CA Unpub Decisions

Joseph M. (appellant) appeals after the juvenile court sustained one count of felony receiving stolen property in a juvenile wardship proceeding (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602).[1] Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that the court failed to designate the receiving stolen property offense—a “wobbler”—as either a misdemeanor or a felony. We conclude the matter must be remanded for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion and expressly declare the offense a misdemeanor or felony as required by section 702. We shall otherwise affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

T.D. (Mother) appeals an order terminating her parental rights over her three sons T.D. (To.), born in August 2004; S.D. (Sa.), born in November 2006; and S.D. (Sh.), born in April 2008.[1] (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)[2] Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court’s finding that the Minors are adoptable is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm.

A modification decision.

Owen John Hardy (appellant) pleaded no contest to possession of child pornography. On appeal, he contends that the trial court was unaware of its discretion not to order or to stay the residency restriction requirement for registered sexual offenders (Pen. Code, § 3003.5, subd. (b)),[1] and that the restriction applies only to parolees. He also argues that the restriction constitutes unconstitutional punishment. Respondent is in agreement that the residency requirement applies only to parolees. We agree with the parties that this residency requirement is inapplicable to probationers such as appellant, and shall therefore remand the matter to the trial court with directions to strike the order containing the residency restriction.

Michael D. Srago and other individuals[1] appeal from a judgment of the Contra Costa County Superior Court filed March 15, 2011, in consolidated actions in which appellants sought a writ of mandate and also sought declaratory relief against respondent West Contra Costa Unified School District (district) and the district’s Board of Education (board) for asserted violations of the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq. (CEQA))[2] and the Ralph M. Brown Act (Gov. Code, § 54950.5 et seq.) (Brown Act). Appellants challenged respondents’ actions in choosing to retrofit Castro Elementary School as a new replacement site for Portola Middle School, after the middle school was determined to be structurally unsafe.

Dora Diaz was charged and convicted of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189, 664, subd. (a))[1] (count one) and three counts of criminal threats (§ 422) (counts three, four, and five).[2] Defendant was sentenced to a total prison term of life with possibility of parole consecutive to a three year, four month prison term. On appeal, defendant Diaz argues that the trial court erroneously admitted gang evidence and committed multiple instructional errors. She also attacks the imposition of a booking fee.
We find no basis for reversal.[3]

This appeal challenges a final judgment of conviction after denial of a motion to withdraw a plea of no contest.

Appellant, Kenneth Wayne Royster, pled no contest to a count of forgery (Pen. Code, § 470, subd. (d)) and admitted a prior prison term allegation and a prior strike allegation. After the court denied Royster’s motion to strike the prior strike allegation, it sentenced him to the midterm sentence of two years, doubled to four years for the prior strike offense, plus one year for the prior prison term, for a total of five years in prison. Royster contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to strike the prior strike allegation, and he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel in the presentation of that motion. We will affirm.

Defendant and appellant, Jeremiah Muhammad, claims the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. (Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. (8).) He also argues he is entitled to one more day of conduct credit. (Pen. Code, § 2933.1.) We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for new trial. We grant, however, defendant’s request for one additional day of conduct credit.

After gunfire hit a car driving through Ducor, a small community in Tulare County, a jury found Abel Julio Mendoza guilty of four counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, four counts of assault with a firearm, and one count of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle and found criminal-street-gang and personal-discharge-of-firearm allegations true.[1] On appeal, he challenges the judgment on three grounds. We affirm.

Defendant Benjamin Ramos Sanchez was accused of sodomizing his 12-year-old half sister. In closing argument, defense counsel conceded that the charged act of sodomy occurred. He argued, however, that because the act was consensual there was no force, fear, or duress.
A jury found defendant guilty of aggravated sexual assault on a child by means of sodomy (count 1, Pen. Code, § 269, subd. (a)(3)), a forcible lewd act on a child (count 2, Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)), and sodomy on a child (count 3, Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (c)(1)).
Defendant was sentenced to a total of 21 years to life, plus the usual fines and fees.

On Mother’s Day 2008, three mothers awoke to a horrific tragedy. Broken hearted, 18-year-old defendant Reyes Carrillo-Garcia stabbed his ex-girlfriend, Jennifer Carrigan, eight times and her new boyfriend, Steven Furtado, 35 times in Jennifer’s bedroom. The prosecution argued the murders were premeditated and committed while lying in wait for his unsuspecting victims; the defense argued he was guilty of voluntary manslaughter, not murder. The jury convicted him of two counts of first degree murder with the special circumstance of lying in wait.
On appeal defendant claims his confession was involuntary and his lawyer was ineffective for failing to request an instruction encouraging the jury to consider provocation in determining the degree of the murders. He also alleges a series of instructional errors. To preserve his right to a federal appeal, he raises three arguments he acknowledges are nonmeritorious in California. The grief occasioned by this case is unfathomable; the legal issues, however, are straightforward and without merit. We affirm.

Hollie H., mother of S. C., appeals from the judgment entered after the juvenile court declared her daughter a dependent child and removed her from her parents’ custody. Although mother does not contest the jurisdictional finding against father under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (g),[1] and father does not appeal, she contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the jurisdictional finding against her under section 300, subdivision (b), and that, in any case, the court should not have removed the child from her custody. We disagree and thus affirm the judgment.

The court found that eight-year-old J.A. was a child described in subdivisions (a) and (b) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.[1] Respectively, these subdivisions speak of serious physical harm inflicted on the child by a parent and of a failure on the part of a parent to protect the child from physical harm. The court declared J.A. to be a dependent of the court but the court found no clear and convincing evidence that there was a substantial risk if J.A. were returned to his mother. Accordingly, the court placed J.A. with his mother and ordered unannounced visits by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), examinations of J.A. by DCFS and individual counseling for mother.
E.J., J.A.’s mother, appeals, claiming that the evidence does not support the jurisdictional finding. We conclude to the contrary and therefore affirm.