CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted Richard Allen of transportation of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)); possession of cocaine base for sale (§ 11351.5); resisting a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)); and destroying evidence (Pen. Code, § 135). The court found true four prison priors within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b); four prior convictions for violation of section 11352 (within the meaning of § 11370.2, subd. (a)), and a prior conviction for transportation of a controlled substance within the meaning of Penal Code section 1203.07, subdivision (a)(11).
Allen was sentenced to a determinate term of 11 years in prison.
Allen appeals contending the trial court prejudicially erred in denying his motion, on the day of trial to terminate his pro per status and again appoint defense counsel. We will find no abuse of discretion by the trial court based upon this record, which supports the trial court's view that this last minute request was but one in a series of delays and manipulation of the system by Allen. We will affirm the judgment.

Moises Rodriguez, a former police officer for the City of Chula Vista (City), appealed his termination to the City of Chula Vista Civil Service Commission (the Commission), which affirmed the termination. Rodriguez petitioned for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court of the County of San Diego seeking to set aside the Commission's decision. The Commission and the Chief of Police of the City of Chula Vista, Richard Emerson (together respondents), responded. The superior court denied the petition and we now affirm.

A jury convicted Lionel Williams of four counts of robbery and two counts of attempted robbery. The jury also found true that Williams personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the commission of the four robberies and one of the attempted robberies. Williams appeals, contending: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to properly inquire into and evaluate the prosecutor's reasons for excusing two African-American females from the jury panel; (2) there was insufficient evidence to corroborate his accomplice's testimony; (3) the court erred in denying his motion to sever the trial; and (4) the trial court's admission of field identification evidence violated his due process rights because the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive and unreliable. We find Williams's arguments unavailing and affirm the judgment.

Appellants Paul Weiss and Deborah Weiss, husband and wife (the Weisses), are the former homeowners of real property located at 1435 Logan Court, Escondido, California (subject property). The subject property is located within a 17-unit planned residential development called Citrus Heights Development (subject development) created by respondents Citrus Heights, LLC, and Trans West Housing, Inc. (together, developers). Respondent Citrus Heights Association (HOA or Association) is a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation that manages the subject development. The subject property at all times relevant in this case was subject to a Declaration of Restrictions (CC&Rs) that was properly recorded in May 2002.

In April 2007, defendants Austen Nunes, Pauliton Nunes, and Daniel Bonge[1] went with several others to the train tracks in West Sacramento to drink some stolen beer. When an Amtrak train came by, slowing as it approached Sacramento, one of the group stood on the tracks, and Austen threw a rock at the train. The train stopped and the angry engineer got off the train. A vicious assault on the engineer followed.

John F. Krattli, Acting County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services.
Petitioners M.L. (father) and S.O. (mother) are the parents of D.L., a two-and-one-half-year-old girl who was detained from the home of her parents by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) after her two-month-old sister was declared dead under suspicious circumstances. After an autopsy report concluded that homicidal suffocation was strongly suspected, the juvenile court sustained various dependency petition allegations, including an allegation that the parents likely caused the death of the deceased child through physical abuse. The court denied reunification services to both parents and scheduled a hearing for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) for D.L.[1]
The parents filed separate writ petitions challenging the juvenile court’s decision to schedule a permanent plan hearing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) They claim substantial evidence does not support (1) the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, and (2) the juvenile court’s decision to deny them reunification services. We disagree with both contentions, and deny the petitions.

Defendant, Juan Martinez Velez, purports to appeal from his February 1, 2012 post-judgment order denying his motion to set aside his nolo contendere plea. We noted that the post-judgment February 1, 2012 order may not be appealable. We then issued an order to show cause re: possible dismissal of the appeal. We have a duty to raise issues concerning our jurisdiction on our own motion. (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126; Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 398.) The post-judgment February 1, 2012 order is not be appealable. (People v. Totari (2002) 28 Cal.4th 876, 886; People v. Cantrell (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 40, 43; People v. Bowles (1933) 135 Cal.App. 514, 516; see People v. Thomas (1959) 52 Cal.2d 521, 527; 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2011 Supp.) Criminal Appeals, § 55A, p. 80.)

Plaintiff and appellant Syrus Parvizian appeals from the judgment entered in favor of defendants and respondents, the County of Los Angeles, and the State of California's Department of Transportation, on his complaint, after respondents' demurrers were granted without leave to amend. We affirm.

Alejandro Vasquez was convicted by jury verdict of assault with a deadly weapon and two counts of making criminal threats. He appealed. Our independent review of the record reveals no arguable issue that would aid Vasquez. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

Plaintiffs Theresa Theus, Jeffrey Gray, Anthony Hadley, Albert Noble, Daniel Pittman, Donte Rhea, Steven Green, and Willie Williams[1] sued The Cochran Firm, and Attorneys Daniel H. Cargnelutti and Brian Dunn (defendants) alleging causes of action for negligence, breach of fiduciary duties, and fraud arising from defendants’ representation of plaintiffs in a lawsuit against their employer, Parsec, Inc. Plaintiffs claim that defendants tricked them into settling their claims against Parsec by inducing them to sign a supposed confidentiality agreement at a mediation, and later appending the signature sheet to a settlement agreement.
The trial court granted defendants’ motion in limine to dismiss the complaint, concluding that because the alleged deception occurred during a mediation, the mediation confidentiality provisions of the Evidence Code prevented plaintiffs from proving their claims. (See, e.g., Evid. Code, § 1119.) On appeal, plaintiffs claim that because they did not intend to settle their claims at the mediation, this action is not “mediation related” and is therefore not barred by section 1119. They also claim that an attorney should not be permitted to commit fraud and avoid liability by “[hiding] behind the Mediation privilege.” Alternatively, plaintiffs claim that mediation confidentiality was waived. We find no merit in plaintiffs’ arguments and affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Ryan Amirant of one count of carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a))[1] with use of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), one count of felon in possession of ammunition (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1)), and two counts each of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)) and resisting an executive officer (§ 69). The trial court found true six prior prison term allegations (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and sentenced him to a total term of term of 22 years, 4 months in state prison. Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction.

Defendant Gerardo Colon appeals from the judgment entered upon his jury conviction of second degree robbery and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. Defendant contends the court committed reversible error in admitting evidence of a prior assault. We conclude the evidence was not admissible, but the error was harmless and did not render defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair. Defendant argues that the sentence violates Penal Code section 654. We agree and order the sentence on count 2 (assault) stayed. We affirm the judgment as modified.

A jury convicted Gary Dawson of six counts of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211),[1] one count of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)), and three counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). The crimes were committed during three separate incidents, on three separate days, each incident involving two victims. In a bifurcated part of trial, the jury found that Dawson had suffered a prior conviction for residential burglary; the prior conviction qualified as a strike and a prior serious felony (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d); 667, subd. (a)(1)). Also, the trial court found Dawson committed a felony while released on bail in another case (§ 12022.1). Dawson was sentenced to state prison for an aggregate term of 38 years. We find one of Dawson’s convictions for assault with a firearm must be reversed; we otherwise affirm the remaining convictions. We remand for resentencing.

Plaintiff, Southern California Residential Drywall Contract Administration Committee, Inc., has appealed from a judgment in a wage dispute in favor of defendant, MDP California, Inc. Defendant secured a discharge of the alleged debt at issue in the bankruptcy court. We issued an order to show cause re: dismissal in light of the bankruptcy discharge order. We have a duty to raise issues concerning our jurisdiction on our own motion. (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126; Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 398.) We requested briefing and set the cause for argument, which was waived. The discharge order renders the appeal moot. (11 U.S.C. § 524(a); Hurley v. Bredehorn (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1700, 1704-1705.)