008) 44
Cal.4th 1181, 1205 (Lawrence).) “[T]he core determination of ‘public safety’
. . . involves an assessment of an inmate’s current
dangerousness.” (Ibid.) “[U]nder the some
evidence standard, a reviewing court reviews the merits of the Board’s . . . decision, and is not bound to
affirm a parole decision merely because the Board . . . has adhered
to all procedural safeguards. . . . This
standard is unquestionably deferential, but certainly is not toothless, and
‘due consideration’ of the specified factors requires more than rote recitation
of the relevant factors with no reasoning establishing a rational nexus between
those factors and the necessary basis for the ultimate decision—the
determination of current dangerousness.”
(Id. at p. 1210; see also
p. 214.)
“It is not
the existence or nonexistence of suitability or unsuitability factors that
forms the crux of the parole decision; the significant circumstance is how
those factors interrelate to support a conclusion of current dangerousness to
the public.” (Lawrence, supra, 44
Cal.4th at p. 1212.) “Accordingly, when
a court reviews a decision of the Board . . . , the relevant inquiry is whether
some evidence supports the decision
of the Board . . . that the inmate constitutes a current threat to public
safety, and not merely whether some evidence confirms the existence of certain
factual findings. [Citations.]” (Ibid.;
see also Shaputis II, supra, 53
Cal.4th at p. 209-210.)
“[A]lthough
the Board . . . may rely upon the aggravated circumstances of the commitment
offense as a basis for a decision denying parole, the aggravated nature of the
crime does not in and of itself provide some evidence of current dangerousness to the public unless the record also
establishes that something in the prisoner’s pre- or postincarceration history,
or his or her current demeanor and mental state, indicates that the
implications regarding the prisoner’s dangerousness that derive from his or her
commission of the commitment offense remain probative of the statutory
determination of a continuing threat to public safety.” (Lawrence,
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1214.) “In some cases, such as those in which the
inmate has failed to make efforts toward rehabilitation, has continued to
engage in criminal conduct postincarceration, or has shown a lack of insight or
remorse, the aggravated circumstances of the commitment offense may well
continue to provide ‘some evidence’ of current dangerousness even decades after
commission of the offense.” (
the prisoner’s demeanor and mental state, the circumstances of the commitment
offense may continue to be probative of the prisoner’s dangerousness for some
time in the future.” (
“[T]he
relevant inquiry is whether the circumstances of the commitment offense, when
considered in light of other facts in the record, are such that they continue
to be predictive of current dangerousness many years after commission of the
offense. This inquiry is, by necessity
and by statutory mandate, an individualized one, and cannot be undertaken
simply by examining the circumstances of the crime in isolation, without
consideration of the passage of time or the attendant changes in the inmate’s
psychological or mental attitude.” (
I, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1254-1255.) “In sum, the Board . . . may base a
denial-of-parole decision upon the circumstances of the offense, . . . but some
evidence will support such reliance only
if those facts support the ultimate conclusion that an inmate
to public safety. [Citation.] Accordingly, the relevant inquiry for a
reviewing court is not merely whether an inmate’s crime was especially callous,
or shockingly vicious or lethal, but whether the identified facts are
light of the full record before the Board . . . .” (Lawrence,
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1221;
Neither
section 3041, nor the governing regulations specifically list “lack of insight”
as an unsuitability factor. However, the
Board may consider an inmate’s lack of insight in determining unsuitability for
parole. (Shaputis II, supra, 53
Cal.4th at p. 218; Shaputis I,
p. 1202.) “The regulations do not use
the term ‘insight,’ but they direct the Board to consider the inmate’s ‘past
and present attitude toward the crime’ (Regs., § 2402, subd. (b)) and ‘the
presence of remorse,’ expressly including indications that the inmate
‘understands the nature and magnitude of the offense’ (Regs., § 2402, subd.
(d)(3)). These factors fit comfortably
within the descriptive category of ‘insight.’ ”
(Shaputis II,
“In
prisoner’s maturity, understanding, and mental state’ are ‘highly probative . .
. of current dangerousness.’
[Citation.] In
petitioner’s failure to ‘gain insight or understanding into either his violent
conduct or his commission of the commitment offense’ supported a denial of
parole. [Citation.] Thus, we have expressly recognized that the presence
or absence of insight is a significant factor in determining whether there is a
‘rational nexus’ between the inmate’s dangerous past behavior and the threat
the inmate currently poses to public safety.
[Citations.]” (
As
insight” into past criminal conduct can reflect an inability to recognize the
circumstances that led to the commitment offense; and such an inability can
imply that the inmate remains vulnerable to those circumstances and, if
confronted by them again, would likely react in a similar way. (Shaputis
I, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp.
1260, 1261, fn. 20; Lawrence,
1218.) Thus, the Board is entitled to
look beyond an inmate’s expressions of remorse and willingness to be
accountable and examine the inmate’s mental state and attitude about the
commitment offense to determine whether there is a truthful appreciation for
the wrongfulness of the act. (
p. 218.)
Nevertheless,
the fact that an inmate has not gained sufficient insight into the
circumstances of the commitment offense can be a proper basis for denying
parole only if it is supported by some evidence on which the Board is entitled
to rely. In In re Palermo, supra, 171
Cal.App.4th 1096 (Palermo), one of
the factors the Board cited when denying the inmate parole was his lack of
insight into his behavior that led to the commitment offense. In his habeas petition before the appellate
court, the inmate asserted, and the People conceded, that this factor was based
on the inmate’s continued insistence that the offense was the unintentional
result of an accidental shooting, and thus constituted manslaughter rather than
second degree murder. (
deny parole was erroneous and rejected the argument that “the Board’s concerns
about [the inmate’s] insight were appropriate and were not an indirect
requirement he admit he is guilty of second degree murder.” (Id.
at pp. 1110-1111.)
In reaching
its decision, the Palermo court examined
other cases in which the inmate maintained his innocence, stating: “Here, in contrast to the situations in
113 Cal.App.4th 315], [Palermo’s] version of the shooting of the victim was not
physically impossible and did not strain credulity such that his denial of an
intentional killing was delusional, dishonest, or irrational. And, unlike the [inmates] in [
[Palermo] accepted ‘full responsibility’ for his crime and expressed complete
remorse; he participated effectively in rehabilitative programs while in
prison; and the psychologists who evaluated him opined that he did not
represent a risk of danger to the public if released on parole. Under these circumstances, his continuing
insistence that the killing was the unintentional result of his foolish conduct
(a claim which is not necessarily inconsistent with the evidence) does
remains a danger to public safety.” (
In
the inmate had been convicted of second degree murder even though he denied
responsibility for killing the victim. (
involvement in planning or carrying out the murder and claimed that a secret
group called the Aces of Spades, of which the inmate was a member, had killed
the victim. (Id. at pp. 1016-1017.) Even
so, the inmate said that “he felt responsible for [the victim’s] death because
the Aces of Spades used him to get [the victim] to let his guard down.” (Id.
at p. 1016.) Although the Board found
the inmate suitable for parole, the Governor reversed its decision in part because
of the inmate’s “lack of insight based on his claim of limited
responsibility.” (Id. at p. 1017.) The
appellate court vacated the Governor’s decision on the ground that there was no
evidence that the inmate posed a current danger to public safety. (Id.
at pp. 1023, 1026.)
In reaching
its decision, the McDonald court
stated: “[L]ack of insight into the
nature and magnitude of the offense, is, without question, a proper factor for
the Governor’s consideration in determining whether the inmate poses a current
threat to public safety.
[Citation.] However, the
conclusion that there is a lack of insight is not some evidence of current
dangerousness unless it is based on evidence in the record before the Governor,
evidence on which he is legally entitled to rely. That evidence is lacking here, as the
Governor cannot rely on the fact that the inmate insists on his innocence; the
express provisions of Penal Code section 5011 and section 2236 of title 15 of
the California Code of Regulations prohibit requiring an admission of guilt as
a condition for release on parole.
[¶] The Governor’s finding in
this case is phrased in terms of McDonald’s denial of involvement in the crime;
he suggests no other basis on which to find a lack of insight. Were this sufficient, however, it would
permit the Governor to accomplish by indirection that which the Legislature has
prohibited. Had his statement of reasons
indicated that the Governor believed the inmate would pose a threat to public
safety so long as the inmate continued to assert that he had not participated
in the crime, reversal would be certain.
The use of more indirect language, yielding the same result, cannot
compel a different conclusion.” (
Here, the
Board concluded that Renteria remained a threat to public safety, relying on
his history of crime and violence, his commitment offense, his lack of insight
into the commitment offense, and his lack of remorse. “Thus, applying the legal principles set
forth above, we must decide whether ‘some evidence’ supports the Board’s
reliance on these factors to deny [Renteria] parole. (In re
Shaputis [I],
Shippman (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 446, 456.)
We find
that there is some evidence to support the Board’s reliance, in part, on the
“aggravated circumstances of the commitment offense” as a basis for its
decision denying Renteria parole. (
individualized consideration, the particular circumstances of an inmate’s
commitment offense may be a basis for finding the inmate unsuitable for
parole].) The record shows that Renteria
not only murdered his wife, the mother of his two young sons, he mutilated and
decapitated her and left her skull and jaw in different places in the backyard
of a residence, and her body underneath a sheet of plastic near a highway.
However,
even if there is some evidence to support the finding that Renteria’s murder of
his wife was committed in a cruel and callous manner (Regs., § 2402, subd.
(c)(1)(d)), such reason would provide “some evidence” to support the ultimate
conclusion and denial of parole here if there were other facts in the record,
such as the inmate’s current demeanor and mental state, to provide a “rational
nexus” for concluding his offense continues to be predictive of current
dangerousness. (Lawrence, supra,
44 Cal.4th at p. 1213.) As the
existence of a regulatory factor establishing unsuitability does not
necessarily constitute ‘some evidence’ that the parolee’s release unreasonably
endangers public safety.” (
factors the Board relied upon.
The Board
found that Renteria’s lack of insight and his current mental state regarding
his crime, in conjunction with the aggravated circumstances of the offense,
indicated that he remained a current danger to the public. The Board found that defendant lacks
credibility because he continues to minimize his behavior, he contradicts
himself by stating that he takes responsibility and does not dispute the facts
but he claims factual innocence, and his remorse “appears to be manufactured.” Some evidence in the record supports these
findings. Renteria initially told the
Board that he never hit any woman. When
asked about the 1984 incident, he admitted that he hit that woman but he did so
when he was drunk. He also stated that
he had never hit a woman before then, even though Valerie had reported that he
had beaten her while she was pregnant.
Although Renteria admitted that he could become violent when he used
alcohol and methamphetamine, he used his substance abuse as an excuse for his
assaultive behavior. He did not state
that he had addressed the issues underlying his substance abuse and his
violence against women in the numerous programs he had participated in during
his incarceration. On this record, the
Board could properly find that Renteria needed to develop insight into the
issues underlying his substance abuse and his violence against women in order
to decrease his risk of further violent recidivism.
The Board
did not require that Renteria admit guilt, nor did the Board hold his refusal
to discuss the facts of the commitment offense against him. (§ 5011, Regs., § 2236.) Rather, the Board looked beyond Renteria’s
expressions of remorse and willingness to be accountable, and examined his
mental state and attitude about the commitment offense, in order to determine
whether Renteria demonstrated a truthful appreciation for the wrongfulness of
the act. That Renteria stated in his
letter that he is accepting responsibility for his offense does not lessen the
fact that he refused to discuss the role his alcohol and drug abuse and his
history of violence against women played.
Renteria’s statements to the Board, considered together with evidence of
his history of violence against woman and his recent psychological report
reflecting that he has not gained insight into the source of that violence
despite years of programming while incarcerated, all provide some evidence in
support of the Board’s conclusion that Renteria remains dangerous and is
unsuitable for parole. (
p. 1260.)
In addition,
contrary to Renteria’s contentions, this case is more like Shaputis I, than it is like Palermo
and McDonald. In Shaputis
I, the court found that the facts of the commitment offense, the inmate’s
history of domestic abuse, and his psychological report reflecting his
inability to gain insight into his behavior despite years of programming while
incarcerated, supported the conclusion that the inmate remained dangerous and
unsuitable for parole. (
In this case, the Board discussed the facts underlying the commitment
offense in order to support the finding that the offense was cruel,
dispassionate, and callous, and Renteria insisted on his factual innocence
without discussing the facts underlying the commitment offense. Renteria also had a history of violence
against women and his psychological report reflected that he had not shown that
he had gained insight into his violent behavior despite years of programming
while incarcerated. Additionally, unlike
in McDonald, Renteria’s denial of
responsibility for the commitment offense was only one of several factors that
the Board relied on. Here, the
interrelation of Renteria’s failure to address his admitted substance abuse and
the impact it had on his violent tendencies, the circumstances of his
commitment offense, and his most recent psychological assessment, which stated
that his unwillingness to discuss the source of his rage increased his
otherwise low-to-moderate risk of violent recidivism, provide some evidence
supporting the Board’s decision, even if we do not consider the Board’s finding
of Renteria’s lack of insight into the commitment offense. On this record, we find that the Board’s
conclusion that Renteria lacks credibility because he denied responsibility for
the commitment offense in the face of the other facts in the record was not
unlawful or in violation of section 5011.
Accordingly, we conclude that some evidence supports the decision of the
Board to deny Renteria parole because he constitutes a current threat to public
safety. (Lawrence, supra, 44
Cal.4th at p. 1212; Shaputis II,
The order
of March 10, 2011, granting the petition for writ of habeas corpus is reversed,
and the matter is remanded to the superior court with directions to deny the
petition.
___________________________________________
Bamattre-Manoukian, J.
WE CONCUR:
__________________________
ELIA, ACTING P. J.
_________________________
WALSH, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1]
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
All further regulation references are to title 15 of the California Code of
Regulations.
